<a​ck-j:matrix.org> So is now a good time to consider Rucknium proposal for GF to rent hash power?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> dont think so

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Rending hashpower isnt fixing anything. It's just burnibg money.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> better? Buy me 1gh worth of ryzen 5950 rigs 😂

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> I think the idea of burning money on temporary fix is an attack in itself. I'm more than half serious about "buy me rigs". Better than renting

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i hope we're gathering data

<e​longated:matrix.org> Rent servers, cheaper than buying hw/power if you want to secure network from attack temporarily

<a​ck-j:matrix.org> I’ll take a free rig too 👀

<a​ck-j:matrix.org> Agreed it isn’t a solution but nothing we’ve come up with seems realistic in a short time

<e​longated:matrix.org> Everyone will, just ask your Belarusian aka to provide source code to his botnet

<e​longated:matrix.org> Not asking to do it right away

<e​longated:matrix.org> But there has to be a intent

<e​longated:matrix.org> I only see botnet owners cheering for rx

<e​longated:matrix.org> ..

<e​longated:matrix.org> …

<e​longated:matrix.org> …

<e​longated:matrix.org> … can’t delete no permissions lol

<c​haser:monero.social> what if there was a standard for sending subsidies to a mining pool of choice to raise their profits? could that attract hash rate to a pool in a reasonable time frame? I'm thinking about this because for most people managing the machines and the mining software is a meaningful overhead, not to speak about acquiring space and potentially the hardware too. it's a less efficient con<clipped message>

<c​haser:monero.social> version of money into hash rate. directing the same economic value to a pool incurs less losses compared to someone mining who doesn't specialize in it. it's less decentralized, but as long as the given pool doesn't act maliciously it contributes more to the network's security than not doing anything.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> anyone looked into what Firo did with Long Living Masternode Quorums (LLMQ) ? They tool it from dash dips (0001-0008): github.com/dashpay/dips/blob/master/dip-0008.md

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> *took

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> we have p2pool built into the gui wallet and people still somehow think mining to a pool is easier than p2pool...

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> tldr; they opened up their masternode network gradually to the general public. That was, of course, a permissioned approach at the beginning.

<i​nterestingband:matrix.org> it's already clear that yall are incompetent, no need to gather any data

<i​nterestingband:matrix.org> and on top of that don't pay to competent people

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Chain locks would be a finality layer flip flop @antilt:we2.ee:

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> the local pow things ability to chip away at rental hashpower seems attractive

<i​nterestingband:matrix.org> kayabanerve your ability to write of lot of texts without any conerns regarding it's meaning is amazing

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i imagine most people don't want to synchronize to the network. Well, perhaps they want to, but perhaps they can't. I know --pruned exists, but I wonder if for p2pool purposes a headers-only thing could be implemented.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> how would you enforce local PoW and make sure that ASICs are "widely manufactured, to not centralize to any manufacturer"?

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> no... local PoW (i think thats what its called) is when you need a running monerod (and a local blockchain) in order to produce a PoW

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> currently known as 98: monero-project/research-lab #98

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> hm local PoW is defined as "Local PoW" the idea would be to require all RandomX miners additionally have an ASIC connected. This would limit the ability to competitively mine using rented hardware as a physical device would have to be connected to the computer to be competitive. We would want the ASIC to be:

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> Widely manufactured, to not centralize to any manufacturer

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> Affordable

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> Not competitive to replicate in software

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> Still acceptable to verify the results of in software

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> Use a high amount of throughput with the host device such that USB-over-IP is not a potential solution

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> here: monero-project/research-lab #136

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> ah, whoops

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> ok this looks different

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> lets call #98 "block signing"

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> No, My Local PoW proposal != 98

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Though they're quite similar in some regards.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> gupax is literally pasting an address and 2 clicks to get started :/

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> hybrid pos really needs to be looked into but master nodes is not the answer imho. the earlier decentralized hybrid pos/pow economic proposal with pos 10% pow 90% rewards seems more reasonable.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> raising tx fees (voluntarily) + uncle rewards would prob. enough to change the game

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> (uncle rewards = giving some % reward to orphaned blocks)

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i just don't get how the answer to defend a permissionless decentralized network against a seemingly transitory attack is to introduce centralizing permissioned things into the protocol, permanently.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> sort of capitulation, yes. Much like TEE

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> It's not a solution, it breaks the trustless consensus design element of a PoW system to introduce staking, no matter the reward % (or even no reward) If you submit to using PoS, there is really no reason to use PoW, it's economically wasteful; if you are checkpointing/validating with PoS, just use PoS.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> long range attacks

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> if we do use some sort of local PoW, how would the change in hash rate look like? unless I've understood it incorrectly, large pools will not exist because (from trevadors proposal) miners would either switch to p2pool by running their own node or quit entirely. because there's no way a large pool can provide 256 MiB cache per hour for every miner sustainably. the issue with this <clipped message

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> is that if lots of miners "drop out", wouldn't the total network hash rate drop substantially, making an attack easier?

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> the finality layer will just ensure that deep re-orgs don't happen from a set of validators who can stake their XMR, with the #set = initial network discovery phase available to everyone who participate in the Monero network, so it will still be trustless. if worst comes to worst and people don't like this idea, it will likely split monero into two separate chains: one with the Po<clipped message

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> S finality layer and another without. the "better" chain will carry on. I don't see why the trustless consensus design would break. the only issues I see with a finality layer is the added complexity and hence the time it will take to implement compared to simple solutions like local PoW

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> programmatically, yes, you can define finality in that way, but in practice, it's just a centralized subset-consensus replacement mechanism that makes the more decentralized mechanism ultimately superflous because the stakeholder couldn't or wouldn't invest to maintain decentralized PoW consensus. If you are going to implement this kind of deep re-org "insurance", just run a chai<clipped message

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> n/fork solely on that mechanism, which puts the ultimate economic power and ultimate chain decision arbitration in the hands of the largest holders, anyway. The concentration/centralization _is_ the the security, at the end of the day, in such a proposal.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> which, at that point, why not just use a centralized payments system, the theoretical gains of a maximally decentralized system become very marginal once you introduce centralized elements

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> so, essentially, you're suggesting that a finality layer could become a centralized bottleneck, where decisions are determined by the distribution of staked xmr, which would likely favor the largest stakers, who can then perform a 51% attack

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> you can prevent centralization by sharding (clique prevention on graph of validators) and making sure the barrier of entry to stake is low (unlike eth where full validator node requires staking 32 eth)

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> there's not really a 51% attack with PoS, because it not really a decentralized consensus mechanism, because of nothing at stake (the punishment for violation of stake is synthetic, and exists only within the system) The actual incentives in PoS are from the economic centralization incurred from coin distribution, the large holders have the largest investment/stake at risk, and t<clipped message

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> his is what prevents off chain collusion, the lack of incentives to collude against the system for that concentrated group of individuals

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> that is the difference in incentive that makes PoS actually work as a check-pointing mechanism relative to PoW, the ultimate removal of decentralization, in a somewhat obfuscated manner. It's what makes any centralized system work

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> even if you view the punishment as synthetic, PoS is still decentralized because anyone can stake and become a validator. yes, the distribution can be skewed, but PoW suffers from the same issue. PoW is also based on economic incentives (the price of XMR). I would lean towards using local PoW over a finality layer (due to complexity), but I'm hesitant until concerns about hash rat<clipped message

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> e distribution are addressed

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> those concerns being ^

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> That's tevador's proposal, not the idea I came up with and referred to as Local PoW.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> mb

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> even if you view the punishment as synthetic, PoS is still decentralized because anyone can stake and become a validator. yes, the distribution can be skewed, but PoW suffers from the same issue. PoW is also based on economic incentives (the price of XMR). I would lean towards using tevador's proposal over a finality layer (due to complexity), but I'm hesitant until concerns about<clipped message

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> hash rate distribution are addressed

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> if we do use tevador's proposal, how would the change in hash rate look like? unless I've understood it incorrectly, large pools will not exist because (from trevadors proposal) miners would either switch to p2pool by running their own node or quit entirely. because there's no way a large pool can provide 256 MiB cache per hour for every miner sustainably. the issue with this is t<clipped message

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> hat if lots of miners "drop out", wouldn't the total network hash rate drop substantially, making an attack easier?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> IMO, tevador's proposal may be overall better BUT shaking the bag o' miners _right now_ isn't guaranteed to work in our favor and is too risky unless p2pool is a notable percentage of the network.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> edited for clarity

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> It literally doesn't matter that anyone can/could become a validator. PoS will work just as well without any PoS reward, because PoS is already inventivized economically along the wealth distribution axis to defend their out-sized economic interest. Unless you are a major holder, being a validator doesn't do anything from a real incentive perspective for a minor stakeholder, it <clipped message

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> is a synthetic obfuscation that provides only the appearance of decentralization.

14:07:00 <m-relay> <g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i imagine most people don't want to synchronize to the network. Well, perhaps they want to, but perhaps they can't. I know --pruned exists, but I wonder if for p2pool purposes a headers-only thing could be implemented.

I have been looking to put a p2pool instance in the "browser" run by the user entirely client side, peering to each other via WebRTC. They'd still need to connect to monerod nodes. Then mining could be done locally with a modified xmrig also via WebRTC

headers only monerod sounds very enticing

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> disagree here. the reason to keep pow is for decentralized distribution of new coins. the most anon way of getting new monero. it also serves as a protection against nothing at stake attacks so you dont even need to implement slashing or anything more complicated on the stake side.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> there isn't a practical nothing at stake "attack". The "attack" is PoS itself, PoS is secured by default centralization of economic inequality. If you want a decentralized distribution of new coins, just make a faucet on a PoS coin, the inflation losses are the same for the majority holders.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> with a 50 50 pos pow hybrid you have neither the 51% pow attack vector nor the nothing at stake issue.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> in this case, you are talking about centralization because maybe you are thinking of master node type staking networks? it doesnt need to be like that at all. everyone can participate in staking.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> or are you more concerned about the distribution of coinbase rewards?

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> a faucet doesn't help the decentralized distribution because it can be gamed. the best way is to allow rewards for pow in a decentralized asic resistant way.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> this localpow stuff im catching up on seems like it would further centralize the network if it requires specialty mining equipment.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> monero-project/research-lab #98

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> look at this proposal. no specific mining equipment required

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> No, all I'm saying is it doesn't matter the programmatic implementation of PoS, just that the programmatic implementation detail isn't what makes it actually work, the centralization is. A PoS needs no reward to function, the reward is part of the obfuscation mechanism to make minority participation *seem* necessary to enhance decentralization, when it doesn't. All PoS reward do<clipped message

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> es is incentivize minorty holders to particiapte to mitigate their relative inflation losses vs. large holders, who are actually the network security in PoS.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> No, all I'm saying is it doesn't matter the programmatic implementation of PoS, just that the programmatic implementation detail isn't what makes it actually work, the centralization is. A PoS needs no reward to function, the reward is part of the obfuscation mechanism to make minority participation _seem_ necessary to enhance decentralization, when it doesn't. All PoS reward do<clipped message

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> es is incentivize minority holders to participate to mitigate their relative inflation losses vs. large holders, who are actually the network security in PoS.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> plz go to Lounge to chat. plz + thks

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> you just explained why pos is decentralized... "minority holders ... to mitigate their relative ... losses.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> i get your idea that large wallets like exchanges would have large weight in proportion to small stakers but this is the same as it is with pow pools vs individual mining.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> you also ignore that any incentive to actively stake for any size wallet would drive the proliferation of many more nodes in the network. thus probably contributing way more to decentralization than just the pow that we currently have.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ah yes, I am only referring to the original intent of cryptocurrency to have a decentralized *consensus* mechanism. Small stake holders participation or not in PoS has no bearing on consensus decentralization, their participation is ultimately irrelevant for the block generation and signing aspect of network security. No re-org is possible in PoS as long as the small number of w<clipped message

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ealthy are running their nodes to defend their majority

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> With PoW you have other centralization pressures, but the provable decentralization is a function of a real world, system independent costs incurred by the stakeholder, which does not exist at all in PoS

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> this is a decent proposal to decentralize mining. it may have some weird side affects that havent been thought through or possibly gamed by large centralized mining facilities with access to high speed fiber network distribution. possibly further centralizing the network.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> also, the migration period to this would make me very nervous. hopefully not a hard switchover....where the entire network gets restarted from a low difficulty. we would need to mess with block rewards for the transition period too.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> when you think of these risks, please consider a hybrid model is completely different from pure pow and pos. let's continue this chat in the lounge.