00:12:03 <xmrscott[m]> https://github.com/monero-project/meta/issues/641
02:01:40 <knaccc> has someone mirrored the cryptonote white paper somewhere? As far as I can see, it's not on getmonero.org and cryptonote.org is not responding
02:03:25 <crypto_grampy[m]> https://web.archive.org/web/20201028121818/https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf
02:03:41 <knaccc> crypto_gramp oh good point, thanks
02:03:53 <crypto_grampy[m]> ;) 
02:04:10 <knaccc> i think we should really get it mirrored here: https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/
02:04:20 <crypto_grampy[m]> love that idea
02:09:45 <knaccc> i've also noticed that references from MRL papers are dead
02:09:54 <knaccc> e.g. https://people.xiph.org/~greg/confidential_values.txt is now 404
02:11:15 <knaccc> i guess it's not such a big deal given we have archive.org to the rescue
03:23:00 <crypto_grampy[m]> uh oh
03:23:01 <crypto_grampy[m]> https://twitter.com/zooko/status/1471665701848944644?s=20
03:23:02 <crypto_grampy[m]> zooko angry
03:28:11 <nioc> same old same old
03:41:36 <Rucknium[m]> This paper is quite good. It re-runs old attacks on Monero and examines how transparent transactions on the Zcash blockchain affect privacy of the shielded ones: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/593.pdf
03:56:41 <Rucknium[m]> I do agree that Monero's "statistical attack surface" is kind of huge. That doesn't mean that user privacy is necessarily subject to effective attacks, but rather that every inch of that attack surface must be thoroughly checked for weaknesses and fortified if vulnerabilities are found.
04:15:03 <shroomreactionar> Would love to see a based simple cryptocurrency which is also private. Monero is no that. I'm not sure it's even possible
04:19:42 <crypto_grampy[m]> <Rucknium[m]> "This paper is quite good. It re..." <- fun read
04:20:01 <crypto_grampy[m]> long story short... statistics are cool
08:46:45 <libre[m]> r
08:56:12 <Inge> shroomreactionar: What about a Monero with zec anonymity set, only shielded transactions, and no trusted setup?
09:01:12 <libre[m]> The only chain doing that has subpar devs. Can't trust them
09:04:13 <Inge> If there was a decent tradeoff to get the full anonymity set and no trusted setup, I'd expect MRL would be all over it
09:18:46 <libre[m]> I also believe it's new math. So it hasn't really been battle tested
09:18:53 <libre[m]> Its good for privacy coins to use different tech
09:19:12 <libre[m]> That way if the math gets compromised not all privacy coins get compromised
09:19:22 <libre[m]> The same way different cryptos use different hashing algos, etc.
11:19:29 <zkao> Test what you're paying for! Public testings of the atomic swap node is ongoing, offers from a market making farcaster can be found at farcaster.dev
11:20:00 <zkao> 2021-12-17T11:09:16Z INFO  farcaster_node::farcasterd::runtime] Swapped(127) | Refunded(4) / Punished(0) | Initialized(131)
11:20:45 <zkao> only 11 of those swaps aren't trades from the devs themselves :(
13:07:23 <Inge> It will be a bit slow in the beginning :)
13:57:23 <Rucknium[m]> <Inge> "If there was a decent tradeoff..." <- It's on "the list", but yeah it's not clear that it's possible at this time:
13:57:23 <Rucknium[m]> https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/94
13:57:33 <Rucknium[m]> "Private, untraceable transactions without ring signatures, but with acceptable tradeoffs"
19:35:27 <sethsimmons> Would love any reviews or feedback before I share this widely: https://blog.sethforprivacy.com/posts/dispelling-monero-fud/
19:41:13 <crypto_grampy[m]> <sethsimmons> "Would love any reviews or..." <- Would add something about L2's on Monero to the scalability- could mention the recent Monerotalk and that these are not necessary at the moment due to Monero's excellent L1 scalability, but are totally possible.  
19:41:55 <crypto_grampy[m]> i see the 'but monero can't do L2s' stuff occasionally
19:42:17 <crypto_grampy[m]> s/Would add something about L2's on Monero to the scalability- could mention the recent Monerotalk and that these are not necessary at the moment due to Monero's excellent L1 scalability, but are totally possible./Would add something about L2's on Monero to the scalability- could mention the recent Monerotalk and that these are not necessary at the moment due to Monero's excellent L1 scalability, but are totally possible and
19:42:17 <crypto_grampy[m]> being researched/
19:43:13 <sethsimmons> I don't run into that often but I'll work on adding it -- should already have some resources saved
20:06:12 <sethsimmons> <sethsimmons> "Would love any reviews or..." <- Pushed a bunch of updates based on feedback!
20:32:29 <h4sh3d> sethsimmons: FYI regarding payment channel the paper(s) mentioned is not feasible in practice (at least PayMo), you can see a discussion between me and kayabaNerve in mrl some hours ago about the problems
20:35:03 <h4sh3d> And I don’t remember him coming in the MRL to discuss about his paper neither for the atomic swap he released recently 
20:35:08 <sethsimmons> h4sh3d: Hmm, will take a look at back scroll 😢
20:35:29 <h4sh3d> Yeah, sorry for breaking the dream 
20:36:14 <h4sh3d> I’m sure we will see payment channel one day in monero, but not with the current protocol :)
21:53:44 <libre[m]> <sethsimmons> "Hmm, will take a look at back..." <- You can mention the inflation bug that wasn't exploited but also compare it to bitcoins inflation bug. Although that may be thorny
21:54:41 <libre[m]> I would move the infinite supply argument to the top. Since it is the most common fud 
21:58:18 <libre[m]> I would add to the argument about how the tail emission compares to the amount of lost coins per year that cryptocurrencies usually experience. Growing in theory, shrinking in practice.  (1.5% lost coins per year in btc)
21:58:41 <plowsof[m]> "wasn't exploited" - there is a 'script' somewhere that confirms this somewhere (not sure where but fluffy has to mention it alot)
21:59:24 <nioc> at some point there will be no btc left
22:00:04 <nioc> and infinite supply happens only with infinite time 
22:00:35 <Rucknium[m]> Yeah I though it was very nice how it could be verified that the XMR counterfeiting bug was not exploited. By contrast, Zcash could not verify that its own counterfeiting bug was not exploited, so they had to implement "turnstiles"
22:00:39 <libre[m]> "Monero mining is centralized" -> "Monero is centralized". Change the title, then also add the graph when China banned mining and compare how bitcoin hashrate shrinked and monero hashrate expanded.
22:01:36 * libre[m] uploaded an image: (846KiB) < https://libera.ems.host/_matrix/media/r0/download/monero.social/VWyFZhMLcGYmXGjbYxzBfscw/Screen%20Shot%202021-12-17%20at%2014.01.19.png >
22:02:40 <libre[m]> Having more hashrate means nothing if it can easily be located and turned off due to asics energy footprint and space requirements
22:03:52 <sethsimmons> Thanks for the suggestions, will review and update when I can 🙂
22:03:57 <Rucknium[m]> libre[m]: What is the graph of, though?
22:04:02 <plowsof[m]> Sarangs words on monero maybe relevant 'auditability' https://web.getmonero.org/2020/01/17/auditability.html 
22:04:12 <Rucknium[m]> What's the vertical axis?
22:04:39 <libre[m]> hashrate
22:04:59 <Rucknium[m]> How is hashrate estimated?
22:05:46 <libre[m]> There are multiple hashrate difficulty trackers on the web for different chains.
22:06:07 <sethsimmons> plowsof[m]: Yup that's already a linked resource 🙂
22:20:55 <zkao> h4sh3d and sethsimmons: i remember the paymo guy showing up, and i guess ukoe or i or kayaba gave him the bad news :|
22:32:25 <kayabaNerve> Definitely not me. I didn't remember this news regarding PayMo.
22:32:59 <kayabaNerve> The recent author appears completely unknown to us though