00:09:28 Here's a working draft for a WIP PR to fix the decoy selection issue in 7807, I figure discussion here would be useful before submitting 00:09:55 * jberman[m] < https://libera.ems.host/_matrix/media/r0/download/libera.chat/5df598dae4b57dcf251f7450f5107a560fdb4aa6/message.txt > 00:10:33 ## Results of the fix 00:10:33 I simulated get_outs using the proposed fix, and plotted against the current: 00:10:50 * jberman[m] uploaded an image: (61KiB) < https://libera.ems.host/_matrix/media/r0/download/matrix.org/RZvJjmiXDfTFFblXwXZEYvwK/10%20block%20unlock%20fix%20vs.%20current%20%5B1%5D.png > 00:10:51 * jberman[m] uploaded an image: (31KiB) < https://libera.ems.host/_matrix/media/r0/download/matrix.org/ymgdZoeFNJmohvLpMXjaLYUX/10%20block%20unlock%20fix%20vs.%20current%20%5B2%5D.png > 00:12:10 * jberman[m] < https://libera.ems.host/_matrix/media/r0/download/libera.chat/0c3d44fcadf8feadeade84b049d5ca596e87ea4a/message.txt > 00:19:58 Sounds good to me 01:05:16 I originally had a commitment round for the challenge values, but reasoned that parallel execution risks could be mitigated by binding the inputs to the per-player values in the hash aggregation; I'm not entirely convinced 01:05:27 At any rate, the communication complexity remains high 01:06:37 FWIW the Lelantus 3 WIP protocol only requires private key shares in a single modified Chaum-Pedersen proof, which is straightforward to produce and can be done linearly 01:07:44 Downside is that like Seraphis, it requires a modified address format 01:08:17 (Disclaimer: Cypher Stack receives funding by the Firo project in part to develop the Lelantus 3 protocol) 01:09:07 We're still working on the transaction and ledger security model for the protocol 01:09:48 The new constructions are a parallel Groth-Bootle proving system and a modified Chaum-Pedersen proof 01:10:08 The security proofs for parallel Groth-Bootle are straightforward 01:11:08 and the Chaum-Pedersen security proof holds under particular assumptions about the prover statements that hold for the application used in the protocol 01:12:18 In theory you lose SHVZK under certain group element choices, but this would result in an invalid transaction anyway due to verification failures elsewhere in the protocol 01:23:42 Oh, should mention that there's also a version of Lelantus 3 that moves the private key share stuff from Chaum-Pedersen to parallel Groth-Bootle instead, but that's more computationally complex 01:24:26 Chaum-Pedersen complexity doesn't scale with input anonymity set size, so the Groth-Bootle work could be offloaded to a more capable device 01:25:50 I suspect that any protocol with sufficiently simple multisignature operations (and, in this case, linking tag construction for double-spend protection) will require address/key modifications (but don't have a proof of this conjecture) 01:58:18 My personal opinion is that a change of the address format is bad but not a nonstarter 02:02:14 To be clear, addresses can still occupy two group elements and be generated from the same types of seeds and private keys, but need to be constructed with different group arithmetic and used differently under the hood 02:17:51 my biased opinion is moving to Seraphis/Lelantus3/?? would be worth the investment in the long run 02:19:32 Address migration would be a huge engineering and UX investment, not to mention requiring action from users to continue receiving funds 02:20:25 But I agree that currently there's a bit of a brick wall in terms of useful future functionality (streamlined multisig, enhanced opt-in view capabilities, ...) 02:22:25 monero's no where near mass adoption, so in my view, frequent breaking changes are fine 02:24:57 Having complicated multisig worries me tbh as people actually use it now 02:25:49 Is there a good comparison chart between the three that's updated? 02:27:35 No, but I'll work one up for DEF CON 02:27:57 The new protocols are so new and in flux :D 02:28:28 boogerlad[m]: keep in mind that there's a consensus breaking change with the same addresses, and then there's "everyone needs a new address"... 02:32:08 very true, exchanges will take their sweet time to upgrade... 02:34:39 Well, not really... failing to upgrade with that consensus change would mean you don't get to play on the network anymore 03:47:46 Yeah this is the crazy part :/ 06:34:52 Should we set a MRL meeting? 06:39:32 might as well 08:00:14 We could try again to set a date: Next wednesday? 08:01:20 fine with me 08:08:06 Is there potential for a re-match between Triptych and Lelantus3 ? 08:14:28 sarang would you be available for a meeting Wednesday 4th? 08:20:48 re-match? 08:21:27 I'll join 😀, as long as it's not before dawn in my side of the world... 08:28:27 coinstudent2048: usually meetings are at 16-17 UTC, but it's flexible 09:45:34 where do these meetings happen btw? 09:54:39 Aqui! 09:54:44 (here) 10:08:06 While we wait for an answer from sarang: is somebody from core going to be available for a meeting on Wedensday? 10:08:34 binaryFate luigi1111 ArticMine fluffypony^ 11:34:12 Sarang: With the new address format be able to be functional alongside the old address format, similar to bitcoin keeping old address formats alongside new Segwit bech32 addresses? 11:34:27 *Would 11:35:02 If so, there is a precedent for this working 14:52:09 I am available on Wed 17:17:43 I am traveling to Las Vegas on Wednesday. Assuming no flight delay and reliable WiFi on the plane I may be able to attend after 16:00 until ~18:30 UTC 18:32:57 Nice. Let's wait for sarang, if he is in i think we have the numbers for a discussion 22:40:18 sarang: will lelantus3 be suitable for monero? afaik lelantas 1 and 2 had issues which made it unsuitable for monero 23:47:32 Lelantus 1 and 2 have significant limitations and issues with their security proofs 23:47:48 Lelantus 3 and Seraphis have similar structures, benefits, and drawbacks 23:48:10 (Disclaimer that the Firo project funds Cypher Stack research that includes work on Lelantus 3) 23:48:40 The size and verification scaling are similar to that of Triptych, but you get enhanced opt-in view capabilities, much simpler multisig, etc. 23:48:51 Downside is a breaking change in address construction 23:49:24 Note that Firo plans to use the name "Lelantus Spark" instead of Lelantus 3, apparently 23:49:25 shrug 23:49:56 Lelantus had some other "downside" but I don't remember it currently. 23:50:08 Lelantus 1 didn't support direct anonymous transactions 23:50:16 Lelantus 2 had recipient addresses in the clear 23:50:25 "self-spend tracing problem" 23:50:30 found it in the logs 23:50:31 Both had/have flawed balance proofs as well 23:51:15 Triptych has the advantage of nice compatibility with the existing codebase and address structure 23:51:26 was L3 changed since we last discussed so subaddresses can be supported? 23:51:50 Not yet. I asked if this was considered a priority at this time, and was told it was not 23:54:27 But some aspects of the design are in flux for efficiency reasons 23:55:09 Are there any competitors for L3 ? 23:55:26 UkoeHB's Seraphis 23:56:26 since subaddresses aren't supported with l3, does that mean scanning times for incoming transactions will be longer? (if implemented) 23:57:15 Scanning times would be on par with CryptoNote-type outputs 23:57:49 I'm not saying that subaddresses won't be possible, just that they had been considered not a priority for Firo use at this time