00:32:03 not even, just someone hit&cold :) 00:32:09 hot&cold* 00:37:00 where can i find reference for ~/.config/monero-project/monero-core.conf 00:37:14 like a list of options or documentation 00:42:47 there is none, is there? 01:18:08 if somebody interested, I assume rg -INoxe "persistentSettings.\w+" | sort -u inside monero-gui would be enough to grab all the variables 04:49:19 chiselfuse: https://github.com/monero-project/monero-gui ? 04:51:23 my mistakes ganza mention gui 04:51:37 https://github.com/monero-project/monero maybe 05:14:25 they're not documented anywhere 06:20:28 Correct 06:21:11 gui conf is written and read by the gui. Its not for manual configuration 06:30:02 @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: good bot 07:14:40 12t11 07:16:02 ^ cat.. sorry. 09:08:14 Monero has been removed from Coingecko I think 09:08:31 https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/nthpyro.dev/nzRUTLBVOBKnzUckiAsltAdi.png (image.png) 09:08:49 Curious what their reasoning is 09:16:00 Now it's back: 09:16:00 > No trading activity recorded by exchanges integrated on CoinGecko in the past 30 days. 09:17:06 Getting closer to dexs like reto providing the price 09:23:01 Yeah the price is staying the same on Coingecko now 09:41:57 also, as one of the commenters pointed out... The dude literally has a twirlable moustache lol 10:26:56 working here. > <@nthpyrodev:nthpyro.dev> Monero has been removed from Coingecko I think 10:26:56 although yesterday there was a few hours the graph 'flat lined’ even though the price fluctuated 10:26:56 I did have a CG update earlier a few hours ago 13:21:04 anyone else having connectivity issues to monero.social? 13:31:48 bridge down here as well? 13:31:59 yep it is 14:33:44 bridge will be down if monero.social is down 17:01:53 where is sgp.... i thought they kept an irc instance going 17:07:00 social admins are aware and should get to this today 22:51:54 Hello, is there any news regarding the latest development within the field "police agency claims to trace Monero, provides no proof"? 22:53:50 I am referring to the recent case in Norway: https://www.politiet.no/nyheter-og-presse/kripos/nyhet/2026-07-07/28_personer_pagrepet_i_internasjonal_politiaksjon 22:54:27 https://www.tv2.no/nyheter/28-pagrepet-i-kripos-ledet-aksjon-ny-politimetode-sentral/19028724/ 22:55:44 as usual they will use exchanges or other tooling to track people 22:56:31 DataHoarder: That is the reasonable assumption without evidence, yes. However, if you like your tea leaves, there are some interesting turns of phrase they used. 22:59:45 Keep in mind that (1) there is only 3 paragraphs of information and (2) the source is just what is claimed by the Norwegian Criminal Investigation Service (Kripos) 23:00:22 > In 2025, Kripos developed a method that makes it possible to track the use of Monero in specific cases. This method was used in this operation and enabled us to identify individuals who paid for access to child abuse material. Kripos has also identified two sellers of child abuse material. These individuals are not located in Norway. 23:00:24 > Central to the operation is a method developed by Kripos in 2025 that makes it possible to track Monero transactions in specific cases. 23:00:26 > "Without this method, we probably wouldn't have made these arrests," says [Police Attorney Terje Nedrebø Michelsen], who explains that the method was developed at the initiative of the cryptography experts at Kripos. 23:03:03 What sticks out here is the odd and guarded phrasing in the first paragraph: they track "the use of" Monero. They also very carefully avoid claiming the ability to identify the sellers. 23:03:34 They say that (1) we used this method to identify buyers, and (2) we also identified sellers 23:04:44 I think this makes it more trustworthy. They are not claiming a general-purpose method, but a method that works for some specific niche. 23:22:55 you can make many specific ways to achieve that with current decoy system, specially if you have cooperation of exchanges and other places along both sides 23:23:44 for example because all coinbase outputs are known per miner on p2pool you can see when someone sweeps (spends a large amount of outputs at once) and identify the specific miner with high likelihood https://p2pool.observer/sweeps 23:23:58 for example https://p2pool.observer/transaction-lookup?txid=537030ea1bab292ca63e0cfc3410c30da12172698957bd9f259ca6b04eb2cc5d 23:24:38 105 inputs, 100% of these were identified as coinbase inputs where all of them had at least a specific miner (plus some others, but one was always in the decoy set) 23:24:52 post FCMP++ this won't be possible 23:25:31 the chain breaks very fast and these are first-order 23:25:47 so you need very special conditions/situations to achieve it efficiently 23:26:22 Yes, this was my thought too. Like: what if you first pay Alice $10, then move $10 to an exchange, then pay Alice $10 again. She'd be easily able to strip out the decoys, right? 23:28:50 no, but can take a guess 23:29:06 that is a single input/output in the set 23:33:21 it's usually when they can tell across many outputs/inputs where a signal can be used, usually along other factors (ips used on exchanges, browsers, etc)