UkoeHB: TX chaining means a transaction can be signed regardless of the membership proof, and the membership proof can be performed later. This means the spend sig isn't bound to the proof. This allows anyone, with sufficient context, to create any membership proof they want, including one of 1 ..= 127, actual output, which effectively doxxes the real spend.

Any multisig member has sufficient context and can harm on-chain privacy accordingly. Currently, they can only harm off-chain privacy by publishing view keys.

It's a practically pointless technicality introduced by malleability in the membership proof I hadn't seen prior discussed.

yes I guess that's possible

Could someone tell me what the current leaning on the tx_extra field is? I'm worried that if not removed the coming monero revolution would be jeopardized.

#monero:monero.social

This room (MRL) is a lab / meant for work. q&a for #monero:monero.social

Rucknium[m] Do you keep track of p2pool payouts being used as decoys? Did their usage actually decrease?

sech1: I have some draft code that will be able to check that soon.

<xmrack[m]> "ima_75b6a4c.jpeg" <- I reached out to the authors of this paper to see if we could ask questions about their constant size range proofs. They responded:

“Thanks for your interest.

We have some optimizations in mind for Monero and may be interested in collaborating with the Monero Research Lab.”

They also mentioned that Luke reached out as well. I’m going to invite them to the meeting on Wednesday and see if they can make it.

thanks xmrack[m]

xmrack: Wow. Thanks!

you're a ⭐️ xmrack

No problem

If anyone has yet to read the paper and would like to. Feel free to reach out to me or atomfried