02:15:52 <br-m> <yushanren:matrix.org> is there lean language proof of monero?
02:37:37 <sech1> john_r365 It was Claude Code harness
06:51:50 <br-m> <monerobull:matrix.org> Lol > <@jpk68:matrix.org> The patch to fix the exploit was also co-authored by Claude
07:40:54 <br-m> <321bob321> Arsonist and fireman at the same time > <@jpk68:matrix.org> The patch to fix the exploit was also co-authored by Claude
11:56:30 <br-m> <fafo757badnewzcoming4u:matrix.org> Gosh I guess running ancient code is not that secure 
12:48:13 <br-m> <syntheticbird> I will still argue that PRs like vtnerd new serialization in epee is essential long-term
12:48:34 <br-m> <syntheticbird> after P2P SSL is merged i would be happy to see it being rebased btw
13:29:11 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> See what rebased, serialization or?
13:29:12 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Pr*
21:13:09 <br-m> <syntheticbird> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: yeah new serialization
21:14:42 <br-m> <syntheticbird> https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/8867
21:15:46 <br-m> <syntheticbird> oh its been rebased 3 weeks ago
21:15:48 <br-m> <syntheticbird> incredible
21:25:04 <br-m> <kayabanerve:matrix.org> Considering monero-oxide has reimplemented all the proofs thus far, and Cuprate the state transition, LLM historical review seems ill-founded. I think there's explicit questions we could further discuss the formal security of instead, or we should double down on FCMP++ reviews as it finally introduces an arithmetic circuit int [... too long, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/3pDKwooLOFcyZ0dl ]
21:40:22 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> @kayabanerve:matrix.org: Do you think multisig fits in here? As in, attempting to improve/standardize it?