00:04:16 Im stackin Goshis... xmr = Ghost satoshis, urban legend satoshi contributed.. 00:04:53 How much for a suicide stack? 00:04:56 Stackin Gats not Sats 00:05:04 Lmao 00:05:32 Fuck a Sat, im stackin Gats, xmr on the map 00:05:56 Lemme guess, room filled with Monero bulls 00:06:06 Duh 00:06:36 @hughjank:matrix.org: Something something its a trap 00:06:58 @slowbeardigger:matrix.org: I personally think it will go to zero eventually 00:07:19 I'm only bullish on collapse 00:07:42 No theory? 00:07:53 Didntbeven mention quantum? 00:08:05 ill take ur gats then 00:09:49 No gat blockchain yet buster 00:10:25 G in gat comes from Goshi aka ghost satoshi.. u buster ass mf 00:10:38 Lol 00:11:03 Nah its from great gatsby 00:22:40 https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/zzzixRIyIOEHajqIrhssCtGe.jpg (IMG_20260811_192140.jpg) 00:24:49 Stackin gats 00:25:00 Bulletproofs 00:39:35 Wait you were srs? 01:02:38 nah > <@gzx:metropolis.nexus> I personally think it will go to zero eventually 01:02:59 Monero won’t go to zero 01:03:02 monero won’t go to the moon 01:03:23 Thinking of monero like another shitcoin is a mistake 01:03:38 It is just cash, use it, p2p, circular economy 01:04:10 Sure enjoy the price up if you can get cash for it 01:04:10 that’s it 01:05:50 Ur prob wrong 01:06:14 One hiccup can change everything 01:06:29 And cause massive ppl to pour in 01:06:49 Shtf events cbdc and more also advancements 01:07:19 Wars 01:07:49 "because xmr will be worth $300 in 2050" 01:07:58 Isn't XMR worth $300 right now? 01:08:20 doesnt matter what happens, if i want to get a beer on xmrbazaar, will be 0.03 XMR today, the same in 5 years… 01:08:22 I don't even think XMR changed from the $350-290 range 01:08:25 i don’t link xmr with fiat 01:08:31 Cindy its worth the amount ill spend on a dinner date with u 01:09:04 Cindy: that’s the comfy range of Monero to Fiat price 01:09:14 Xmr is 400 rn 01:09:40 If u try to buy private over 420 01:09:41 @hughjank:matrix.org: you know why? 01:09:54 iran 01:09:58 wrong 01:09:59 Trump 01:10:04 hughjank: Wow, cheapstake 01:10:04 try again 01:10:09 Dollar printer 01:10:16 its simple 01:11:28 study a bit more about Monero 01:11:44 Lol 01:11:47 and youll understand why is not like any other shitcoin 01:12:09 I get all my info from john mcafe and maverick on youtube 01:12:29 Thats a joke btw 01:12:57 @hughjank:matrix.org: ah, good, i was looking for a meme to answer to that 01:13:06 Lmfao 01:19:51 Cindy______ Gold digger 😂 01:30:54 https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/wDJECpRNNgkvnqVpJLQMcUKd.jpg (Gats/Gatoshi's) 02:48:25 Centralized Control: GrapheneOS is run by a tiny, strict leadership team. They dictate exactly what can and cannot be said. 02:48:25 The reason Monero feels less suspicious is transparency through openness. When a community allows everyone to speak freely, even when they disagree..it feels like nothing is being hidden.For many users, that silence feels like a corporate filter or a hidden agenda, whereas Monero's open, messy debates feel honest. 02:57:07 Because GrapheneOS relies on a centralized team to sign software updates, there is a single, physical cryptographic key that controls the safety of every user. 02:57:07 The Risk: If a government agency or a highly funded hacking group launches a targeted attack, they only have to compromise a few key individuals. 02:57:07 The Outcome: If attackers steal that signing key, or legally force a developer to use it, they can push a malicious "poison update" directly to everyone's phone without users knowing. Monero's decentralized network makes this type of single-target attack impossible. 02:59:52 Monero prioritizes trust through openness. It is messy and chaotic, but because anyone can speak and audit the system, it has zero central vectors of compromise. 02:59:52 GrapheneOS prioritizes protection through lock-down. It builds incredibly strong physical walls against hackers, but you are forced to completely trust a tiny group of people holding the keys. 03:52:11 @hughjank:matrix.org That sounds like it was partially written by AI. I also don't buy it. How is GrapheneOS's governance different from, say, a Linux distro's? Many popular Linux distros have small teams. Linus Torvalds, the creator of Linux, is sometimes called a "benevolent dictator for life", and has the final say on any changes that make it into the Linux kernel. 03:52:11 Monero's governance works the way it does because the blockchain is a shared resource. With an open-source operating system like Graphene or a Linux distribution., you can use a fork if you don't like the creators. But the blockchain in Monero can't be forked so easily without losing the community that gives the currency value [... too long, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/q87i7J8LcFlYRXQ4 ] 04:07:24 Although Linux has 18k+ contributors. Most GOS repos have very little contributors. 04:12:23 hughjank: Monero and GrapheneOS is like comparing apples with oranges 04:12:26 Final thoughts? 04:13:23 very true doesnt seem realistic we can have monero type governance on a phone 04:13:34 That's like if I compared Bitcoin with Arch Linux 04:14:55 So basically impossible to have monero style governance on mobile os and a physical phone? 04:15:21 and keep it secure? 04:15:23 It's impossible 04:15:35 Let’s just make MonerOS 04:15:54 Cindy: X2 04:16:24 Someone has to hold the keys 04:16:30 gg 04:16:55 Meta is to use flip phone then and pocket computer 04:17:16 Im not fuckin with that shit 04:17:39 You have to trust whatever contributions end up on Monero's software too 04:18:26 Because if the majority believes something's true, it'll end up being true 04:19:27 I don't like the creators of GrapheneOS much, but I believe in its technical merits. It's the one phone OS that governments routinely fail to hack for a reason. 04:20:00 What will the creators benefit from pushing a malicious update signed with the keys 04:20:13 Other than irreparably destroying their reputation 04:20:35 They are struggling to get apps using Play Integrity to use their keys aswell 04:21:20 The "poison pill" described by the AI can happen with pretty much any Linux distro, or even with many Monero wallets. It's not a unique threat to a small team. It could (perhaps) even happen with Monero. A relatively small number of people have the ability to push releases to the Monero repo. They could be compromised by the government too. 04:21:29 Yes 04:21:44 The thing is, what would Graphene have to gain from this 04:22:02 What would anyone have to gain from this 04:23:04 Even if a government compromised the GrapheneOS team and forced them to push out a malicious update, it is extremely likely that it would be detected, and it would look bad for that government too. 04:23:29 It would look bad for GrapheneOS in general too 04:23:55 If there gonna go that far wont be detected 04:24:00 They've been trying to get bank apps and shit to believe that they are the most secure OS 04:24:14 So they can pass attestation with their own OS root keys 04:25:02 GrapheneOS has reproducible builds. It will be easy to detect if a version is published that doesn't match the source code. 04:25:06 ^ 04:25:10 I was about to say that 04:25:41 GOS is built to be reproducible, builds with the same exact source code will result in the same checksum 04:26:32 https://grapheneos.org/build#reproducible-builds 04:26:56 If you change anything, the checksum will be different and people will catch this 04:27:05 Does Monero have reproducible builds yet? 04:27:23 monero is not software 04:27:29 torir: Does it have any build dates? 04:27:35 The official Monero daemon. 04:29:02 Or any nondeterministic build steps/compile-time code? 04:29:45 Hmm... looks like it is using Guix for bootstrapable builds. I never found reproducible build instructions anywhere besides that, but it does seem vaguely reproducible. 04:31:17 Whats more likely to be a honeypot, qubesos or fedora? Fedora less likely because corporations depend on it to be secure imo thoughts? 04:31:49 Why would I honeypot an entire distro when I could honeypot a small thing every distro uses? Or how about a web browser? 04:32:02 @hughjank:matrix.org: the source code is available for both, even if they have proprietary components 04:32:09 I used to like Qubes but I didn't like how they aren't even keeping up with their security 04:32:28 Because it would be restricted to a qube 04:32:29 Their Anti-Evil Maid protection for example, requires TPM 1.2 and Intel ME 04:32:42 Which is super dated compared to computers now having TPM 2 04:32:54 Like really, TPM 1.2 is shit 04:33:45 well not every computer has it 04:33:47 Cindy: What os do you reccomemd now 04:33:48 hughjank: I could honeypot the hypervisor 04:33:55 Throwing out honeypot accusations is not generally useful. Look for products that are several years old, fully open-source, and respected by security experts. Those are the ones that unlikely to be honeypots. 04:33:56 also not cool that it needs ME 04:33:56 The Xen hypervisor 04:34:00 Gyat 04:34:14 I use Fedora tbh 04:34:30 Real shit homie 04:34:49 Corporations depend on it to be secure 04:34:52 Fedora Sliverblue to be exact. I chose it because it has Secure Boot, SELinux support 04:35:04 And well, I use my apps through Flatpaks mostly 04:35:11 Qubes makes u disable secureboot 04:35:23 That shit is dumb 04:36:09 Idk bro maybe notfbihoney is a nsa agent he put me on qubes 04:36:27 I cannot say they're a good OS when they barely keep up with modern PC security 04:36:48 Like even Secureblue the Fedora fork has Secure Boot support 04:36:56 He had a video wearing a mask but showed his ponytail like fbi cant find out who he is 04:37:05 With his voice aswell 04:37:54 I'm not interested in using Qubes unless they up their game and take advantage of what PCs have to offer in security nowadays, instead of what they used to offer back in 2012 04:38:23 Gg man my qubesos prob backdoored guy even said his qubesos got hacked 04:38:42 Not backdoored 04:38:52 Just I want an OS with physical security too 04:39:01 Not just digital security 04:39:15 It's a matter of threat model 04:39:34 Fde is ok right if secure boot disabled on qubesos? 04:41:27 Eh 04:41:32 I mean it's fine 04:41:45 But someone who has access to your drive can tamper with your bootloader 04:41:46 @hughjank:matrix.org: FDE is not a replacement for secure boot 04:41:55 Cindy: ^ 04:42:07 Yes 04:42:14 FDE has no relation with secure boot 04:42:42 But I think it's worse with secure boot off because someone can inject code into the bootloader while you're not looking 04:42:54 (Given your threat model includes that) 04:43:05 lmao 04:43:47 And if they can, well they can siphon your drive password and save it for later :P 04:44:18 So it kinda depends 04:45:08 FDE should be considered broken the moment someone is allowed to tamper with your hardware. Don't decrypt your device is you think it has been tampered with. 04:45:12 Cindy ur knowledge is supreme 04:45:39 I wouldn't say that 04:45:49 Also this is where TPM comes into play 04:46:29 You could FDE your disk with a mix of your password/key and one of the TPM registers (preferably ones that have to do with Secure Boot or the hardware) 04:46:52 Torir thatsonly for physical attacks? 04:46:53 or remote aswwll 04:46:57 Then if someone messes with your laptop BIOS settings, you can't decrypt your hard drive anymore 04:47:05 Or Secure Boot 04:47:17 hughjank: Physical 04:47:44 GrapheneOS's threat model includes physical attacks, for example 04:47:46 Drive encryption is only for physical attacks. If your device is stolen, it keeps your data safe. Or if your device gets siezed at a border crossing. Secure boot is mainly for physical, but it can help prevent malware from becoming persistent. 04:48:31 Torir what os do you reccomend then 04:48:33 If you use Secure Boot and TPM well, it can help against physical attacks 04:49:16 Yes, but TPM attacks exist on a lot of devices. The security of your TPM depends a lot on what hardware you have. It's the reason Graphene insists on only support Pixel devices. 04:49:40 My os says tpm not supported 😂 04:50:10 torir: Ideally TPM should be embedded directly into your CPU 04:50:20 And not outside of it (on your board) 04:50:31 Because then someone can just use a bus pirate 04:50:51 Cindy should i run for the hills says tpm not supported 04:51:14 If you don't care about physical attacks, you don't need secure boot. But secure boot is still good to have because it helps against rootkits. 04:51:28 It depends on your threat model. 04:51:33 ^ 04:51:40 It all depends on your threat model 04:51:47 Do you care that much about physical attacks 04:52:01 Yes 04:52:41 so if i travel out of the country what could they do it has bios pw fde 04:52:56 Tpm not supported no secure boot 04:53:35 If it has FDE but no Secure Boot/TPM, then the most they can do is tamper with your bootloader and inject some rookit 04:53:41 Bios pw will give string 04:53:51 What I would do: Use full disk encryption. back up all data to cloud storage, wipe the device, take it across the border, wipe it again afterwards and reinstall OS. 04:53:52 They can bypass bios pw 04:53:56 Then what 04:53:57 BIOS password does nothing 04:54:07 They can grab the hard drive out of the computer 04:55:38 If you are just worried about border crossings, full disk encryption is probably sufficient, assuming you reinstall the OS after the crossing to undo any bootloader changes. (Technically, they could attempt to install a rootkit in your firmware, but that is very unlikely if you aren't a targetted individual). 04:56:10 But if you wipe the device, then they can't try to get the encryption password from you either, so that's even better. 04:56:16 Even then if they took the harddrive with fde Out of Your pc they can inject rootkit in bootloader aswell? 04:56:34 Bootloader exists on the harddrive, yes, it could be modified. 04:56:45 because secure boot is not prgrammed inside the ssd 04:56:53 Right 04:56:53 I've never heard of bootloaders being modified during a border crossing, but it is technically possible. 04:57:13 Yeah it is technically possible 04:57:23 More u know 04:59:38 How secure boot works is it checks the bootloader signature from the drive before running it. Secure boot exists on the motherboard, bootloader on the drive. 05:00:10 Secure boot can detect a modified bootloader on the drive, but can't preven the drive from being removed from the device. 05:00:16 prevent* 05:02:43 this can also be achieved on libreboot, without strictly needing UEFI 05:03:14 Secure Boot is done by the BIOS, not by TPM btw 05:03:35 But TPM makes things more effective by binding secrets to one of the many PCR registers it has 05:04:25 https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Trusted_Platform_Module#Accessing_PCR_registers 05:05:27 Basically, you could, for example, bind your FDE hard drive to PCR7 (the Secure Boot State), in addition to whatever keys you'd normally need to access it 05:05:43 So if someone changes stuff related to Secure Boot, your drive becomes undecryptable 05:06:35 Bitlocker (in Windows) does that, I think. And then undermines it by sending your encryption keys to Microsoft. So you get the worst of both worlds: getting locked out of your data if you lose your motherboard, and giving the government your encryption keys if they ask Microsoft nicely. 05:06:54 Honestly this is probably better than using Intel ME (ew) 05:07:12 Cindy: https://libreboot.org/docs/linux/grub_hardening.html 05:07:20 you might like this 05:08:01 Eh 05:08:20 I mean anyone smart enough to know what Libreboot is can just tamper with the BIOS now 05:09:00 "Please also expect to brick your machine at least once" But now at least the evil maid will need an SPI programmer to get my encryption password. 05:09:30 This really doesn't fix anything and just makes things worse 05:09:34 Cindy: the document i linked is the mitigation against that 05:09:49 Because now you don't have Secure Boot, and I don't think this BIOS tells anything to the TPM to change its registers 05:09:55 Since it's unsigned code 05:10:33 muffin: I meant physical attacks 05:10:47 None of this protects against someone who is knowledgeable in hardware and using a SPI flasher 05:10:59 And knows what you did 05:11:38 Unless there's something I'm missing 05:11:43 the flash protections are kind of a mitigation though 05:12:26 You can disable them just by shorting a jumper 05:12:33 Which is what the guide mentions 05:12:55 yes, that’s why they’re “kind of” 05:13:10 So at most if nsa targets you cindy whats most they will get? 🫣 05:13:38 muffin: Yeah... I dunno about it 05:13:49 I feel like this is way too risky and still crackable 05:14:05 NSA needs to kidnap leah rowe to explain all this 05:14:10 Way too risky to set up I mean 05:14:16 Cindy: yeah 05:14:25 that’s just with libreboot in general too 05:14:39 5V programmer instead of 3.3? oopsie! 05:14:55 Libreboot is cool and all but like 05:15:02 It's like most Android custom ROMs 05:15:16 You crack the bootloader once, and it remains insecure like that forever 05:15:40 hughjank: Uhhhh, weird stuff? ^^; 05:16:24 i mean at that threat level we get back to the wrench method > Libreboot is cool and all but like 05:17:05 Libreboot would be cool if it preserved the same amount of security (related to the boot code integrity) as if it was stock 05:17:13 Just like Pixels and GrapheneOS 05:17:31 yeah 05:18:28 I understand that's not always possible 05:18:42 especially at that lower level 05:18:42 And you might aswell pry the security open with a crowbar to shove your code in 05:19:07 At the cost of reduced boot code security 05:19:46 a worthy sacrifice 06:23:07 Hey guys, i statted mining monero yesterday, amazing process intresting to learn new things and never touched linux like i did with the mining setup, thank god ai holds my hand lol 06:23:07