04:20:13 <Rucknium[m]> one-horse-wagon: Doesn't Moser et al. (2018) "An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain" do what you're asking for, more or less?
07:07:20 <Halver[m]> Actually, we discover some (many) horrors in the Monero blockchain thanks to heavy 
07:07:20 <Halver[m]> (and probably long) investigations, and only lately.
07:07:31 <Halver[m]> Maybe one doable thing would be to have volunteers realizing from time to time 
07:07:31 <Halver[m]> some specialy designed txs from various exchanges/wallets and, 
07:07:31 <Halver[m]> knowing themselves those txs, take notice of suspicious behaviour (eg bad formed ring).
07:07:45 <Halver[m]> Suspicious txs could then be collected somewhere (could eg be a github repo or thread).
07:07:54 <Halver[m]> If enough weird txs concern often the same exchange, this could be useful info for Monero users.
07:08:00 <Halver[m]> It's probably not easy to have such a collective watch organized,
07:08:00 <Halver[m]> but I wonder if it could be an interesting idea, or not ?
08:09:12 <carrington[m]> It's a shame that the only entities with that visibility of spend patterns are the big exchanges, and I doubt they will share their findings
08:24:50 <Halver[m]> I don't think we need to watch big patterns to notice that something is wrong.
08:24:52 <Halver[m]> eg, if there is some web-wallet which systematically forges bad rings, this behaviour could be catched just by making a tx sample from time to time.
08:25:35 <Halver[m]> s/eg, if there is some web-wallet which systematically forges bad rings, this behaviour could be catched just by making a tx sample from time to time./eg, if there is some web-wallet which **systematically** forges bad rings, this behaviour could be catched just by making a tx sample from time to time and dissecting this tx./
08:25:59 <Halver[m]> * something is going wrong.
15:38:38 <Rucknium[m]> Or "somehow" the decoy selection algorithm could be enforced. At one point enforcing at the consensus level was considered, but ArticMine suggested that it be done at the node re-broadcast level instead, which could be a nice compromise. See:
15:38:39 <Rucknium[m]> https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/87
15:53:38 <nioc> Halver[m]: it was gate dot io and was first noticed in 2018