05:45:35 <Fibonacci12358> I think I figured out Monero it's basically like Gay coin... Nobody should use it and it's not gonna stay a secret
05:46:53 <Fibonacci12358> It seems like a bunch of queers in the community ngl..
05:52:38 <m-relay> <p​olar9669:matrix.org> Oh someone’s hurt
08:09:54 <m-relay> <1​23bob123:matrix.org> Any hole is a goal
08:20:38 <m-relay> <m​onerobull:matrix.org> lol
08:21:26 <m-relay> <m​onerobull:matrix.org> we are the queer nazi pedo coin, everything at once
08:21:57 <m-relay> <m​onerobull:matrix.org> thats just what you get when you have a tool everyone can use
08:22:26 <m-relay> <g​orillaquest:matrix.org> I fully support you
08:22:34 <m-relay> <m​onerobull:matrix.org> fellas, is it gay to protect your financial sovereignty?
08:23:00 <m-relay> <g​orillaquest:matrix.org> Don't ever think otherwise
08:23:17 <m-relay> <g​orillaquest:matrix.org> I am here for you always and forever
11:52:56 <gingeropolous> got my first catch with fail2ban on monero
11:52:58 <gingeropolous> https://github.com/Gingeropolous/monerof2b
11:54:49 <gingeropolous> actually apparently 5
12:07:53 <m-relay> <m​onerobull:matrix.org> what does it do
12:08:06 <m-relay> <m​onerobull:matrix.org> like, the attacker
12:08:31 <gingeropolous> i dunno. mainly spams my logfile and eats up resources
12:09:30 <gingeropolous> the primary instances i found of this was like 35k error messages, every 4 seconds or something ridiculous
12:09:41 <gingeropolous> well 1 every 4 seconds
12:21:14 <m-relay> <m​onerobull:matrix.org> could that just be outdated nodes trying to say hi
15:01:46 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> What kind of attacks does this solution protect from? What would count as a fail? Is it based on clients IP addresses?
15:03:56 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> Downside of it would be an easy way to block shared IP addresses, eg. from Tor exit nodes
15:09:52 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> I have a question regarding sweep_all RPC call. From my understanding, when used for selected subaddress(es) it performs similar to transfer except it sends all unlocked funds minus fee. The question is: where change goes? To source subaddress(es) or to #0 (main account address)?
15:11:11 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> I have a question regarding sweep\_all RPC call. From my understanding, when used for selected subaddress(es) it performs similar to transfer except it sends all unlocked funds minus fee. The question is: where change from transfer call goes? To source subaddress(es) or to #0 (main account address)?
15:12:03 <sech1> sweep_all leaves no change. The 0 XMR output (change) is sent to some completely random address
15:13:09 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> Yes, I meant 0 XMR for sweep_all. Ok, so it goes to random address. But how about transfer?
15:14:02 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> If, for example, we spend from specific subaddress.
15:14:23 <sech1> Change goes back to it
15:15:39 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> Ok, so if we would want to consolidate all change from individual transfers from a group of subaddresses to another wallet, we should use sweep_all?
15:17:17 <sech1> yes, but it would combine output from different subaddresses which is not good for privacy
15:19:23 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> Is it somewhat other topic which is also interesting to me. From one side, consolidation is bad for privacy (in Bitcoin where blockchain is auditable) but why for Monero, where there are ringCT and decoys?
15:22:32 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> In some cases it is also impossible to avoid consolidation. There are services that earn on small fees/change. I do churning a few times of these consolidated fees, so a chance of guessing true spend after consolidation should be extremely low.
15:26:49 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> I do imagine a case where someone consolidates straight into a KYC exchange or other adversary though. In that example I would agree for it to be a bad idea.
15:51:47 <lza_menace> gingeropolous: could you share the scripts/commands you're using to investigate?
15:54:36 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> m-relay: Does transfer_split automatically calculate the minimum required number of tx? I assume this works to prevent the transaction size limit from being reached.
16:48:48 <m-relay> <h​alcyon73:matrix.org> wtf is this crap https://tailswallet.net/
16:49:09 <m-relay> <h​alcyon73:matrix.org> this is almost certainly malware isnt it
16:50:23 <m-relay> <p​lowsof:matrix.org> noticed it shared on reddit a few days ago.. no mention of source code, so definitely avoid.
16:51:04 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> whois  returns:
16:51:04 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> Registered On
16:51:05 <m-relay> <a​lfieedwards:monero.social> 2023-09-04
16:56:30 <m-relay> <g​fdshygti53:monero.social> sus
16:56:30 <m-relay> <g​fdshygti53:monero.social> Could also be honeypot wallet
16:56:30 <m-relay> <g​fdshygti53:monero.social> For all we know that thing can export your keys, keylog and take screenshot of your activities.
16:57:29 <m-relay> <h​alcyon73:matrix.org> yeah i found it on reddit as well
16:57:39 <m-relay> <h​alcyon73:matrix.org> also practically no results on google https://www.google.com/search?q="tailswallet.net"&filter=0
16:58:05 <m-relay> <h​alcyon73:matrix.org> except for one guy very obviously spamming it under various reddit posts
16:58:09 <m-relay> <h​alcyon73:matrix.org> very strange
16:58:12 <m-relay> <p​lowsof:matrix.org> just marketing
16:59:24 <lza_menace> they made it with <3 though
17:01:50 <m-relay> <p​lowsof:matrix.org> if you want a "tails wallet" for monero - 3 options are listed here under Quick links: https://xmrguide.org/ (but im probably preaching to the choir)
17:26:17 <m-relay> <l​za_menace:monero.social> so many rooms
20:59:45 <gingeropolous> lza_menace, i linked my github repo with the fail2ban stuff but if you just grep the bitmonero.log (and the other logfiles) for "error state" you might see some