<n​ineteen_century_man:matrix.org> I'm not a big expert in curves either. Leaving this question to judgement of more experienced people. I still perceive a difference between triviality of being proved secure and having a practical record of being secure for a long time... So, it's good that your're going to check it with various protocols.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> MRL meeting in this room in two hours.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Meeting time!

<r​ucknium:monero.social> 1) Greetings

<v​tnerd:monero.social> Hi

<j​effro256:monero.social> howdy

Hello

<o​ne-horse-wagon:monero.social> Hello.

<0​xfffc:monero.social> Hi everyone

<j​berman:monero.social> *waves*

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Meeting issue: monero-project/meta #1048

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> 👋

<r​ucknium:monero.social> 2) Updates. What is everyone working on?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> me: Comments on some tx broadcast PRs. Reading papers on gossip protocols and their privacy, bandwidth, and speed.

<v​tnerd:monero.social> I'm working (right now) on jeffro256 pr for blockchain syncing - hopefully we can get this shipped today. Also doing LWS frontend stuff atm

<0​xfffc:monero.social> Reading and familiarizing myself with my broadcast mechanisms. I have started implementing this: monero-project/monero #9334#issue-2306257939

<0​xfffc:monero.social> Reading and familiarizing myself with broadcast mechanisms. I have started implementing this: monero-project/monero #9334#issue-2306257939

<j​effro256:monero.social> Me: writing the carrot doc. Draft is here github.com/jeffro256/carrot/blob/master/release/carrot_0.1.md

<0​xfffc:monero.social> Reading the erlay paper and familiarizing myself with broadcast mechanisms. I have started implementing this: monero-project/monero #9334#issue-2306257939

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> I've been preparing crates for auditing, once our current reviews wraps up.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> 0xfffc: Looks like we are looking at a similar area

<j​berman:monero.social> me: working on adding fcmp++'s to the cryptonote::transaction class

<r​ucknium:monero.social> 3) Stress testing monerod monero-project/monero #9348

<s​gp_:monero.social> Hello

<r​ucknium:monero.social> spackle created a new release version for stressnet. It pulled in everything that is in the new monero master plus the invalid blocks fix and jeffro256 's PR to reduce tx writes from 2 to 1.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Things seem to be running smoothly with the new release so far

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Any more comments on stressnet?

<o​ne-horse-wagon:monero.social> Rucknium: Is there any projected date as to when stressnet will end?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> That's still being discussed.

<o​ne-horse-wagon:monero.social> My feelings are to keep it going until every stress idea has been exhausted.

<0​xfffc:monero.social> Around August 8,9 spackle will leave stressnet, and me Rucknium will maintain the repo. We expect to continue stress-net but with much less nodes.

<0​xfffc:monero.social> ( spackle did a great job so far. So hats off to his work )

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Yes that's the loose plan now

<r​ucknium:monero.social> 4) Potential measures against a black marble attack. monero-project/research-lab #119

<r​ucknium:monero.social> A group claimed responsibility for the suspected spam transactions earlier this year: antidark.net/board/viewtopic.php?t=10

<r​ucknium:monero.social> They said that their objective was not to launch an anti-privacy black marble attack, but to congest the txpool to try to exploit some mechanisms in some services' withdrawal logic.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Anyone want to share opinions about this?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> When I first read it, there was no evidence of their claims, and it didn't completely make sense. I wouldn't care too much about it. I'm unsure if they've added more detail though to justify their story.

<j​effro256:monero.social> Agreed: As of yet it is unverified. Might be a mistake to assume that a black marble attack did not occur because some rando on a forum said so

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I basically concur. But they did say something that a person who prepared spam txs would know: wallet2 does not perform well when 200,000 accounts are created.

<j​effro256:monero.social> This looks to be a followup (maybe): antidark.net/board/viewtopic.php?t=15

<b​asses:matrix.org> There are some discussion from antidark members monero.town/post/3785880

<b​asses:matrix.org> yes

<r​ucknium:monero.social> In the followup they answer a comment about why won't they release the spam wallet(s) view keys. They said that they would not release it.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> It would be bad for user privacy if the suspected spammer actually released the spam wallet(s) view key(s).

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Releasing the view keys would prove that they actually were responsible for the spam (or at least that the entity that was responsible gave them the view keys.

I guess it doesn't change much for us overall whether it really was this group or not.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'd rather such a theoretical view key not float around.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> 5) Research Pre-Seraphis Full-Chain Membership Proofs. getmonero.org/2024/04/27/fcmps.html

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I don't have much more to say than my initial comment. Veridise is moving forward with the R1CS gadget for evaluating this week, and there's preliminary opinions on the GBP proof review.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I saw this paper: distributedlab.com/whitepaper/Bulle…roofs-Construction-and-Examples.pdf "This document introduces some clarification and corrections to Bulletproofs++ [Eag+23] paper."

<r​ucknium:monero.social> The paper probably isn't very relevant for Monero right now since BP++ is not going forward in the Monero protocol AFAIK.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I saw the note it existed. I wouldn't change the perception of BP++, as Aaron reviewed it, at this time.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> If this leads to a new revision of BP++, then that may be eligible for rereview, but...

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Any more topics anyone wants to discuss?

<j​effro256:monero.social> Who would be some good auditors for the new addressing protocol ?

<j​effro256:monero.social> Whether that be Jamtis or Carrot or something else

<a​aron:cypherstack.com> FYI the Cypher Stack review of the Veridise report should be released to kayabanerve @kayabanerve:matrix.org today as an initial draft for comment

<a​aron:cypherstack.com> Very curious on the GBP opinion :D

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> :D

<r​ucknium:monero.social> That reminds me that Cypher Stack reviewed a protocol that seemed to add return addresses to Monero-like txs, which has been on getmonero.org's roadmap for a while: github.com/cypherstack/salvium-revi…w/releases/download/final/final.pdf

<a​aron:cypherstack.com> We did that review, yes

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> jeffro256: You'd need to define the desired properties.

<k​ayabanerve:monero.social> Presumably, a variety of indistinguishability properties.

<j​effro256:monero.social> I have a list of informal security and indistinguishability properties that I plan to add later. Also working on writing a condensed abstraction of FCMP++ requirements for Carrot (i.e. O = x G = y T, C = z G + a H, 0 <= a < 2**64, L = x Hp(O), sender needs knowledge of x, y, z, a, outgoing view wallet needs knowledge of x, etc)

<j​effro256:monero.social> Is this the right path?

<j​effro256:monero.social> *O = x G + y T

<r​ucknium:monero.social> kayabanerve: What do you think ^ ?

Seems to me if Cypher Stack reviews something like this Salvium, they are in a good spot to review our "stuff" as well. Looks pretty ambitious, by the way, that Salvium project.

<a​aron:cypherstack.com> I can't speak for Cypher Stack, but I would certainly advocate that the company put in a bid for such a review (for the addressing, I mean)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'd have to see the document to properly comment, sorry.

<j​effro256:monero.social> Aaron Feickert: thanks !

<j​effro256:monero.social> kayabanerve: fair enough, will try to do later today

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I think we can end the meeting here. Thanks all.

<j​effro256:monero.social> Thanks everyone !