Ok reconnoiter tomorrow

sech1: #monero-pow is on mute all. not sure if intentional

It was, because of spam and offtopic. Maybe it will be better this time.

seeing some strange pro-PoS takes recently

e.g. x.com/bawdyanarchist_/status/1796047563168391243?s=46

meanwhile we forgot about RandomX’s 5-year anniversary… hm

<r​brunner7:monero.social> Not every sentence that has the English word "stake" in it is a pro "proof of stake" argument ...

<n​ononynous:monero.social> Idk if I2P devs are still around but adding I2Pcontrolport with SAMv3 for monero binaries could make I2P very easy to use

<n​ononynous:monero.social> repo.getmonero.org/monero-project/ccs-proposals/-/merge_requests/454

<n​ononynous:monero.social> geti2p.net/en/docs/api/i2pcontrol

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> kayabanerve: Can you explain in layman's terms the privacy issue with PocketChange that you alluded to in your tweet a few months ago?

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> The TXs themselves are decently identifiable and they reduce the quality of your graph re: analysis AFAIK. cc Rucknium

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> This is related to the splitting of "pockets", or due to spending + combining the outputs later?

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> This is related to the splitting of "pockets", or due to spending/combining the outputs later?

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> The split is decently identifiable.

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> Consolidating two of those outputs is also decently identifiable.

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> I won't comment on exact odds.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> IMHO, the recombination of outputs in a single tx after the PocketChange tx has the greatest privacy risk

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> FCMPs would make it so only the split is identifiable.

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> Those ideally overlap with multi-payments.

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> But then every tx after the split has teh same privacy guarantees as normal "non-split" txs correct?

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> But then every tx after the split has the same privacy guarantees as normal "non-split" txs correct?

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> There's nothing else that can distinguish it from a regular FCMP tx.

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> Could you explain how that would affect PocketChange users? I'm trying to explain in Monerujo chat but they seem to think its only the amount of pockets that's the issue

<r​ucknium:monero.social> For example, say that the pocketchange tx creates 10 outputs in a single tx. Then later there is a tx that has three inputs. Each of those inputs has one of the outputs of the original PocketChange tx. The probability that those three ring members were selected by chance by the decoy selection algorithm is low. In other words, the probability that those ring members are the real spends is high.

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> So it effectively reduces the ring size to 3 in your example?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> The exact probability is an open research question. It's in the list of research topics I may work on for my current CCS.

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> Or heavily weighs the odds that those 3 contain the real spend vs the other 13.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> "So it effectively reduces the ring size to 3 in your example?" We don't know the exact probability, but the effective ring size would probably be much lower than 3. Just a guess, but it could be 1.5 or something.

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> Oh wow. So it potentially strips the Monero tx of its ring-signature protection and just leaves a tx with encrypted amount and address.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> J0J0XMR: Read moonstoneresearch.com/2023/11/03/Postmortem-of-Monero-CCS-Hack.html

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Moonstone (i.e. SGP) doesn't compute an exact probability.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> To compute exact probabilities you need to define a classifier and determine the false positive rate. _AND_ you need to use actual empirical blockchain data and the actual probability distribution of Monero's decoy selection algorithm.

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> Sure, I'm just looking for a layman explanation on the privacy hit so I can explain it to monerujo.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> A researcher could start with my research here about defects in tx uniformity: github.com/Rucknium/misc-research/b…-spend-with-fungibility-defects.pdf

<j​0j0xmr:monero.social> Like I said, they seem to think its only the number of pockets that's the issue.

<s​ilverpill:poa.st> I2P devs: mastodon.social/@i2p/112530350247470462

sgp_:

I see I'm saving us money by waiting till monero goes up

<s​gp_:monero.social> indeed! For the next few minutes your new price is 70 XMR. If there's any excess, I'll apply it to the MAGIC Monero Fund

* shows fangs * or the Monero general fund

I see the buffer is now 2%

if we assume kayabanerve requires MAGICs services again the excess can carry over

all 25$ of it

$100*

ok sent

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> should I regret not putting in a clause excess xmr in the research fund becomes a performance bonus for those actually looking for audits with competitive rates 🤔

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> that $25 could've got me like, 8 bottles of soda

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> (I am entirely joking, there's no such clause due to the multitude of CoIs it'd cause)

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> 25$ is around 41.6 bananas

bananas for kayaba

<s​gp_:monero.social> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…ero.social/WcWePHvnxmXklMlziVDXPTvd

<s​gp_:monero.social> $151.73 reserved for the next project

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> is this Rino?

<s​gp_:monero.social> kraken

<s​gp_:monero.social> you can all beg Kraken for your $40.77 back

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> kraken just stole 67.95 bananas

legitimately acquired*

<p​rancing389:matrix.org> ### The Urgency of Moving Wealth into Private, Anonymous Currencies: Embracing Precious Metals and Monero for a Sustainable Future

<p​rancing389:matrix.org> In an era of unprecedented economic instability and increasing concerns over privacy, it is becoming crucial for individuals to protect their wealth and financial autonomy. Traditional financial systems, dominated by fiat currencies and heavily monitored by governments and financial institutions, are facing growing scrutiny. As a result, many are turning to private, anonymous curr<clipped message>

<p​rancing389:matrix.org> encies such as precious metals and Monero. This shift is not only about safeguarding personal wealth but also about fostering a parallel economic system that can operate independently of centralized control. This article explores the urgency of moving wealth into these private currencies and the importance of building a circular economy around them.

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<p​rancing389:matrix.org> 1. **Economic Instability**: High levels of national debt, inflation, and economic crises can devalue fiat currencies, eroding individual wealth.

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<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> wow guys ChatGPT is invading the chat

<p​reland:matrix.org> Lol