07:14:17 Yes, it was one of my arguments. I didn't mean ring contamination, of course. What I meant is that it leaks details of a transaction you make with someone who has shared their view key. > jeopardizing others was one of the arguments 07:14:17 Consider this example: I have a friend, Bob. I want to buy $100 worth of xmr from him for btc. I send him btc, he sends me xmr. 07:14:17 If he hasn't shared his view key, BS only sees a btc transaction from me to Bob (I'm assuming here that our btc onchain identities aren't hidden). Maybe it was a gift, maybe I paid him for something else.[... more lines follow, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/zff_ueEKS2J4Y3JF ] 07:44:02 ^ this same scenario happens with IVK not just OVK 07:45:49 however > Such a tactic can be extended further. Say, a day later I send this $100 of xmr to Alice as a gift. If BS knows that Alice is my friend and if Alice has shared her view key too, BS can infer that the transaction may have come from me. 07:45:56 the linkage is already broken here ^, except if you mean account matching 07:46:21 they can't do the usual txo matching as you are doing in bitcoin example 07:46:53 post-FCMP++ that is. it could be you, it could be someone else, indeed if you send the exact amount back and forth (minus fees) you make it easy 07:47:01 > If Bob hadn't shared his view key, then BS wouldn't know what this transaction was 07:47:23 they don't know what transaction it is 07:47:54 remember. you can't tell the originating transaction and you have made new ones (and they don't have yours). the link is broken 07:48:25 you can probably make this a state flowchart annotating what information is carried across every step so it's clearer 07:49:51 I didn't try to correlate transactions onchain. Suppose BS considers that Alice has received a gift from one of her friends. Given no other info, it could have been any of her friends. Given the information that I've received the same $ value of xmr a day before, I was likely that friend 07:50:19 > Given the information that I've received the same $ value of xmr a day before, 07:50:31 they don't know this. they know bitcoin was transacted 07:50:38 and that funds left from the friend 07:50:40 Is it happening with IVK alone or with the IVK + KI combo? > ^ this same scenario happens with IVK not just OVK 07:51:08 you are making the correlation here and acting as it was then tagged on XMR, but it's tagged on BTC 07:51:52 hbs: you can view change back and such with IVK under legacy currently (though new carrot changes this for IVK) 07:52:45 They inferred that it was me who purchased xmr on the previous step. They don't need to tag xmr. They only need to know that I'm an Alice's friend who purchased xmr a day before 07:54:35 with carrot you can know a transaction happened afaik, even if it's internal, but not decode data or be 100% certain 07:54:56 I can do it a bit later > you can probably make this a state flowchart annotating what information is carried across every step so it's clearer 07:54:59 even if it's a special internal send, it scans with view incoming 07:56:38 just_another_day: but again, let's say it's 1 XMR 07:56:53 you then send 1 XMR to alice (you cover the fees) 07:56:57 this could have been you 07:56:59 or someone else 07:57:35 they have the timing from days before, but they could also have received it from someone else and they don't know if these funds originated from the initial Bob friend 07:57:55 as they can't do the walk back statistically post-FCMP++ 07:58:25 and assuming it's also just one-two input, also uncertain given it's recent on current 07:59:03 you can make a hypothetical and in this case they realized it was you as you had given them the information already on bitcoin 07:59:54 so, for your example, you have given them viewkeys elsewhere so it seems you were the black sheep all along > when I transact with my friends, I assume they wouldn't snitch on me to BS. 08:03:39 this can probably be discussed in #monero-research-lounge if they are hypotheticals 15:02:07 All I wanted to say is that full view keys (or IVK + KI for that matter) allow turning sheep into BS spies with little friction 15:02:44 It's also relevant in the context of 3rd party LWS providers 15:13:30 have you tried Zcash? I heard it's really good 15:13:39 :^) 15:14:13 ^ this is not constructive at all 15:14:43 all the constructive criticism, debate, and conclusions, have already been had 5 times over 15:52:32 whenever someone's name here is stance i can already assume their opinion will be worthless 15:53:23 the discussion will be worthless rather 18:20:04 👎 > <@just_another_day:matrix.org> All I wanted to say is that full view keys (or IVK + KI for that matter) allow turning sheep into BS spies with little friction