05:21:18 <fundiswithsifu[m> How is RingCt compared to zk stark?
Advantage, disadvantage, difference
05:23:56 <Reuben[m]> Zkstark can support global anonymity sets and pretty fast verification. The underlying crypto is quantum resistant but need to examine the other components too. It's a lot more complex though but the main stickler is that proof sizes are like 50kB currently 
05:25:15 <Reuben[m]> RingCT has lower theoretical anonymity but good performance characteristics for a pretty well understood design. Needs to change in the long run though 
05:26:15 <Reuben[m]> I'm not sure if a full circuit has been designed for use in a tx privacy setting as a complete privacy protocol though but I may be wrong 
05:27:05 <Reuben[m]> I can't quite remember if proving times have been improved too 
07:38:05 <slave_blocker> hello
07:40:22 <slave_blocker> i still did not get it, im here reading the design.md of randomx, and it is saying that while mining executes 8 chained programs, the verification takes only 1 program? 
07:55:28 <slave_blocker> should verification not be exactly the same as proving?
08:17:53 <fundiswithsifu[m> <Reuben[m]> "Zkstark can support global..." <- Zkstark 50kB
08:17:53 <fundiswithsifu[m> What is size for ring ct?
08:22:07 <fundiswithsifu[m> Hope we can make transition easily when ringCt is insufficient
08:32:20 <sech1> slave_blocker it doesn't say anything like this about verification
11:00:30 <slave_blocker> ok thanks
11:28:35 <slave_blocker> my mistake
11:29:31 <slave_blocker> another question :
11:29:45 <slave_blocker> The program executed by the VM has the form of a loop consisting of 256 random instructions.
11:29:47 <slave_blocker> ?
11:30:21 <slave_blocker> if i look at :
11:30:24 <slave_blocker> https://xmrchain.net/randomx/2577259
11:30:45 <slave_blocker> i see 8 programs ...
11:31:24 <slave_blocker> or does every program have a loop (or more) inside it?
11:38:18 <sech1> each of 8 programs has this loop
18:11:39 <slave_blocker> is the loop identical in each program? What is the max iteration count?
18:35:32 <fundiswithsifu[m> Do monero lab plan to use zk stark on monero?
18:40:06 <hyc> zk starks are still computationally impractical
18:53:08 <fundiswithsifu[m> Then how do monero plan to be quantum resistant?
19:00:41 <Reuben[m]> There's an open research task for that already 
19:01:30 <Reuben[m]> https://repo.getmonero.org/monero-project/ccs-proposals/-/merge_requests/142
19:13:40 <slave_blocker> i heard that zcash had found a way, with halo arc to circumvent the "trusted setup"? Is this correct?
22:34:17 <fr33_yourself[m]> <moneromooo> "So close to nobody will buy..." <- Couldn't Russians use Tor to connect to onion nodes and process transactions while staying connected to the "larger" chain/network?