18:21:32 maybe providing an option of sweep-pairs would be a good idea. its always a better idea to sweep 2->1 and repeat than everything at once. 18:53:32 This is how txs are (usually) formed by default 21:57:22 Why is Monero not using a DAG based POW algorithm like Kaspa to solve the reorg problem? 21:57:23 Kaspa POW: 21:57:25 Honest blocks reference each other ⇒ forming a dense structure. 21:57:27 In protocols like PHANTOM/GHOSTDAG, algorithms compute a “blue set” or “heaviest k-cluster” = the group of mutually referencing honest blocks. 21:57:29 Any late arrival fork has zero references from the rest of the DAG. It gets quarantined into the “red set” (rejected). 22:03:30 Any update on the results of this paper? Perešíni, M., Homoliak, I., Benčić, F. M., Hrubý, M., & Malinka, K. (2023). Incentive Attacks on DAG-Based Blockchains with Random Transaction Selection (No. arXiv:2305.16757). arXiv. http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.16757 22:03:47 > Several blockchain consensus protocols proposed to use of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) to solve the limited processing throughput of traditional single-chain Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains. Many such protocols utilize a random transaction selection (RTS) strategy (e.g., PHANTOM, GHOSTDAG, SPECTRE, Inclusive, and Prism) to avoid transaction duplicates across parallel blocks in 22:03:49 DAG and thus maximize the network throughput. 22:04:08 > The simulations confirm that greedy actors who do not follow the RTS strategy can profit more than honest miners and harm the processing throughput of the protocol because duplicate transactions are included in more than one block of different chains. We show that this effect is indirectly proportional to the network propagation delay. Finally, we show that greedy miners are inc 22:04:09 entivized to form a shared mining pool to increase their profits. 22:05:04 I didn't read this paper, but I read the abstract. 22:06:00 By changing the fork-choice rule from “longest chain” to “densest, most consistent sub-DAG,” honest blocks that are richly referenced by others in the network always outweigh any attacker’s hidden fork, since the adversary’s blocks lack those deep references. 22:06:01 - Honest miners’ blocks almost always get included (no waste of honest effort). 22:06:03 - Deep reorganizations beyond a handful of steps are nearly impossible, because the graph density of honest blocks “votes out” late hidden forks. 22:06:05 - Block rates can be much higher (Kaspa runs ~1 block per second now, aiming for 32/sec in future), since orphans no longer break consensus. 22:06:07 Not to mention converting Monero to a DAG would require a huge amount of time and labor. 22:29:03 Kaspa dev community has acknowledged RTS weaknesses. Their pragmatic fix is to only pay transaction fees once (to the first block that includes a transaction in the blue set). 22:29:05 This means: duplicate inclusions don’t earn more → incentive to duplicate vanishes. 22:29:07 Later confirmations on GitHub discussions around pruning dupes in mempool fee handling. 22:29:09 Not a “proof of NE,” but in practice blunts the greedy strategy.