15:28:20 the average ZEC transaction fee has shot up as their price has appreciated, despite blocks not being full: https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/zcash-transactionfees.html#3y 15:28:20 Zcash uses a set minimum fee with ZIP-317. This further demonstrates the shortcoming of picking a set minimum fee that is supposed to be a sufficient spam deterrent. fwiw, I think Zcash knows this and wants a dynamic price to more closely fit eip1599 15:29:53 https://x.com/nuttycom/status/1977069453838811348 16:08:43 This is because they are using fixed fees in ZEC 16:09:12 The same thing happened with DOGE 16:12:19 The whole fixed block sizes and fee structure in Bitcoin type coins regardless of whether they are small block or large block is broken badly 16:17:53 In a large black situation with mostly empty blocks a free fee market will lead to zero fees 16:20:34 This makes the coin highly vulnerable to a massive spam attack. This is exactly what happened to ZCash with a 300x increase in the block size spam attack that lasted for a year 16:24:32 Monero's approach actually works very well to mitigate spam attacks while allowing for scaling to meet actual market demand. 16:32:25 How would Monero's adaptive block size work if XMR skyrocketed but demand didn't? Would that not result in prohibitively expensive transactions? Eg if XMR was worth $1 million today but block demand didn't increase/grow 16:33:56 My understanding is that the minimum fee in XMR would be unchanged and thus would be very expensive 16:35:46 The minimum fee in Monero is set by node relay not consensus. 16:36:21 We saw this before: https://www.getmonero.org/2017/12/11/A-note-on-fees.html 16:36:21 > So why did the significant price increase not lead to a significant reduction in absolute fees, i.e., fees in XMR terms? Well, basically, the factor increase in price was significantly higher than the factor increase in usage. Furthermore, the median block size needs to be constantly above 300 kB in order for the dynamic fee [... too long, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/gfP9wMcKVlhRdVh0 ] 16:38:02 There is nothing preventing you from running a Monero node that does not enforce the minimum fee 16:39:00 Node relay is not consensus 16:56:19 Maybe I'll make a mining pool that accepts txs sent to me directly and allows the lowest actual fee in that case (zero?). What's to prevent Cake (or whoever, this is just an example) from allowing their users to send XMR on "slowest" priority (mined by their pool only) for free (while space allows)? 17:03:19 This is similar to miners filling the block with spam, but this has the subtle difference that they would still be paid like 1 piconero or whatever 17:05:08 I guess technically nothing but it seems like Cake (or miners using Cake's pool) would essentially be subsidizing those transactions, as larger blocks propagate slower and have a higher chance of being orphaned, especially if they include never before seen transactions 17:11:24 suppose the fee discount was 50%, it would still be an effective marketing tool. "Use X wallet and save 50% on network fees." And the risks would be offset by the monopoly on these low-fee incoming txs (no other miners would have the ability to mine them). Obviously this is an extreme example to explain the potential risks. Ye [... too long, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/9Yv-wccKSlFBZUhZ ] 17:12:33 what's this hypothetical situation, again? price is high, so min fee is high, but block space isn't scarce? 17:12:36 My main point is just that miners have a financial incentive to set the minimum relay to near-0 17:13:18 @monero.arbo:matrix.org: Yeah, that was my initial concern I brought up 17:13:41 it seems like the community would just reduce the fee relay in aggregate, not just the miners 17:13:53 @monero.arbo:matrix.org: Moving the entire Monero economy to centralized regulated ledgers 17:14:56 This is what in effect has happened with Bitcoin 17:18:40 How is the price going to grow that much without any demand for transactions? The sov is already captured by corn and that boat has sailed > <@sgp_> How would Monero's adaptive block size work if XMR skyrocketed but demand didn't? Would that not result in prohibitively expensive transactions? Eg if XMR was worth $1 million today but block demand didn't increase/grow 17:19:22 @elongated:matrix.org: It can if the economy moves to banking type ledgers to 17:19:48 @elongated:matrix.org: The better question is "how do we know for sure, in the crazy speculative crypto market, that block demand will actually organically increase with price" 17:20:11 I mean it could happen, it just doesn't seem like a major issue. and what's the suggested solution? 17:21:11 @sgp_: Price isn’t going to go up for xmr if there is no actual usage, have you not seen last 6yrs of monero ? 17:21:37 Well one solution is to set the min fee to 0 which appears to already by implemented (node relay can be bypassed and there's a financial incentive to do so). But it does call into question the effectiveness of the other spam mitigation measures if the entire penalty free space can be filled for near-free 17:21:59 Elongated see this post > <@sgp_> We saw this before: https://www.getmonero.org/2017/12/11/A-note-on-fees.html 17:22:39 @sgp_: 2017 dec pump was a artificial pump by coral reef project which is short lived 17:22:51 I reckon it just means we need to be okay with the penalty free space being full 17:22:55 that's why it's penalty free, right? 17:23:29 Correct, we need to be okay with the penalty free space being full for no spam deterrent cost 17:23:53 Which ironically is the same as the "base space" in my proposal, ha 17:24:15 can you link your proposal (sorry I'm sure I missed it) 17:24:15 @sgp_: Provided the nodes do not mind spam 17:24:42 it's just the miner nodes who decide not my rando node 17:24:50 Only those nodes with zero fee get the soam 17:25:08 https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/152 17:25:15 @articmine: well they would get it when the block is mined.... 17:26:31 yeah the scenario is me, a spammer/attacker, telling a miner "please mine this full block with all my spam txs for $0.01". Technically the miner is financially incentivized to accept the offer 17:26:35 @sgp_: oh yeah I did read this. It seems broadly similar to what we have now, the part I'm skeptical about is the automatically increasing flex space 17:27:25 @sgp_: I'm not sure they actually are incentivized at 0.01c? is the logic that artificially full blocks pushing up fees for other users? 17:27:29 It is not 17:28:10 This simple proposal just does not work 17:28:53 looks like in ArticMine's latest, the initial penalty free zone is 1 MB? https://github.com/ArticMine/Monero-Documents/blob/master/MoneroScaling2025-11.pdf 17:29:19 It amin to bake into the Monero protocol the harm that t Blockchain Surveillance industry has done to Monero for the last decade 17:30:04 @articmine:monero.social: When you say "the Monero social covenant going back to the Cryptonote whitepaper" are you talking about the idea of having a fee market at all? 17:30:14 or something else 17:30:15 @sgp_: Yes FCMP++ transactions are 4x the size 17:30:22 That is why 17:30:54 @monero.arbo:matrix.org: Monero has a fee market 17:31:14 It always has 17:31:36 I'm not sure what you meant then 17:32:02 The penalty free zone is increased just by the last X blocks being "full," not based on the actual fees paid right? 17:32:22 @sgp_: ya 17:32:26 What I meant is fixed arbitrary limits that do not work 17:34:09 The latest is initial conditions based upon 30 year old Internet bandwidth 17:34:31 Which is in this simple proposal 17:34:35 How do we prevent runaway spam in the proposed model then? An attacker paying essentially nothing (but still >$0) to fill the initial block penalty free zone, which then expands the dynamic penalty free zone, which allows for more space and spam penalty-free, which allows for ... (the cycle continues). We rely on miners refusing to accept payment for the transactions to be mined? 17:35:13 well there is a natural limit where blocks don't propagate effectively and miners are directly harming their own revenue 17:35:42 @sgp_: There is a penalty for a reason 17:36:34 yeah but large past blocks allow for future larger blocks without penalty right? M(L)? 17:36:55 the large blocks have to be sustained, it shrinks if block size does 17:37:49 my point is that they can be sustained for like $0.01, not a meaningful financial cost 17:38:17 I mean, I could see an argument for taking into account how much fees are being paid in block size growth. we have something to measure against, the 0.6 base reward 17:38:32 but I don't think that requires reinventing the wheel, so to speak 17:38:35 I will respond to this simple proposal once I have completed the weight work for which there is consensus 17:39:50 this doesn't even have to do with my proposal, it's about how in your proposal, if there is no minimum fee, and if large blocks allow larger blocks, then miners are financially motivated to accept very low-cost spam. And then this low-cost spam allows for larger penalty-free blocks (more spam) 17:40:47 we would need to rely on miners rejecting payment for low-fee transactions 17:42:38 @sgp_: growing blocks does explicitly require giving up part of the 0.6 base reward, so fees paid on top of the cheap transactions still have to be meaningfully high enough to offset the penalty. it seems like in that case though, it would be more directly profitable not to include the zero price transactions 17:42:53 because you can still get all the fees with no penalty 17:46:22 I'm trying to follow; where does creating a block smaller than M(L) incur a block reward penalty? 17:47:02 in order for the penalty free zone to grow, you need blocks larger than the penalty free zone 17:47:16 which implies a penalty for whoever does that 17:48:37 Ok I'll take a stab at actually modeling that; you can ignore me until then 20:41:35 @sgp_:monero.social: I wrote a Python simulation for this which you may find useful: https://github.com/spackle-xmr/Dynamic_Block_Demo