06:43:56 chainalysis is so lame, 40 mins of over technicalities, just to say they used someones info that got leaked by unknowingly connecting to their node, outlier, its clever tho, they make it seem like its reproductible 06:45:19 we need some software for service providers to randomize IP addresses of their own so it cripples them, because they are tracking IP of fixedfloat etc 06:46:08 Seems changenow and fixedfloat are governement honeypots, they are either owned or controlled by them 06:46:28 https://matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/v1/download/matrix.org/TpHWyQRyUkShKiIdgFUmVBOb 06:46:44 FBI appears as reference for IP addresses 06:49:05 Its no wonder they are still standing, despite sideshift, coinswitch and cexs leaving..i think mexc to xmr is probably better, they werent on the list and plus i doubt theyd cooperate with fbi 07:04:07 You are aware that this video and the cases they show have their age, it does not necessarily represent where exactly they stand now? I don't think it means much if MEXC does not appear in this very video. Or maybe I totally misunderstand, and your post is an add for them :) 07:04:49 > chainalysis is so lame 07:05:10 What did you expect? No need to be brilliant if you can make your money by just being so-so. 07:07:37 And well, you could argue that the Monero dev community should build such tools itself, to conduct white-hat attacks on Monero and demonstrate where there is a clear need for improvement. In the spirit of the "Breaking Monero" series of videos, in a way. 07:08:38 Such tools rely heavily on information from potential hundreds of malicious nnodes 07:08:48 And direct data from CEXes 07:09:13 So while we technically write such tools, the infrastructure for them will be too expensive for the community 07:09:30 *can write 07:09:54 and there is no way the community can get access to CEX wallet to eliminate decoys 07:11:46 All true. Can you please stop to disrupt my brainstorming :) 07:12:14 With a well concerted effort, we maybe could play "malicious nodes and CEXs" with lots of volunteers on testnet, or a separate network like testnet. 07:12:27 *stressnet 07:14:34 but why 07:14:40 FCMPs arrive soon 07:17:44 True as well of course. Maybe soon that video will nicely document "The dangerous old times, before we had FCMPs, when bad people broke through our decoys", and that's it :) 07:19:50 they already talk about "good old times" (from their perspective) before D++ :) 07:20:09 Funny, just now jeffro256 posted some interesting thoughts and arguments over in the "No Wallet Left Behind" room that if we are not careful how we implement wallets with FCMPs we may run into similar possible attack angles like now with decoys ... 13:25:04 When are fcmps slated for? 13:25:20 2025 20:31:28 How does fcmps stop chainalysis ip tracking? does it extend beyond decoys? 20:34:55 FCMP do not protect against IP tracking. IP is already protected with dandelion++ which is live right now. Chainanalysis was able to track IP of transactions because these transactions were broadcasted to their malicious nodes. It is impossible to protect from this. You must always use a node you trust 20:36:55 also that isn't the appropriate channel for asking these questions. Consider #monero:monero.social or #monero-community:monero.social 20:45:37 With FCMPs, and wallet trees, the most a node you publish to learns about you is how many inputs you have to spend and which TXs you make. They don't learn which outputs you received (yet rings are small enough they can do analysis there) and can't perform multi-input EAE attacks. 20:46:42 It isn't a solution to malicious nodes, it just prevents contagion effects where they trace which coins you're spending and whoever you send to.