09:20:25 pauliouk: do remember that depending upon what country you are in, this will also reduce how much goes to your pension, vacation pay etc 09:56:27 hey, does merge mining some other coin work with p2pool? 10:26:34 Last time I knew, no. p2pool needs to switch from a hash to a merkle tree root for some value I don't remember somewhere in the header, like Tari and TF do. 10:27:12 thanks, I vaguely recall it needed a change. 12:37:46 merge-mining townforge + tari + xmr w/p2pool WEN? 15:07:25 New GUI XMRIG+P2Pool miner, Gupax 15:07:25 https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/zqonn1/gupax_v100_released_gui_for_p2poolxmrig/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3 15:07:38 * New GUI XMRig+P2Pool miner, Gupax 15:07:38 https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/zqonn1/gupax\_v100\_released\_gui\_for\_p2poolxmrig/?utm\_source=share&utm\_medium=web2x&context=3 15:08:56 How much does it help for decentralization to mine P2Pool using a remote node? Does the remote node still control the hashrate? 15:12:09 Monero node is ultimately controlling everything 15:12:37 But if node owner will try any funky stuff, p2pool will start to complain a lot and spam lots of warnings 15:13:06 also, I don't think any single node can handle enough connected home miners to get any significant % of the network 15:13:28 it must be 10k and more connections 15:13:47 yeah I don't think epee is efficient enough for so many connections 15:14:05 OpenLDAP has been tested to at least that many high volume connections... 15:14:23 even if some node gets 51% of the network through p2pool and tries an attack, all honest p2pool miners will see it in their logs immediately 15:14:36 so it can't be done stealthily 15:15:28 as soon as a miner gets serious than just run a coupls PCs with gupax, they'll start thinking about their own node 15:15:35 *more serious 15:16:26 hyc btw some p2pool miners connect 5000+ miners to p2pool directly and it works 15:17:30 using libuv right? 15:19:10 yes 15:56:12 "even if some node gets 51% of..." <- Mmm not sure, if this actually catches on and hundred of thousands of non tech-savvies start mining, they may not care enough to change their node same way they didn't care about switching away from minexmr 15:57:16 or certainly won't react immediately (who checks their logs?) 15:59:11 But all the other tech-savvies will see it in their logs and alert everyone 15:59:43 sure, but how did that go for minexmr 16:00:06 it's an improvement nonetheless, but perhaps it should make users run their own node by default 16:00:08 minexmr didn't do 51% attacks 16:00:35 true but if it did would people have even cared enough to swtich? 16:00:54 I'm not sure, we are talking about many thousands of individuals, not large scale farms 16:01:11 individuals pay a lot less attention/care 16:01:41 oh, I totally forgot about one thing 16:01:50 all blocks found on p2pool are broadcasted to all p2pool nodes 16:01:52 * of individuals (with minuscule hashrate each), not 16:02:04 so you can't start mining an alternative chain in secret even if your node has 51% 16:02:12 because all your blocks will be broadcasted 16:02:32 it takes one honest p2pool node to prevent this attack 16:04:34 what? so p2pool can't act maliciously? 16:04:47 malicious node can still mine empty blocks 16:04:51 for example 16:05:09 and orphan all non-empty blocks 16:06:07 yes, p2pool architecture works like this: p2pool node finds a block -> sends it to other p2pool nodes -> they all submit it to _their_ monerod 16:06:09 yes but why I couldn't mine in alternative chain if it controls the hashrate? 16:06:33 because when you find a block, it gets submitted to other Monero nodes 16:06:39 so it becomes the main chain 16:07:24 oh! 16:07:50 so while they can create the blocks, they can't submit them themselves like a regular pool would? 16:08:13 no, block template creation and submission is done by p2pool nodes 16:08:48 Monero nodes only provide transactions to mine and some crucial data to build block templates 16:09:03 like current height, previous block, current block size etc. 16:10:44 ah got it, but why it takes a single honest monerod to prevent a chain split? 16:11:17 * single honest node (not sure monerod, * monerod or p2pool one) to prevent 16:11:25 * single honest node (not sure if monerod, * monerod or p2pool one) to prevent 16:14:58 >sends it to other p2pool nodes -> they all submit it to _their_ monerod 16:14:58 at what stage would a malicious block fail? how would an honest node detect it? and what majority would the attacker need to control in order to prevent an honest node from detecting it? 16:15:42 * > sends it to other p2pool nodes -> they all submit it to _their_ monerod 16:15:42 at what stage would a malicious block fail? how would an honest node detect it (and prevent its submissions) ? and what majority would the attacker need to control in order to prevent an honest node from detecting it? 16:31:11 it's not a malicious block, it's an alternative chain 16:31:25 if it gets submitted, and it has more PoW, it just becomes the main chain 16:31:44 "malicious" part is when an attacker doesn't submit it until the attack is over