09:42:55 <TimeWalker[m]> That idle thing is pretty annoying
09:43:24 <TimeWalker[m]> I always end up having Monero (OLD) pop up again as unread and clicking on "continue this conversation" adds me back to this room
15:51:45 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> can vouch for smspool
15:52:08 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> I have a ref link too but \:P
15:52:54 <cockliuser[m]> Oh the discord replies to messages don't show up here
15:53:21 <cockliuser[m]> *still don't \:P
18:25:18 <tired_turtle[m]> Does anyone in here know where I can purchase Wownero?
18:28:49 <nikg83[m]> tired_turtle[m]: Tradeogre 
18:31:43 <layter[m]> nikg83[m]: Thanks mate!
18:32:04 <layter[m]> Oops wrong account 🤣
18:33:47 <layter[m]> s/🤣/🤣🤦🏽‍♂️/
18:34:17 <plowsof11> nikg83: Thanks mate!
18:35:08 <L29Ah> plowsof11: no problem!
18:37:35 <ofrnxmr[m]> Your welcome 👍
18:37:53 <ofrnxmr[m]> * You're welcome 👍
18:56:09 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> Why do we need to prove that sum of inputs - sum of outputs equals 0?
18:57:16 <merope> So that no coins are created or destroyed out of nowhere
18:57:16 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> Why is coin destruction bad though?
18:57:17 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> If someone wants to burn their cash in a fire pit they can do that
18:57:37 <xfedex[m]> Yes, they can do that by sending to a non-existing address
18:58:12 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> But that doesn't mean the coins are out of supply though
18:58:13 <xfedex[m]> if you want to burn coins you are free to send to this address: 892HHTyDg5mJm5eWJWZ8L1ZMYnnWExciQFFkpsgLh1DfVUXfUFj6z1X2jDD2ZRQLiwWYskeyNkrtpAHse4M3G29uBfiYgVL
18:58:13 <xfedex[m]> :D
18:58:22 <merope> Monero's block rewards are tied to the supply, for example
18:59:47 <merope> xfedex: how original
18:59:47 <xfedex[m]> anyway Pedersen commitments work like this in XMR, why on earth would anybody want to find a way to modify them just to allow "coin burning"?
18:59:48 <merope> But in general, you don't want individuals fucking with the supply
19:00:52 <xfedex[m]> we are not BNB or similar scams which burn coins that are not in markets and pretend that it'll "increase price"
19:00:52 <merope> Because some people believe that burning coins will pump the value of existing ones
19:00:53 <xfedex[m]> only thing it does is decreasing marketcap
19:02:28 <merope> Spoiler: if the supply keeps deflating like that, then nobody wants to spend because they want to he the "last man standing" with the highest price. But if nobody wants to spend, then nobody actually needs those coins, so they become worthless
19:03:16 <merope> So randomly burning coins only helps destroy the flow of money, and thus the market
19:05:41 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> Wouldn't tail emission invalidate that argument though?
19:07:23 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> That last man standing thing is a really big problem with BTC though and all the BTC maxis parrot stuff like "we can implement some kind of emission we have time"
19:08:24 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> They'll probably never do that though, because they just get richer as it deflates more
19:08:55 <Rucknium[m]> Coin burning is probably not economically rational for Monero users. It is easy to burn coins: create a wallet, send to it, and then delete the wallet keys. Proving the burn would be trickier.
19:10:13 <moneromooo> unlock time to max block size (that's a lot of years IIRC)
19:10:34 <merope> bridgerton[m]: Spoiler: if they don't implement a tail emission, btc mining will be dead in ~20-30 years at most
19:11:11 <great_taste> some of us will be dead in 20-30 years
19:11:45 <moneromooo> Possibly all of us.
19:11:50 <RavFX[m]>  BTC could survive without tail emission.
19:11:50 <RavFX[m]> Just don't mine anything if average fee per vB is under 100$
19:11:52 <Rucknium[m]> moneromooo: And then create a spend proof to prove the _amount_ you "burned"?
19:12:01 <merope> (Along with a significant blocksize increase)
19:12:53 <merope> > <@gfdshygti53:monero.social>  BTC could survive without tail emission.
19:12:53 <merope> > Just don't mine anything if average fee per vB is under 100$
19:12:53 <merope> That assumes that someone will be willing to pay that much
19:13:01 <moneromooo> Sure. Or you can create an address with a view key which you disclose, and a public spend key of I.
19:13:11 <RavFX[m]> yep, indeed.
19:13:11 <RavFX[m]> Maxi will have to :D Or switch to a better tech
19:13:20 <moneromooo> Then anyone can view burnt stuff in realtime :D
19:13:37 <merope> Also, it implies that the $/sat price will go up to insane levels. We're talking several orders of magnitude above the world gdp
19:14:34 <merope> (Or rather: the market cap will be that big)
19:24:41 <DanIsnotthemanBr> Also kills whales when you burn coins ;)
19:30:59 <as2333> the claim that btc won't work without a block reward is baseless
19:31:41 <Rucknium[m]> It will work....just 51% attacked constantly
19:31:57 <as2333> another baseless claim
19:32:07 <as2333> also, there's nothing special about 51% hash rate
19:32:25 <Rucknium[m]> Except it's in the bitcoin white paper
19:32:42 <as2333> it doesn't say 51%
19:32:56 <Rucknium[m]> 50% honest hash rate is the foundation of bitcoin's security.
19:33:06 <as2333> no it isnt
19:33:13 <as2333> the paper says 'majority' IIRC
19:33:26 <as2333> but I can of course check =)
19:34:28 <as2333> "The
19:34:40 <as2333> "The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes "
19:36:08 <as2333> anyway miners attacking these kinds of systems make little sense regardless of how much hash rate they haev.
19:36:15 <as2333> makes*
19:36:27 <Rucknium[m]> I don't know what to say. That's just a restatement of a 51% attack
19:37:19 <dzwdz> hello o/
19:37:52 <dzwdz> i hope this is the right channel to ask - why does the monero gui forbid using simple mode on Tails?
19:41:07 <dzwdz> i'd assume many people have tails on a stick too small to fit the blockchain
19:46:56 <bridgerton[m]> <GenericMage> I can't remember exactly but I think he 51% was something he said on Bitcointalk. 
19:46:57 <bridgerton[m]> Also 0.1.0 was very easy to attack so long as you had 1 confirmation. That was later fixed, can't remember if it was Finney or Andreesan that fixed that.
19:47:10 <bridgerton[m]> s/he//
19:57:25 <merope> <as2333> "the paper says 'majority' IIRC" <- i.e. a simple majority, aka 50%+1
19:57:58 <merope> <as2333> "anyway miners attacking these..." <- So you don't believe that users have an inherent selfish incentive to doublespend (ie free money)?
19:58:13 <merope> If so, then why do pow mining at all?
19:59:51 <as2333> merope yes, but users are not miners. 
20:01:16 <merope> Users can mine. And when the hashrate will collapse to <1-10% of today's value, it will become very easy and cheap to do an attack using a fraction of all the discarded/sold off hardware 
20:01:24 <as2333> so the attack requires miners to make transactions and then revert their own transactions. And if that happens frequently, the system is fucked.
20:01:32 <merope> (Not a baseless number - actual math was done)
20:02:15 <merope> Exactly
20:02:39 <as2333> ...meaning, miners don't have too much incentive to fuck their own system.
20:03:30 <Rucknium[m]> But enemies of bitcoin do. Or anyone who has a financial short position.
20:03:45 <merope> You missed the part about all the discarded hardware, which they will be forced to sell since it won't be profitable to mine with it anymore
20:04:03 <as2333> yes enemies of bitcoin do - and they are the government - and they have far easier ways to attack bitcoin than a '51% attack' 
20:04:50 <as2333> merope it's not that I missed. I'm not taking for granted the claim that hash rate will drop to 1-10%
20:04:58 <as2333> missed *it
20:05:27 <merope> In this specific scenario, it's just a waiting game. The system is already fucked, they just have to wait 20-30 years until the base block reward drops low enough
20:06:19 <merope> Then, either the users will start paying massive fees (50+ $/tx), or the mining incentive will be too low and miners will be forced to stop (assuming an electricity price of 0.10 $/kWh)
20:06:30 <merope> Regardless of btc price
20:06:33 <great_taste> if one can buy mining hardware for pennies then mining becomes profitable
20:06:41 <merope> No
20:06:54 <merope> Profitability is cost of energy vs mining efficiency 
20:06:59 <as2333> I admit I haven't looked at the historical fees/block reward ratio. 
20:07:15 <merope> Hardware price comes in later, when you calculate roi times
20:07:35 <merope> But you can't have any roi if you spend more per kWh than you earn back from the mining
20:09:03 <bridgerton[m]> <GenericMage> Electricity costs are the main consideration, plus halving shrinks rewards over time. If price doesn't double every 4 years, a generation of mining hardware becomes unprofitable.
20:09:37 <as2333> my general comment is that fees would adjust to whatever 'the market' is willing to pay. If that means less hash rate, so be it. I'm not sure why that's a problem. 
20:10:23 <merope> It's a problem because at some point "less hashrate" becomes "less than 5% of the hashrate today"
20:10:33 <merope> And that point is higher than you'd expect
20:11:11 <merope> Even 1$/tx is quite bad
20:14:27 <sech1> Less hashrate in btc = more unused "dark" hashrate that can be bought up and used to 51% attack
20:15:28 <merope> Though it will probably just shift to BCH
20:15:43 <merope> But even that has its limits
20:16:05 <u221f> i think the risk of the 51% attack is exaggerated. just look at bsv
20:16:30 <merope> That's because nobody really cares about bsv
20:16:38 <merope> The point of 51% is to doublespend
20:16:55 <merope> There's nothing to doublespend if you have nothing to spend in the first place
20:17:01 <u221f> if hashrate goes down the market cap will also
20:17:08 <as2333> ok, as far as I can tell, during 2022 btc fees were $100k per day - block reward at 6 bitcoins is something like $150k
20:17:43 <as2333> so fees are 40% of miners earnings
20:18:13 <as2333> wait, wait
20:18:26 <as2333> 6 btc per block...
20:18:33 <merope> Just look at the $/second
20:19:11 <merope> Right now btc is paying 230 $/s to its miners
20:19:17 <merope> Highest historical value was ~1000 $/s
20:20:17 <merope> Right now the base reward pays for most of it
20:20:26 <as2333> hm so block reward is 19 millions per day? 
20:20:56 <great_taste> effective block reward is also proportional to the btcusd price
20:21:11 <merope> 150k$ * 144 blocks/day, checks out
20:21:39 <merope> great_taste: Yes, but so are user fees
20:22:05 <merope> Right now, base reward pays for >95% of all that money though
20:22:28 <merope> But when the base reward drops, eventually user fees will be paying for most of the reward
20:22:45 <as2333> fair enough
20:23:32 <merope> Even in the most extreme scenario where users pay 1 sat/tx (note per tx, not per byte!), around epoch 20-21 users will be paying for >50% of the reward  
20:24:01 <as2333> so I'd expect fees both fees to go up and hash rate to go down, absent block reward. 
20:24:41 <merope> And that's assuming that the price skyrockets to insane values, such that the total fiat value of the reward still maintains the $/s incentive of today
20:24:47 <u221f> and then PoW wars? :)
20:25:07 <merope> Sorry, epoch 20-21 was 1 sat/byte. 1 sat/tx crossover is a little later
20:26:27 <merope> Fees won't go up necessarily. Rather, users would have to willingly choose to pay more to keep the miners going. And if they won't, then the miners will drop off
20:26:44 <as2333> yeah
20:27:40 <bridgerton[m]> <GenericMage> BSV is extremely centralized, how they ward off 51% attacks is by having known miners whose chain of transactions are considered authoritative.
20:27:49 <as2333> so a fair amount of hardware may end up being useless. Whether it's used for '51% attacks', who knows. 
20:27:49 <merope> Right now we're in the order of 1-10 million asics mining btc. If users will pay 1$/tx, the network will drop to 50k-200k asics
20:27:50 <u221f> as2333: my thinking is almost identical with one exception: pricing energy in other than fiat (preferably in btc) would change all dynamics
20:28:02 <merope> That's a big drop in miners
20:28:22 <merope> u221f: No, it just changes the price units. Same dynamics applies
20:29:11 <u221f> merope: hmmm... in a post-fiat world?
20:29:25 <as2333> u221f I haven't thought of energy prices yet - that requires more thinking on my part =P
20:29:53 <merope> Money is money, works the same way. You pay for energy, and you need to earn more than what you spent in order to be profitable
20:30:46 * merope sent a code block: https://libera.ems.host/_matrix/media/v3/download/libera.chat/574f98248442b7768b87906127db99365ba0bf28
20:31:06 <merope> Here's an idea. This is the situation right now for a broad sample of btc hardware
20:31:37 <merope> The second to last column ($/kWh) is how much it earns right now, given its efficiency
20:32:01 <merope> In other words, you'd nees to pay less than that for your electricity in order to be profitable 
20:35:15 <merope> The mining incentive determines the maximum hashrate that you can pay for, at a given efficiency 
20:35:32 <merope> (And a given electricity price)
20:36:33 <merope> I typically assume a reference value of 0.10 $/kWh, to make math simpler
20:36:36 <as2333> merope do you think the majority of btc miners will end up losing money? 
20:36:59 <merope> When we get to that point, yes
20:37:21 <as2333> so far, block reward has been going down, and hash rate has increased
20:38:18 <merope> If user transactions have to pay for miners, and there's a maximum limit to how many transactions you can fit in a block, it follows that the incentive has to be shared among a limited number of transactions 
20:38:36 <merope> Because the overall incentive has stayed high
20:39:39 <merope> Easy example: when block reward goes to 0, to maintain 200 $/s at 7 tx/s, you have to pay 28.57 $/tx to keep the incentive up
20:40:35 <merope> Working backwards, you can calculate how much % of the block reward is paid by the users (in sat/byte or sat/tx) in each epoch
20:41:47 <as2333> yes - ok, so block reward has remained high in dollars because of btc price increase.
20:41:51 <merope> Additionally, you can ask: "How high would btc price have to be, in order to pay X $/tx at a given sat/byte fee level? And how high would the market cap be, at that price?"
20:42:12 <as2333> what do you get? =)
20:42:57 <merope> And you will find that lower fee levels (1 sat/byte, 1 sat/tx) push the crossover point further away in time, but would eventually require the mcap to be 10^6-10^9 times higher than global gdp
20:42:58 <as2333> still, even if btc goes up a lot more, transaction fees would be objectively expensive. 
20:43:34 <merope> Whereas higher fee/byte levels make the mcap situation more reasonable, but push the crossover point much sooner 
20:44:12 <merope> Tx fees would stay "the same" regardless of sat/byte fee level
20:45:11 <merope> You'd still have to pay 30 $/tx, whether it's 1 sat/tx @ 1 bajillion dollars/btc, or 10 sat/byte @ 100k dollars/btc
20:45:38 <merope> (Don't recall the exact numbers)
20:46:09 <as2333> yes, so given the current hash rate, transactions would cost $30
20:46:24 <merope> *current mining incentive
20:46:35 <merope> [$/s]
20:46:52 <merope> Nethash follows that value
20:47:20 <merope> But yes
20:49:25 <as2333> well, my guess then is that hash rate will probably go down - whether the unused hardware would be then used to try to do doublespends, I don't know.  
20:50:13 <merope> Even worse: this entire calculation assumes that blocks are always full with standard transactions (in order to actually have 7 tps). If there are fewer bigger transactions, or there aren't enough txes to keep blocks full, then users would have to pay even more per tx
20:53:19 <merope> Dynamic blocksize and tail emission solve this issue
20:53:30 <as2333> merope do you think a question like "how much hash rate is needed for 'security'" can be answered?
20:54:37 <merope> Sort of. It's not about absolute hashrate, but relative hashrate
20:55:24 <merope> If the hashrate is spread among a "large enough" number of miners, and a new miner would have to spend a "large enough" amount of money to obtain a "significant" percentage of nethash, then the system can be considered secure
20:55:43 <merope> I have not yet worked out in detail how big those numbers would be, exactly 
20:56:53 <merope> But for reference, btc is currently mined by ~1-10M asics. Eth, towards the end, was mined by ~5-20M gpus. Monero is ~100k-1M cpus
20:57:52 <merope> And to acquire 50% of nethash, it would take several billions of $ (assuming the cost of new hardware)
20:59:24 <merope> Sorry, not 50% - if you're bringing fresh hardware, you need to at least match the nethash, so 100%
20:59:30 <merope> Which would mean that an attacker would need to pull off a massive doublespend in order to profit from the attack
20:59:55 <as2333> I still don't think that doublespends of that kind make sense.
21:00:24 <merope> Also: unless you can source extremely cheap hardware, the main cost of the attack is the hardware itself - the energy and other costs are negligible in comparison, even for a prolonged attack
21:00:52 <merope> (I actually want to estimate the optimal attack scenario in a future paper)
21:02:02 <merope> as2333: Of course, a doublespend of that magnitude is not realistic - which is why we can safely say that it's not going to happen, and that any smaller attack is not worth doing. But when nethash drops low enough, smaller attacks become much more feasible
21:03:01 <merope> Especially if cheap hardware is just laying around, collecting dust in a warehouse full of doorstops and paperweights, and the owners hope to recover some of its cost by selling it off
21:06:16 <as2333> sooo, the btc party line may be that yes, onchain transactions will be rather expensive, but most traffic will go through the lightning network. 
21:06:36 <merope> Nope
21:07:50 <merope> Because lightning is a L2. Can't have a functional L2, if L1 breaks down
21:08:00 <merope> And even if enough people keep paying for L1 to work, L2 would still be expensive af unless you do thousands of txes between channel open and channel settlement
21:08:02 <as2333> well, I'm not saying that's what will happen =P - but it's a standard reply I think
21:08:41 <merope> Sure, but then you instantly know that whoever said it is fucking clueless :D
21:09:00 <as2333> well L1 wouldn't break down because txs would be a lot more expensive
21:09:43 <merope> "Would" is incorrect, because it implies causality
21:09:48 <merope> You can't force users to pay more 
21:10:04 <merope> But if they don't, then the system breaks
21:10:24 <as2333> yeah - I'm assuming they will pay more because it makes sense
21:11:21 <as2333> say, open/close a channel per year at $60
21:11:34 <merope> Does it, though? Pay tens of dollars to feed a bunch of miners and pray that your financial system doesn't break down, vs moving to a system that has fixed this issue at its core
21:12:10 <merope> Then you need to do 1000 txes/year in order to pay 0.06 $/tx average
21:14:44 <merope> Gotta go - will reply later if you have more thoughts/questions
21:15:01 <as2333> ok, thanks for the chat =)
21:15:38 <merope> Oh btw - found the link I wanted to send earlier: https://moneroj.net/securitybudget/
21:37:52 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> Currently mining on an Antminer S19 Pro (no 1 in buzzfeed-like best ASIC lists) costs $90000 "per block"
21:39:49 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> "Decentralised finance" with $50 fees to transfer money lol
21:40:37 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> Some maxis unironically advocate for "custodial solutions" in the future
21:41:15 <moneromooo> Use Bitcoin, end up in custody ?
21:43:26 <bridgerton[m]> <᷾s> But hey, atleast they let you keep your Bitcoin t-shirts \:P
21:48:46 <great_taste> how is monero any better in that regard?
22:11:49 <CopenhagenBram[m> In what regard?
22:19:37 <nioc> seems I found the btc channel
22:20:36 <levinster82> lol