00:06:48 <blankpage[m]> So an attacker could mine maximally expanded blocks completely filled with a single coinbase transaction with a huge number of outputs? Might this have an outsized impact on the network? (E.g. on the ability of nodes to keep up with verification)
00:08:04 <UkoeHB> They would sacrifice the block reward, although it may actually be a cheaper spam attack than via txs ArticMine
00:08:39 <blankpage[m]> I'm imagining this technique being combined with the "big bang" attack and I wonder what the cost/damage calculation is with this
00:10:56 <sech1> If you mine your own blocks, tx fess become irrelevant because you get them back anyway (assuming you don't broadcast your transactions)
00:11:54 <blankpage[m]> It seems to me that having a consensus limit on coinbase outputs would inhibit such an attack and provide an upper limit on the number of miners which could mine on a p2pool instance. This would lead to several smallish p2pools, which might be good from a decentralization perspective
00:14:26 <sech1> coinbase outputs are very fast to verify - they don't use RingCT
00:14:35 <sech1> so there's no need to limit them
00:14:46 <blankpage[m]> I guess maybe self-spend transactions are heavier than lots of coinbase outputs though
00:14:53 <blankpage[m]> Ah ok
00:55:51 <UkoeHB> A miner trying to spam can just add normal txs with arbitrary fee
00:56:23 <UkoeHB> So it’s just being a miner that makes spamming more efficient
05:33:58 <ArticMine> Are we talking here a big bang attack as an add on to 51%?
10:24:14 <blankpage[m]> Not necessarily 51%, but just the fact that mining some portion of blocks could make spamming much cheaper in those blocks