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br-m<jberman> @spirobel:kernal.eu decided to raise a counter-argument to twitter in favor of Monero-PSK: xcancel.com/spirobel/status/2060002430558065137
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br-m<jberman> "the current jamtis draft ... fails to articulate the value proposition for end users ... nobody in the real world will accept a change that worsens the user experience like this without providing a tangible benefit"
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br-m<jberman> That's a pretty absurd claim @spirobel:kernal.eu. The opening paragraph could not be clearer that it provides PQ privacy in the event a QA knows your address
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br-m<jberman> That's the core reason why the address is significantly larger. It's beyond me that your post doesn't mention this
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br-m<jberman> PGP has a notoriously poor UX and hasn't caught on to a significant degree among non-technically inclined people. I'm not sold on an interactive opening round being something most people will be inclined to do
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br-m<jberman> Today in Monero, it's likely the case that a ton of users connect to centralized RPC nodes (like Cake Wallet's and/or other central operators)
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br-m<jberman> This scheme would 100% leak privacy to said node operators, because wallets would query for their txs to those nodes
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br-m<jberman> I have a hard time seeing major centralization risk from the introduction of a filter-assist tier that is de facto worse than the current landscape. Plus, the "filter-assist" could even be a fallback (default to full wallet scan via daemon, and if available, use the filter-assist)
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br-m<jberman> And it has the major benefit of both a smoother UX than Monero-PSX (no interactive opening) with better privacy properties and no potential footguns
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br-m<syntheticbird> big ass tweet in response to a big ass tweet. > <@jberman> @spirobel:kernal.eu decided to raise a counter-argument to twitter in favor of Monero-PSK: xcancel.com/spirobel/status/2060002430558065137
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br-m<syntheticbird> reach: 0
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br-m<jbabb:cypherstack.com> devil's advocate: we could more clearly explain to a typical user how serious it is and the implications of PQ privacy against a QA... maybe something like "within 10 (20?) years, a quantum computer could X; this upgrade reduces the risk to Y."
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br-m<jbabb:cypherstack.com> but that's not so much an argument for M-PSK so much as a note that we could boil it down a bit better
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br-m<jbabb:cypherstack.com> > <@jberman> "the current jamtis draft ... fails to articulate the value proposition for end users ... nobody in the real world will accept a change that worsens the user experience like this without providing a tangible benefit"
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br-m<jbabb:cypherstack.com> "devil's advocate" isn't exactly what I mean--rather, just that the criticism that the jamtis proposal "fails to articulate the value proposition for end users" might have some merit. this isn't a technical note, it's a presentation one
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br-m<jbabb:cypherstack.com> I should correct myself: I just checked gist.github.com/tevador/639d083c994…1ef9401832c08e2b7832#1-introduction and that introduction does do a good job of explaining the situation: my statements are a bit out of date, sorry. the only improvement would be to shove a little more easy to understand paragraph at the very top, but it's actually better at explaining the "why" than I remember
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UkoeHBValue proposition includes: improved hardware wallet UX, improved scanning for mobile wallets and other casual users, improved PQ forward secrecy, improved subaddress model that enables use-cases like random addr gen.
2 minutes ago