13:28:00 <r4v3r23[m]> Ruckniumjeffro256: rethinking the outputsplitting, whats the difference between having only a single output in your wallet that you keep spending from, and splitting your balance into separate outputs thats arent merged (assuming you churn each output once after the split)?
13:34:29 <ofrnxmr[m]> You chain the change together 
13:34:46 <ofrnxmr[m]> The idea is to load the wallet with a bunch of unrelated outputs 
13:35:10 <ofrnxmr[m]> So if you swap into xmr, use 2 different swaps and get 2 different unrelated outputs 
13:35:27 <ofrnxmr[m]> (ironic)
13:37:17 <r4v3r23[m]> so having only a single output in your wallet still harms privacy?
13:38:05 <r4v3r23[m]> and if thats the case, does pocketchange really make it worse?
14:20:43 <ofrnxmr[m]> It does, because combining multiple outputs that were created in the same block is a far stronger heuristic
14:22:09 <ofrnxmr[m]> Theres a good chance that someone else will use your single input as a decoy, and depending on how long/short the chain is, the likelyhood of confirming the conncection is higher/lower respectively 
14:27:03 <ofrnxmr[m]> Meaning, there are likely many users transactions that use your input as a decoy. Less of a chance that you will select the other users real spend in your second spend, or that their second spend will select your second spend as a decoy. 
14:27:03 <ofrnxmr[m]> basically, the more you respend the same output, the stonger the correlation from a-z and the lower the likelyhood of someone else chancing onto a decoy web that competes or mimics your own. 
14:27:03 <ofrnxmr[m]> combining outputs, afaict, is far worse as it pretty much instantly doxxes the true spend as soon as you combine outputs 
14:49:32 <r4v3r23[m]> so this applies both to a single-output wallet and pocketchange
15:43:02 <ofrnxmr[m]> The privacy implications of decoys? Yes
16:29:17 <r4v3r23[m]> is there a graphic that explains this? i need to see it visually