04:40:53 <br-m> <jbabb:cypherstack.com> for a weak sort of security
04:40:53 <br-m> <jbabb:cypherstack.com> can I keep close track of every address ever shared publicly and always sweep from those to wallets whose addresses I never share externally?
04:43:34 <br-m> <jbabb:cypherstack.com> --not sweep, but rather carefully transfer each output individually and at as-random times as I can
04:44:39 <br-m> <jbabb:cypherstack.com> * and rather than 'every address', I mean: track all wallets/seeds whose addresses have ever been shared publicly
04:44:47 <br-m> <jbabb:cypherstack.com> like say in preparation for a QA
04:49:59 * br-m <jbabb:cypherstack.com> wonders what txs themselves provide to QAs
10:45:13 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> Zcash's ECC “quantum-recoverability” network upgrade is being audited and is slated for release in Q4 2026. The coin climbed 50% last week.
10:45:13 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> Monero can't tell users to wait years for Jamtis‑PQ when Zcash already has 'sellable' quantum secrecy on the table released. Monero should be able to offer clearer quantum secrecy messaging in the near future so it doesn’t lose users and funds to Zcash amid the Post-Quantum fears/ hype. 
10:45:13 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> So I want to quote myself here:[... more lines follow, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/vuWr1vgKVWMzdDIt ]
10:51:47 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> Many people that are afraid for QAs still think bitcoin is anonymous. It's good to bring them to Monero for a bigger market cap
11:18:01 <tevador> ixr3: "Quantum recoverability" for Zcash doesn't address any privacy loss caused by a quantum adversary. It's equivalent to the PQ turnstile that's already part of the FCMP++ upgrade for Monero.
11:18:23 <tevador> specs here: https://zips.z.cash/draft-ecc-quantum-recoverability
11:24:37 <br-m> <syntheticbird> me when misinformation have consequences on a market driven primarly by bots reading keywords
11:58:32 <tevador> xmra1m3m8kughq3ieswbmeajcd6tdgqwy5tndwitx42srrbnss7yg7i5wcrkeed6g1tp9edag4q9k1pkky7uruebad20j7h4ndh5h6uw67g1kcr9dm30gxqu7jdmj3kts8tximmw0gighpi8w6iaisgtwfck7p2tf7keej2fmeuu0n85xujf885fw5y7yq2katwbkymcag0xjm3qu7e34xqkhh5nc2is88by32a9twxat0yruk2i63mx1k4u79p38st6cksutiadd8n9pjgmi9drmypya6179i31mnxcmmkwyx6i453werr1adhipajxkdc4m7hqff8qna34k58ks6erhdma1a5y1qq5hjnm39f7x2jxe61bx7b28ctgepuuijpxcytfy2c3menacd57uck0bu3jj684qxx2pt7799tey0tqba050e
11:58:49 <tevador> Looks scary, but still fits in one IRC message.
12:00:15 <tevador> oops, doesn't fit
12:00:21 <br-m> <syntheticbird> huh akshually so far I've been looking and typing my addresses by hand
12:01:11 <br-m> <syntheticbird> it's so long to be typed manually without errors, at this point just use emojis
12:01:11 <tevador> The last 26 chars were truncated: bfp38gfd91rgs1fkgf26965iis
12:02:28 <br-m> <syntheticbird> i say its worth a try
12:20:43 <br-m> <basses:matrix.org> @syntheticbird: I wondered why I got kept getting xmr to my address without expecting any, thank you
12:52:35 <br-m> <syntheticbird> @basses:matrix.org: 🥲.
14:13:47 <tevador> What is the status of this proposal? https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/125
14:30:28 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> cc @jeffro256:monero.social @jberman:monero.social
15:05:07 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> I know it is. But it sells. > <tevador> ixr3: "Quantum recoverability" for Zcash doesn't address any privacy loss caused by a quantum adversary. It's equivalent to the PQ turnstile that's already part of the FCMP++ upgrade for Monero.
15:05:07 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> According to Jeffro, if I understood right, XMR transactions can be linked to each other with the current PQ turnstile implementation if some public addresses of the sender or receiver are known. This might be mitigated by sending money to a newly created wallet and keeping its public addresses secret. In that case, can we mix [... too long, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/g8Pj3fgKdVhQaDRS ]
15:05:07 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> With the carrot key hierarchy, users can churn funds to mitigate that issue. That story is easy to explain and sell to non-developers, regular users without deep knowledge that want to enjoy anonymity[... more lines follow, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/g8Pj3fgKdVhQaDRS ]
15:09:21 <br-m> <syntheticbird> @ixr3:matrix.org: 1. Just warning you some here hates the "we should make technical decision based on public relation" type of arguments.
15:09:21 <br-m> <syntheticbird> 2. The ability for a QA to compromise a wallet from a public address is stricly due to ECDLP solving and has nothing to do with the PQ turnstile.
15:09:21 <br-m> <syntheticbird> 3. There is no confirmation that an intermediate wallet is a suitable QA defense. Jeffro said he thinks, so i wouldn't count on a thought as an argument until it is being either proven or explained in full.
15:12:06 <br-m> <syntheticbird> s/compromise a wallet/compromise wallet's transaction graph
15:24:36 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> @syntheticbird: 1. I understand, it is how business works at the same time. The public is doing the funding and a bear market is ahead. As far as I understood its not a huge technical hurdle or delay in the core dev planning.
15:24:36 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> 2. Yes, that's why I said "might". You can't sell something unproven. Churning with the carrot key hierarchy is a proven-to-work solution right? As far as proving that is possible.
15:26:55 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> The last reaction was to 3. Matrix somehow marks it as 2
15:27:49 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> Solved that now
15:28:35 <br-m> <syntheticbird> Yes, churning is a proven to work solution and is detailed in the carrot document
15:34:08 <UkoeHB> @tevador afaik it's mandatory since there is no way to enforce timelocks without a redesign. jberman ?
15:43:36 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> I think the Monero developers and the research lab are doing great work. I'm very happy with all the developments. I'm also very glad that UkoeHB  is back. In my opinion he's very important. I understand why he wants to drop the carrot key hierarchy, but I disagree. I want a proven solution to protect against some QA attacks until Jamtis‑PQ is shipped. The more PQ secrecy now, the better.
15:45:10 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> Give the XMR users some temporary calm
16:09:45 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> The PQ turnstile without the carrot key hierachy seems weak and unproven when any of the receivers public addresses are known? That is very hard to avoid. Give the XMR users some temporary calm
16:19:24 <tevador> ^ No, the turnstile has nothing to do with the new hierarchy.
16:22:48 <tevador> The turnstile and Zcash's "quantum recoverability" both solve the same problem that is not related to privacy but gives the ability to spend old e-notes in a post quantum setting.
16:46:50 <br-m> <jwinterm:matrix.org> did any of the timelock changes for FCMP get implemented? Is there relevant code related to thus, or just issues discussing it?
16:47:50 <br-m> <jwinterm:matrix.org> re: discussion here: https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/129
19:45:12 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> tevador: Ok, I got that twisted up. I hope I made my concern clear.
19:45:12 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> "There is no confirmation that an intermediate wallet is a suitable QA defense. Jeffro said he thinks, so i wouldn't count on a thought as an argument until it is being either proven or explained in full."
19:45:12 <br-m> <ixr3:matrix.org> If this scheme is proven secure against transactions being linked in the future, I’m fine with the devs dropping the carrot key hierarchy. That said, I think it sells better if we add and can explain and sell the churning story.
22:25:13 <br-m> <kiersten5821:matrix.org> i thought as long as you churned once it was quantum proof
22:26:01 <br-m> <kiersten5821:matrix.org> no matter what
22:26:07 <br-m> <kiersten5821:matrix.org> need better docs on this
22:40:21 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> +1 from me for an updated Zero to Monero edition ;)