15:25:20 <br-m> <sgp_> https://engineering.block.xyz/blog/predictable-rng-fallback-and-32-bit-reseed-in-coldcard-firmware
15:29:29 <br-m> <rucknium> Half of wallet critical vulnerabilities have to be entropy flaws at this point.
15:32:32 <br-m> <syntheticbird> @rucknium: thats good
15:33:17 <br-m> <syntheticbird> that means the core wallet library and the most popular ones aren't broken
17:40:55 <br-m> <thomasbuilds:matrix.org> Someone on X made a valid point that open source is useless unless people look at it.
17:40:56 <br-m> <thomasbuilds:matrix.org> Pretty sure this vuln was found with AI - it's good at spotting details that humans often miss.
17:41:37 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> coldcard isnt open source
17:41:39 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> so fuck em
17:41:50 <br-m> <thomasbuilds:matrix.org> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: it is?
17:41:56 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> its research-only or some shit
17:42:01 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> Yeah, I thought it was too
17:42:09 <br-m> <thomasbuilds:matrix.org> https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware
17:42:16 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> You can read the source, it just has some weird IP bullshit attached to it
17:59:40 <DataHoarder> tl;dr can't sell it, so can't make competitors for it (MIT with Commons Clause attachment)
18:00:17 <DataHoarder> the point is still similar, source-available, coinkite says they launched AI on it recently and found not that
18:00:48 <DataHoarder> along sgp_ link there is https://blog.coinkite.com/entropy-technical-backgrounder/ as well 
18:06:51 <br-m> <thomasbuilds:matrix.org> DataHoarder: thing is knowing how to use AI and knowing how to code are 2 different skills entirely.
18:06:51 <br-m> <thomasbuilds:matrix.org> Probably they didn't insist enough in the audit just asked audit the codebase - 1 prompt that's it
18:07:26 <br-m> <syntheticbird> Just like privacyguides used to say, being open source doesn't mean its secure (because people needs to look at it), but it definitely has more potential to be secure (because people can look at it). > <@thomasbuilds:matrix.org> Someone on X made a valid point that open source is useless unless people look at it.
18:08:54 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> brings back memories of mysu (predecessor to monfluo). nobody had the source code after the repo went offline except for r4v3r23
18:09:11 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> meaning, sure, it was open source, but also that nobody had ever even cloned it
18:12:10 <br-m> <sgp_> Schrödinger’s source code
18:12:55 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> it doesnt exist until you open the box
18:13:27 <br-m> <ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> and even then, it may or may not be dead / match the product being shipped
18:23:41 <br-m> <rucknium> Any opinions on whether diehard tests would have caught this?
18:35:22 <tevador> Randomness tests typically test the generator, not the seeding entropy.
18:40:36 <selsta> that reminds me, years ago there was a push to switch to libsodium or Bitcoin's implementation for CSPRNG in monero, but this never went anywhere
18:54:11 <br-m> <torir:unredacted.org> @rucknium: Seeing as it hashes the result of the bad RNG with SHA256, I don't think any statistical test could have caught it.
18:55:27 <br-m> <torir:unredacted.org> Unless testing was done before the SHA256 hash, I suppose.
19:29:41 <br-m> <rucknium> Anyways, I'm going back to dice :D
19:32:10 <br-m> <rucknium> I couldn't find anything about Coldcard having an audit done.
19:32:50 <br-m> <jbabb:cypherstack.com> https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/cypherstack.com/ErzAMayiLdRCchVBUGxhGPXR.jpeg (ima_a78cbcc.jpeg)
19:33:12 <br-m> <jbabb:cypherstack.com> reposting an image shared by a coworker--source isn't me, credit isn't mine
19:36:10 <br-m> <syntheticbird> @jbabb:cypherstack.com: https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/monero.social/dHzhGfxVRlSdZpxxKByHVBLM.png (image.png)
19:36:32 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> How stupid do you have to be to thing a PRNG is good enough for seed generation
19:36:40 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> s/thing/think/
19:39:37 <br-m> <rucknium> I didn't find that code block in the firmware repo. Maybe it's been changed already. But "ideal" turns up some "interesting" comments nonetheless https://github.com/search?q=repo%3AColdcard%2Ffirmware+ideal&type=code
19:39:48 <tevador> It was a bug in the code, the PRNG was not being used on purpose. They had an incorrect preprocessor condition.
19:40:53 <tevador> They used #ifndef MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG instead of #if !MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG
19:42:19 <br-m> <rucknium> I've seen similar comments in the Monero codebase, but not in the cryptography parts. Some of them are holdovers from the original cryptonote genesis.
19:53:14 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/1271
19:53:51 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> I could be wrong, but last I checked, this had not been fixed yet
19:56:08 <DataHoarder> jpk68:matrix.org: the entropy generator changed from intended one to this on one refactor, and even worse, the hw entropy kept being used on other stuff 
19:58:10 <sech1> what hasn't been fixed? That PRNG is secure and uses the same generation scheme as kernel RNG. It doesn't expose the full keccak state to the callers, so it is cryptographically secure
19:59:12 <br-m> <jpk68:matrix.org> I didn't mean it was a problem, I hadn't really looked into it. It just seems that nothing much has been changed there since the issue was opened
19:59:17 <sech1> tldr of that report - "it's bad because I don't like it"
19:59:22 <sech1> no concrete issues reported
20:00:11 <br-m> <syntheticbird> sech1 can you stop being reasonable ?
20:00:32 <br-m> <syntheticbird> fearmongering and sensationalism is very important for the health of twitter