00:38:31 <m-relay> <c​haser:monero.social> re churning: given what we have already known and suspected about churning, the biggest question is whether it has a net positive/zero/negative contribution to privacy, and, if not zero, then what the magnitude is.
00:39:16 <m-relay> <c​haser:monero.social> in more practical terms: due to the suspected "manual" nature of most of the churning, and maybe even regardless of that (<- IIUC the new paper implies this), it may be possible to tell ad hoc (organic) and churning transactions apart *to a certain degree*. however, it seems crucial to know what this degree is. that, together with your threat model and your available resources for<clipped message>
00:39:17 <m-relay> <c​haser:monero.social>  churning, is what would yield actionable results.
00:40:06 <m-relay> <c​haser:monero.social> e.g. if the benefit is only marginal, churning may not make sense for most people, but the added "noise" may be worth it for some people with severe threat models.