18:18:47 Anyone for the above? 🙏 18:20:36 edge7: Did you read this? https://reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/12kv5m0/empirical_privacy_impact_of_mordinals_monero_nfts/ 18:59:36 The problem with your question is xyproblem.info 18:59:49 Youll need to reword it if you want a proper response 19:07:23 I read now the article posted by Rucknium and also this: 19:07:23 https://medium.com/@JEhrenhofer/lets-stop-using-coinbase-outputs-da672ca75d43 19:07:23 Which is still by Justin. 19:07:24 I think I got the point that if a user selects coinbase transactions as decoy it is easy to say those are decoys. I think Justin is pointing out a different problem, which is about excluding decoys from a public pool transactions in particular circumstances 19:08:55 I am quoting from the medium article posted above : 19:08:56 For instance, suppose a pool mines block A and receives its associated coinbase output, value 1 XMR. It then pays out 0.5 XMR to one miner. The pool creates a transaction with two outputs, each for 0.5 XMR. The pool receives this change output, and it publishes this payout transaction for others to see. 19:08:56 Initially, users do not know which of the outputs is a change output. However, if a pool later creates a transaction spending it, then users know that the output was spent in that transaction. It could not have been spent in any others where it is used as a decoy. We need to prevent this from happening. 19:09:57 edge7: Here's more. Check the references at the bottom, too: https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/109 19:14:47 Thanks. 19:14:47 But am wrong or Justin is pointing to a different problem? The possibility to mark outputs from mining pool as real spend which then will reduce the real ring size of any other transactions that include that output ad decoy? 19:14:55 Thanks. 19:14:55 But am wrong or Justin is pointing to a different problem? The possibility to mark outputs from mining pool as real spend which then will reduce the real ring size of any other transactions that include that output as decoy? 19:17:05 But how do you *actually* know that output was spent in that second transaction? 19:17:07 Don't forget that it will still be part of a ring 19:18:34 endor00: in the video it is explained a bit better. Skip to around 11 minute 22:02:51 The problem is how mining pools publicly reveal information which is enough to deduce real spends and change 22:05:57 Hi Justin as you are around, could you elaborate a bit more also considering the last 3/4 messages? That would be highly appreciated, cheers 22:06:51 Sorry, idk if it's just been a long day for me so it's hard to focus, but it's hard for me to really provide a direct answer :/ 22:07:01 https://matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/v1/download/magicgrants.org/3060af7fd6d03f83076bd7e2380d39c3ae7d05cf 22:07:34 here's a presentation I made for MRL back in 2018, maybe it'll help. It's a deck that showcases a bunch of mitigation options, as well as various pros and cons 22:09:08 fwiw, this probably isn't easy reading. It was made for a very specific context in time :) 22:09:27 it wasn't polished like the breaking monero episode 22:13:30 It might be helpful to approach coinbase outputs and non-coinbase outputs held by pools differently 22:14:27 slides 11-15 are probably the most important 22:15:44 My only doubt is that in that episode you are pointing to a different problem than just coin base transaction. But focusing on the fact that a further transaction from the pool could reveal the real output that then can be excluded from a ring size done by ANY user in the future. And if this happens frequently the ring size decreases indirectly 22:18:54 sides 11-15 walk through a possible mitigation for pools' subsequent histories 22:20:04 I found it was important to build a web of pool transaction outputs, coinbase and not, to see which outputs could be highly associated with the pool based on certain activities. Then, I played around with different activities to see what protected the pool miners and other unaffiliated users the most 22:20:33 If you have more specific questions or if I knew what you needed help with, that would help me better answer your question 22:29:17 I am just looking for some take aways. I have 2 for now : 22:29:17 1) coinbase transactions reduce the ring size for a normal user as they usually belong to pools. This is clear. 22:29:18 2) certain edge cases (as shown in the episode of breaking monero) can show the real output used by a pool. This is true as all the pools outputs are known so if in the ring size just one is considered as not being a pool output that is likely a change output and one can mark it as real. So if in any future (by any user) one sees that output the ring size is automatically decreased by one 22:30:24 I just need to be sure the 2nd point is correct. 🫠😵‍💫 22:32:52 I am just looking for some take aways. I have 2 for now : 22:32:52 1) coinbase transactions reduce the ring size for a normal user as they usually belong to pools. This is clear. 22:32:52 2) certain edge cases (as shown in the episode of breaking monero) can show the real output used by a pool. This is true as all the pools outputs are known so if in the ring size just one is considered as not being a pool output that is likely a change output and one can mark it as the real output for this transaction . So if in future (by any user) one sees that same output the 22:32:53 ring size is automatically decreased by one.