01:35:43 <m-relay> <f​reeross:monero.social> Rucknium: thank you, I will look into it further ...
03:44:02 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> This isn't (only) about Monero but inseparable from privacy efforts in the crypto space.
03:44:03 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> After the delistings, the main way to get XMR is by swapping coins obtained from a CEX to XMR.
03:44:05 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> This is a potential chokepoint because it's inevitable that a centralized instance is involved in this process.
03:44:07 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> Until now, the only two possibilities to go cexless are mining coins for yourself or P2P-trading. In practice, both is impractical for most people.
03:44:09 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> CEXes are always one law away from doing whatever authoritarian politicians deem necessary to keep control.
03:44:11 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> Part of their functionality can be replaced by DEXes but there is no effective alternative to using them as fiat on-ramps.
03:44:13 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> This is why I've written a proposal on how to create unstoppable, decentralized, permissionless and trustless fiat on-ramps. The main takeaway is that it's possible to decentralize fiat on-ramps with a mechanism I call proof of sacrifice. It works by destroying physical objects (e.g. bank notes) in the real world and minting tokens of equivalent value on the blockchain side.
03:44:15 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> The text is too long to dump everything here but the entire proposal can be found on Bitcointalk:
03:44:17 <m-relay> <m​incberan:matrix.org> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5498908
04:54:48 <m-relay> <j​effro256:monero.social> The devil is in the details of validation: you're going to need an actually solid, highly reusable proof of fiat valuation destruction if you want any real traction. To perform full node verification, I don't want to watch 10000+ hours of people destroying things and then trying to subjectively value the items destroyed
04:56:08 <m-relay> <j​effro256:monero.social> This basically has the same underlying trusted oracle issue that Chainlink struggles with on a daily basis: how do you verify off-chain data?
17:12:26 <azflin7> any message here???
17:12:50 <m-relay> <s​yntheticbird:monero.social> Messaging is useless
17:12:55 <m-relay> <s​yntheticbird:monero.social> why would you want to message?
17:13:06 <m-relay> <s​yntheticbird:monero.social> also yes there are messages here, plenty
17:13:30 <m-relay> <a​mmortel:monero.social> Prove it
17:13:46 <m-relay> <s​yntheticbird:monero.social> ^
17:14:10 <m-relay> <s​yntheticbird:monero.social> this is a message
17:14:17 <m-relay> <s​yntheticbird:monero.social> with mine and yours it make plenty
17:15:32 <m-relay> <a​mmortel:monero.social> I respect your opinion