<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> I'm not disagreeing with that. I guess I'm more saying, fcmp verification times look scary as fuck

<t​orir:matrix.org> There's some added complexity with batching being possible with multiple transactions in some cases? It's not clear to me.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Byte for byte, its notbad

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Looks the same as ringct to me

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> On ringct, i can sync ~1-1.5 blocks per second at ~200kb avg blocks. I verify abt 250kb per second on fcmp

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The biggest difference is in tx generation

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Takes 7mins to create a 128in

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> that's a weird comparison to use if TXes are much bigger. the amount of data needed to be processed will obviously go up in that case

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> They are onlt much bigger at low inputs

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Like 7kb for a 2in (5x size), but a 128in is like 110kb (maybe 10-15%larger)

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> I'm looking at github but do you have a link handy for ringct verification times?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> no, just syncing mainnet on the same device that i'm spamming fcmp

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Post checkpoints, log-level 1 on mainnet shows me abt 1.5blocks per second

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> there's a cahrt somewhere from when ring size was last being discussed, I'm sure

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> there's a chart somewhere from when ring size was last being discussed, I'm sure

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> berman said he wanted to run the bumbers at some point, so i would assume they arent available

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> anyway I think a lot of the sync time is disk IO? cause cuprate is like twice as fast at initial sync than monerod and I don't think it's cause they verify transactions so much faster

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Also need to test on hdd. Its hypothesised that fcmp will do better on hdd

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Cuprate is much faster for various reasons, such as usinf 64bit accellerated libs

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Theres a pr on monero to use the accellerated versions as well, increased sync 40% in my testing

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> For a thing, it should not have to forever seek to verify right

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> It doesnt have any effect on fcmp though

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Wdym?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> With current sheme dont you have to check the tx in the decoys (all of them) when you verify? Some new, some old...

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Yeah, has to do db reads for decoys

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Fcmp doesnt have to do that, which could lead to faster hdd sync

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Orders of magnitude faster yes.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Monero should host a bootstrap from the beginning til the fcmp switch.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> That should fix all sync issue for hdd I think

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> My hdd is failing, otherwise i'd check :P

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> With the current sheme your constantly seeking, so you have seek time + time for the thing to bring the sector to the head once it landed on the track, with can be instant up to one full rotation (5400.. 7200.. Rpm)

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> For each uncached decoys

<e​longated:matrix.org> Wil need to check for pre fcmp inputs though?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Eh.. my testnet doesnt have any/many of those :P

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Yes, its why I proposed a bootstrap

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> The US Gov has nuclear powered data centers. They will always be able to 51% attack cheaply.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> endor00: anything other than pow is just hype == anything other than pos that uses the ([CPU / asic / gpu + electricity] coin as eligible stake) is just hype

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> That which can be asserted without the evidence can be dismissed without evidence

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> PoW is hype

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Should I get ready for POS and buy 2% of the supply?

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> I'm not sure how comfortable I am with Monero's security being tied to holding Monero as opposed to expending something in the physical world

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Would PoS limit the sort of attacks that we're experiencing now?

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> How big of a whale would you have to be to disrupt the network?

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> yes. it would be an order of magnitude more expensive. we had the discussion the in the mrl meeting

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Ah, link?

anyone know when the mrl meeting logs will be posted?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I get that man, but only huge cryptocurrency’s like bitcoin could survive something like that. There is compelling evidence that suggest it’s not possible anymore to do a 51% attack anymore for Bitcoin, because the cost to do so is outrageous and it would require a total of 7 million asics, which is more than currently available on market.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-ethe…rcent-attacks-coin-metrics-research

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Yeah, the rich would own the thing. Meaning you have to have more money than them to 51% it

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> libera.monerologs.net/monero-research-lab/20250813#c557536

thanks

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Except if the rich are malicious (state actor buying there way in, faster than setting up mining rig and no need to micro manage them)

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> I'm no expert, but I think to attack PoS, you have to PUMP THE BAGS of the existing holders

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> It looks like PoS discussion didn't begin at that point

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Exacly

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> So the 51% who sold... They leave with a fat pile of BTC/fiat

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Easier for state actors, harder for the common asshole

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> And they can just take their bag and spin up a new PoS privacy chain

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Rinse and repeat

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> The key insight is this

<t​orir:matrix.org> I think if Monero does Proof-of-Stake, we need to invent a way to disincentivize exchanges from staking their customer's coins, or we just get back to the large mining pool problem except now it is centralized exchanges beholden to government.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> In pure PoW the cost to attack and the cost to defend are 1:1

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> PoS is asymmetric. It favors defense

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> You have to pump their bags

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> The question is who is going to get an easy grab of the network?

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Coin distribution is more of a problem if you're doing pure PoS from the Genesis block

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Less if you migrate from PoW

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> At the end, cex and some elite/state will own xmr, sound good

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> As long as they need xmr

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> no inflation

<t​orir:matrix.org> In PoW, you need to pay ongoing maintenance costs to continue holding your "share" of the network defense cost. In PoS, the ongoing cost is lower, which means people will stake and never have an incentive to unstake. Could we add some sort of meaningful maintenance to staking?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Why would the exchange not stack it. If its not some way to control the network

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> They are already online 24/7

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> It cost nothing for them, reward or no

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> give them the tx fees. that also gives them an incentive to make sure people actually use the network

<t​orir:matrix.org> Transaction fees don't scale. In practice we know users will migrate to coins with lower fees.

<t​orir:matrix.org> Bitcoin is going to have that problem once the block emission runs out.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Bitcoin rely on TW/h

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> the less incentive the better. only truly committed participants should be staking. the others can be bribed in any case. (similar to opportunistic hashrate switching to qubic or getting rented by them)

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> That have a cost

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Stalking have no cost (for exchange s)

<t​orir:matrix.org> Transaction fees work as a cost to attack the network via spam attacks. They don't work well as a financial incentive to secure the network, not when users will switch to another network to have lower fees.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> financial incentives dont in the form of staking rewards or mining rewards dont really secure the network.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> financial incentives in the form of staking rewards or mining rewards dont really secure the network.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> opportunistic hashrate or stakers can be bribed

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> lets say you are a whale right now, if you wanted to contribute to the security of the network you would have to sell part of your xmr to mine at a loss. From this most interested in the security of the network participant's perspective no inflation PoS would be better. Currently we have proof of stake that you have to pay for instead of receiving a reward. (and it still works bec<clipped message>

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> ause people believe in monero so much)

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Stalkers can serve there own interrest. And its easy way in

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Blaclrock can scoup 10% of the supply tomorrow

<e​longated:matrix.org> Atleast they will not lend it to market makers 😅 and short it to ground

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Problem with the pow model is only the price

<e​longated:matrix.org> Blackrock is not interested in your tiny coin

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> would be more expensive than buying the hashrate

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> If xmr was at its just price, we would not have issue

<e​longated:matrix.org> Current pow is the problem

<t​orir:matrix.org> There are potential threat actors willing to attack Monero at a loss. Qubic is believed to be mining at a loss. A government might also be willing to perform an attack against the coin. Giving defenders a financial incentive to secure the network probably helps more than giving them nothing.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Hashrate require time, expertise, employees, etcetc

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Pos require pressing a button on kucoin

<t​orir:matrix.org> There are coins in existence with no inflation and PoS-like consensus such as Nano.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Qubic has no cost, they are burning vc funds and greedy miners who are paid in their shitcoins

<e​longated:matrix.org> Atleast they will be staked and not sold by market makers

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Qubic is a ponzi per definition

<t​orir:matrix.org> I think the solution most likely to be adopted for Monero is PoW + no emission PoS finality layer.

<t​orir:matrix.org> With PoW still providing emission.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Pow+pos for finanality , pos needs incentive

<t​orir:matrix.org> It doesn't in Nano.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Nano is useless

<t​orir:matrix.org> Qubic is more useless than Nano yet still is managing to cause us a massive headache. Let's consider what we can learn from "useless" coins.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Ponzi work wonferfully til they dosent

<b​asses:matrix.org> just rich CEOs

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Future XMR controller

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> What if they vote to return to decoys and limite it to 4 decoys? For compliance

<b​asses:matrix.org> if we had a CEO things would have been easier 😔

<t​orir:matrix.org> The actual hardest part of mitigating 51% will be coming to consensus on a solution, I see.

<b​asses:matrix.org> also a lot of venture funding and gov funding like zcash

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> If only xmr was at its just price of at least 4k per coins

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> We would not have that discution

<3​21bob321:monero.social> Rock,scissors,paper

<e​longated:matrix.org> It will never reach there with current randomx

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Sure, centralizing mining with make it better

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> somehow

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/vofnWwkJUHxIBvKhJdPsUlsR

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Is mexc allowing back monero?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Just getting reducing effect of botnets will do much better. Bump up ram requirements it’s not a specialised hardware

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Bump up ram is to prevent specialized hardware to heat it all

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> yep

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yah or just continue being rags with botnets

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I mine right now

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I would mine qubit or some other shit if Monero required ASIC

<e​longated:matrix.org> You can’t buy 16gb ram ?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> OH, then I missread you

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> So you mean, bumping the mining so it require more ram?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yes

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> That could work.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Same process but requiring a lot more.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Don’t want to work ? Want freebies like botnets? Stay poor with price

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> How botnets affect the price, they provide hashrate.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Sure, bumping the botnet out could bring more honest actors but we might also endup with less hashrate

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> The reward coupled with electricity cost is what bring hashrate

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> 0.6 xmr at 250$ is different to 0.6 xmr at 4k

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> at the end, just an increase in price would put the botnet into the insignifiant bracket

<e​longated:matrix.org> Botnet owners don’t support price, it costs them almost nothing to mine xmr ; they do spend dump at any cost and it affects price

<e​longated:matrix.org> If someone has paid for their rig they won’t sell at any price

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> because the botnet change according to how much shit they can infect / propagate

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> even if every miner dumps, 100k a day in sell pressure shouldn't be that impactful

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> they don't really care about the price, for them the most they infect the better

<e​longated:matrix.org> Costs almost nothing to mine, zero cost

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> it cost nothing to botnet but do you think that if price was 4k, the botnet would infect like 20x more machines

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> because if you take the account of electricity cost / reward you would see that price alone would bring a crapton of hashrate

<e​longated:matrix.org> They have been doing it for years, someone buys a few million in xmr, just to come back in a week to see someone mindlessly selling at any price

<s​herry:unredacted.org> xmr support by lots of botnet/low performance devices, change to something with 16gb RAM, maybe kill xmr network healthy

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s not healthy, it’s rotten

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> it would nuke the botnet and at minimum make xmr more vulnerable until replacement hashrate is brought online.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Sure, botnet hashrate would be replaced by more honest hashrate if the ram requirement was higher (again, reward & electricity cost is pretty much the only thing that matter)

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> botnet gone == extra reward buffer

<e​longated:matrix.org> With current state of xmr, legit miners are buffer

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> have to be careful with that migration, it's just what i'm saying.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> bumping the requirement will probably shut the botnet instantly but it will take more than instantly to brind replacement hashrate

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> have to be careful with that migration, it's just what i'm saying.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> bumping the requirement will probably shut the botnet instantly but it will take more than instantly to bring replacement hashrate

<e​longated:matrix.org> With current randomx, you need pos for actual security

<s​herry:unredacted.org> actually, nobody knows how many hashrates support by botnet, 30%? 70%?, if just 30%, ok for replace to a bigger algo, but if 70%...

<s​herry:unredacted.org> more serious to next step

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Can they slowly increase the ram requirement, that would be ideal. That would scrap out the botnet.. slowly while healty hashrate replace it

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> botnets are good actually?

<s​herry:unredacted.org> i think botnet is bad

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> hashes are hashes

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> We don't know what there up to too much

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> but they do provide hashrate.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> if they are proving 70% and we nuke them in one day then it will be way easiler to attack monero till the replacement hashrate is brought online

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> And yeah, I don't think we can even know how much hashrate there prividing, so a gentle scrapping would be ideal... imo...

<e​longated:matrix.org> For the operators, not price or confidence of ppl investing in mining or coin

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> Explain again how kicking honest miners off the network helps against a 51% attack again

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> Explain again how kicking honest miners off the network helps against a 51% attack

<e​longated:matrix.org> Botnets are not honest

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> If you produce valid blocks are aren't employing selfish mining techniques, that's an honest miner

<e​longated:matrix.org> Just needs a bigger botnet to mine for cubic

<e​longated:matrix.org> Free zero cost mine anything

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Yeah, it would also kick people wou have less ram.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> 16GB "should be ok" but 12GB is better.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> a LOT of honest miners use that traditionnal "two 8GB dual rank stick" so they have 16GB today

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> And Ryzen run a lot shittier if you stuff the four slots so it would force them to replace 16GB for 32GB. It will incure a cost per 20Kh/s

<e​longated:matrix.org> Mine whatever pays more

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> is 20KH/s is worth 150$?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> considering it make less than 10 a month, that is the question

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> you just described most crypto miners

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Most botnet are "probably" on shit hardware and office shit that have 8GB or less. Again, probably

<e​longated:matrix.org> Good luck

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Just rising the bar to 6GB should scrap a ton of them

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I would say if they can make code that force the algo to require 1GB more, every months, until we are at 12GB, could be the way.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> The only honest people that will get anoyed by that, are the one that mine on the computer they use at the same time

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> 12GB out of 64GB is nothing, but 12GB out of 32GB might be a lot depending of the users

<e​longated:matrix.org> They are not going to even increase it by 1mb, they will give rpi excuse to keep mining themselves on botnets

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> do people even mine with that garbage grade hardware?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Ask lyza and crew defending their botnet algo

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> lol

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> for the price of an orange pi, you can get an used thinkcentre with 8 or 16GB ram, that have like 6x the oomph of a orange pi (plus it come with a metal case, 3 display output, 6-7 usb, 1-2 nvme and sata).

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> rpi/opi are such an overpriced scam

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> except if your plan is to make a computer for you car or to send it to space or something

<e​longated:matrix.org> Botnet loving crew is responsible for current state of xmr and will be dead in price and security in couple of years

<e​longated:matrix.org> Anyways I am out, this is MRL; I can’t do daily botnet rants

<s​herry:unredacted.org> lol btw my laptop only 8G RAM XD

<s​herry:unredacted.org> with core 2 duo CPU

<s​herry:unredacted.org> if change to bigger algo, i cant mine xmr on this laptop for fun! (just kidding

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Bymping to 12GB would remove only 4kh/s from my stash

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yes you are mining so much, thanks without your laptop mining for masters; xmr wouldn’t be where it is

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i love that I can write into the bots "cryptographic whatsits" and it responds with "oh you mean commitments"

<e​longated:matrix.org> PoS + PoW Hybrid Would Work for Monero

<e​longated:matrix.org> In a hybrid design, both miners and stakers must agree on a block.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Example:

<e​longated:matrix.org> • PoW miner creates a block →

<e​longated:matrix.org> • PoS validators sign/finalize it →

<e​longated:matrix.org> • Block enters the chain only if it passes both checks.

<e​longated:matrix.org> This means an attacker would need:

<e​longated:matrix.org> 1. >50% of the hash rate and

<e​longated:matrix.org> 2. >50% of the staked XMR

<e​longated:matrix.org> …which is exponentially harder than just dominating PoW.

<p​reland:monero.social> (If the goal is to completely control the chain, then yes.

<p​reland:monero.social> If the goal is only to disrupt or stall the network, 50% in either would be enough to prevent consensus

<p​reland:monero.social> Back to hiatus)

<e​longated:matrix.org> You need both for 51% attack

<e​longated:matrix.org> You may halt it for sometime but reorgs are not possible

<e​longated:matrix.org> You may halt it for sometime but deep reorgs are not possible

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> That sounds like a good idea

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> How do you guys feel about a hybrid like system?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i like it

<h​bs:matrix.org> It all depends how validators are chosen, how many there are and what their power is. Introducing an additional layer should be thought out as to not weaken the resistance of Monero to censorship/coercion. As of now I see it as abandoning decentralization, but happy to change my mind as details unfold

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i like the 1 week epoch idea, not sure about PoS-ing every block for instant finality.

<h​ennyh:matrix.org> In that proposed hybrid scheme if majority validators offline - the whole chain is blocked

<h​ennyh:matrix.org> with the proposed finality layer, PoW continues - finalization is just halted

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> This is an important point. It's still easy for large actors with nuclear data centers to do a "denial of service" 51% attack on the PoW consensus protocol.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> But, I like the idea of doing a hybrid PoW/PoS upgrade at first, because ). it seems like the most palatable solution.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> If we ever do experience a denial of service 51% attack, we can discuss migrating to pure PoS (after its effectiveness has been tested in the real world).

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> This is an important point. It's still easy for large actors with nuclear data centers to do a "denial of service" 51% attack on the PoW consensus protocol.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> But, I like the idea of doing a hybrid PoW/PoS upgrade at first, because it seems like the most palatable solution.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> If we ever do experience a denial of service 51% attack, we can discuss migrating to pure PoS (after its effectiveness has been tested in the real world).

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> im gonna stop the delusion right there. nuclear is state controlled, so you are inherently talking of a state actor in which case it will be decently more economic to buy liquidity and stake, making PoS way weaker

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> In PoW, the cost to attack and the cost to defend are 1:1. And state actors will always have more resources.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> In PoS, it asymmetrically favors defense.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> You have to pump the bags of the hodlrs in order to attack.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> And if they do buy 51% of the network, then congratulations to the early hodlrs, you now have a fat bag of BTC

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I think POS or the proposed hybrid solution are the only realistic path forward. Yes they have their risks, but I think at this point the benefits outweigh the risks.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> Mav on twitter is for some reason pushing for GPU mining

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> lmfao

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> which does not make any sense at all imo

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> I just saw him calling about exiting monero if it goes PoS because of centralization

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> come on

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> What an idiot! Don’t let the door hit him on the way out I guess

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> anyway if I can agree with mav for once is that there are a lot of seemingly silent accounts suddenly pushing for PoS

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> full PoS is definitely not the way

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> but the finality layer is a decent compromise imo

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Maybe Mav just bought a GPU and wants to make some money.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> He doesn't like PoS because he's poor.

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> will stop botnets

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> nobody mines on gpus illegally

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> 1. it is too similar to zano. 2. it is an irrational compromise: if an adversary is willing to burn hundreds of millions on the stake, is he suddenly going to stop at spending a few million on cpus as welll? for this minuscule amount of pseudo security very fast finality and practically zero inflation is left on the table.

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> spirobel trying not to shill his zero inflation pure PoS challenge: IMPOSSIBLE

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> the pow game has been plaid out. its either asics, gpus or cpus. the endgame for private digital cash is zero inflation pos with 1-10 second finality. (default path sub 2 second finality)

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> its more about protecting the PoW from attacks than be resiliant against a literally infinitely wealthy PoS attacker

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> PoW consensus is already being threatened by something as tiny as qubic

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> qubic could have never reached a disruptive PoS stake

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> The devil is in the details, but my intuition is to agree with spirobel that pure PoS is better. But, a hybrid approach seems more palatable and easier to get up and running quickly.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Eth migrated in 2 steps IIRC. Step 1 to hybrid PoW/poS and then step 2 to pure PoS

it is kind of a once in a long time opportunity to get the switch done, if not now then how hard will it be in the future

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> we still have feelings for PoW but the vast majority of the world does not have these feelings. if you have the choice to use something that feels basically instant and has no inflation you will pick it over something that takes minutes to half an hour and has inflation. Monero can decide to be the former or the latter.

PoS doesnt have inflation?

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> It can have

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> transaction fees

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> could be enough

especially if it doesnt cost a ton of electricity to run an node right

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> since running a staker doesnt have a condiserable direct cost aside form the stake

<e​longated:matrix.org> I guess 10-20% of block reward

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> design choice. Iinear increase (!=interest)

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> if you have a block reward you still have inflation

<e​longated:matrix.org> Pow remains

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> fixed inflation is a good thing

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> It's not even really inflation... If 100% of people staked, then their relative purchasing powers would stay the same.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> IOW, the supply might increase by 1%, but you also earned 1% on your stake.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> IF xmr adoption raises, deflation means death of real producers. btw

want more HR to protect the network? pump the price

buy now

<e​longated:matrix.org> lol

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> right now we are discussing using bitcoin from the gf to pay for hashpower. that is like a system where the people interested in network security are willing to pay to stake. PoW is a very inefficent PoS system with negative inflation. its like the eu doing negative intrest rates taking money out of the biggest whale bank accounts.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> In PoS, if you want to support the network, you pump the price!

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> always nice to remind that while discussing PoS is all fun and games but in the current state of things it can only be implemented in the long-term making it non-viable for preventing Qubic threat of today. Moreover, im afraid some here are getting to hype up about their stake idea while ArticMine i think explained in details the inherent vulnerabilities of it and multiple PoW har<clipped

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> dening improvements can be think of first.

<e​longated:matrix.org> If and when it’s implemented, rn we are at mercy of random cpu masters

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> i know what I say sounds like I am committing blasphemy. its the truth though and nobody has given a convincing argument against it. people just argue based on what they think the crowd can accept. there is not a single argument based on facts.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i honestly kind of agree with spirobel

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> The question of how fast we can migrate to PoS is important.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> But there is a lot of existing PoS privacy coins that we can look at their code bases.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> PoS has a bad rep because of the way other projects use it

<e​longated:matrix.org> You can’t change social contracts that easily, you can adjust but not change it randomly

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> I think the question of whether or not to migrate to PoS is more important

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> and grumpy ex-eth miners

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i was making 10€ a day mining ETH, of course its a bit sad that its gone now

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i can only imagine how the people with 12 3080s must feel :P

<e​longated:matrix.org> Don’t worry there are only cpu owners who are actually profitable, a rare few; but yes their masters will bleed

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> It's not a random arbitrary change. It's in response to the price falling by like 20% because everyone realizes that pure PoW is weak.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Pure pow algo is weak

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> "everyone"

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> statement dreamed up by the utterly deranged

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> you guys love to talk about facts while extrapolating events in your favor. thats curious

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> what are the dangers of PoS? that you can short it on CEX? 1. same applies to PoW (which would be much cheaper and more feasible) 2. the people arguing for PoW will be gone in the future. They are already dwindling. We have to look at the situation from the end state instead of getting stuck in what we think the current "other people" will think. this perception is outdated and th<clipped message>

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> ey will be gone in any case.

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> TL;DR: PoS is good because I said so and I've bunch of my young friends here who love PoS

<e​longated:matrix.org> If devs are genuine they will bring out randomxv2 which isn’t exploited by masters

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> People can have ulterior motives for supporting PoW. They might have a bothet of cheap CPUs for example.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> PoS is good because it can become big enough to not be fucked with. PoW will always be at the mercy of datacenters

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> I think there are no ulterior motives with PoS other than wanting the price to pump and the network to be secure.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> no. address point 1. that was the inherent danger that arcticmine pointed out. a short against pow xmr is much easier to pull off than one against pos xmr

<e​longated:matrix.org> Can be fixed, needs to change ram requirements simple

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> PoS is also good in a scenario where miners are hunted

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> its very hard to hide a mining farm

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> finally a good argument

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> Ok mea culpa, however I would like numbers backing this up

<e​longated:matrix.org> There are no cpu farms, there are data centres or botnets

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> because pow involve a lot of logistics, that pos do not require

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> it's not just about money

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> also consider the memetics of: there will only ever be 18 million xmr. think about the feeling of saying it to a bitcoiner. that joy alone is worth it.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> yeah, if you really wanted to go after miners you can track them down with a bit of effort and palantir software

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s not easy to acquire a large stake, but am against only pos

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i dont agree with the 0% inflation spirobel is suggesting lol

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> yeah zero inflation is bad

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> fixed inflation is good

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> we should still have a slight inflation to replace lost coins

<e​longated:matrix.org> Tail emission is just that

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> yeah

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> spirobel was arguing for 0% inflation, tx-fees only PoS

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> tail emission was to ensure the feasibility of pow into eternity. we saw how that played out

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> with zero inflation, the economy is deflationary which immediately pushes people to not consume/spend because the price of tomorrow will be higher than yesterday

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> aka it will be like bitcoin

<e​longated:matrix.org> Not just pow but replacing lost coins

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> oh fuck yes ofrnxmr good morning

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> that's it i can head out now

<e​longated:matrix.org> So there is a soft consensus for pos of some kind ? Maybe tweak pow too and help genuine home miners ?

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> there a no consensus whatsoever on pos, at least from the high weight devs/researcher people

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> on pure pos*

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> last meeting was "pow hardening worth investigating" and "pos/pow is interesting"

<e​longated:matrix.org> Some pos not pure pos 😅

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> my bad

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> all I can understand from this argument is, he thinks stake is sort of a credit to the network. Might be a fringe case at best, not to be generalized.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> poor people will keep spending because of necessity and the end state is zero inflation. if there is a choice to convert to something that has zero inflation people will pick that any day. from a security point of view it is better because it disincentives liquid staking. there are no good reasons for inflation

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> spirobel do you even realize why the fiat system is trying very hard to keep inflation at 2% no more no less?

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> also its wrong, people loses coin, which make a zero inflation system deflationary

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> poor people will not keep spending

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> that has been proven over time in history

<e​longated:matrix.org> Deflation is not good for currency, as ppl can lose coins

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> so your argument is because mommy largarde said so?

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> also if you really believe that then we need a central bank that adjust according to what the current monero economy is like

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> incredible shortcut

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> spirobel the argument speedrunner

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> whats it with people disregarding basic economics today

<e​longated:matrix.org> 1% inflation isn’t going to kill monero or price, but that same 1% can bring in more ppl into monero ecosystem

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> id even be down for changing the tail emission away from a fixed xmr amount to a fixed percentage

<t​orir:matrix.org> 1% inflation is tiny. Some countries take more than 30% in taxes and still have higher inflation rates.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> tari does it

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> right now we just end up in the same place btc will, just a thousand years later

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> this whole argument mixes in feelings about general economic policy by fiat legacy governments into a debate that should be strictly about security

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> oh

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> idea: add 10 lines of code to tell a node to checkpoint itself 10 blocks from its tip, and 10 more lines of code to tell it to ban peers that send alt chains that start before that cutoff 🧠

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> highly debatable feelings.

<e​longated:matrix.org> With tail emission the % keeps decreasing and that’s fine as number of lost coins will keep reducing with time as ppl get used to crypto currency

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> 🪞

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> I think when thinking about inflation v. Deflation it's important to ask what's the goal?

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Network security?

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Preserving purchasing power?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> eventually you will still reach deflation elongated

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> NGU?

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Stimulating economy?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> p2p digital cash economy

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> you cant divorce the economics from the rest of the design, they are pretty fundamental

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> people arguing for inflation have the burden of proof.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Better than if you have a fixed coin

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> currently we have negative inflation staking.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Why is deflation bad again?

<t​orir:matrix.org> For the purposes of being able to convince people to switch to the hard fork when we update the consensus, I propose we not change emission now.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> same long-term result

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> yeah i agree, fucking with the economics would be too decisive

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> yeah i agree, fucking with the economics would be too divisive

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> also: we are not even asking about economic inflation or deflation. its not like we have the XMR FOMC meetings that assess the local catnip economy to adjust the monero fed funds rate

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> a slight inflation keeps stakers happy even if there arent many transactions

<t​orir:matrix.org> Still, we can't completely escape the economic debate, since PoS and PoW differ fundamentally in who gets distributed funds and if we do a hybrid model we need to decide which gets what percentage.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> but the goal of SyntheticBird was to increase transactions and keep people spending. so wouldnt it be best to keep stakers unhappy when there are no transactions? so they go out and spread the word and make people happy to spend

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> if a farmer buys seed and earns less and less later on - he cant afford to buy seeds for the next season. starvation is the result of deflation, a death spiral.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> % starts to compound quickly. I doubt monero will change the emission (its been the same forever)

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> (of producers in the real economy)

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> no, syntetic just didnt want to choke out any sort of economic activity via deflation

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> unhappy stakers that do little dances to keep everyone spending and making transactions is more likely to be successful than inflation. because the obvious answer to inflation is just to sell and move to an asset that does not have inflation.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> wish we had more austrians in the chat

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> read hayek kids

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> I think Spirobel is making good points

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> either inflation or deflation - has to be just right! And there is no fixed formula

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> heavy consumers subsidize the way non-consumers live

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> *neither

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> if everyone spent money like me, the world economy would be in absolute shambles

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> If our goal is to attract people to a new monetary medium that can't be confiscated by governments, then deflation is attractive to Hodlrs

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Dynamic blocks are a function of tail emission

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Tx fees burn the emission under heavy usage

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> stop buying so many useless plushies >:c

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> PLUSHIES4LIFE

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> ryan my point is that i dont spend nearly enough to support an economy liek this one

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> right, we are in attraction phase - where economics is less important.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> if everyone spent like me, we would get less technological innovations

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> in this phase memetics are important.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> imo it would make a lot of sense just lock the current percentage inflation rate but the long-term gain would not be bigger than the shock of changing the economic design

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> we will be good for the next 500 years

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> I'm more worried about governments banning farming than I am about deflationary economics making seeds too expensive.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Spirobel is right that investors want low inflation assets.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> future generations can decide if they need to lock it to a percentage

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> its the same cope as BTC maxis but the difference is that the BTC design falls apart at around 2040

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> which is really not that far from now

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> We had gold based currencies for 100s of years. Maybe you could argue gold has an inflation rate of like 1%

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> zero inflation is the inevitable end state.

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> no. don't remind me we're closer to 2050 than 2000. grr.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> You need inflation for PoW, not for PoS

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Because the electricity has to be paid for

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> the economics

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> single biggest lie in the monero network

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> economic design impacts much more than the consensus algorithm

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Why is it a lie? I'm open minded.

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> this guy got infected with the srbminer. old.reddit.com/r/truenas/comments/1…d_a_hidden_crypto_miner_need_advice

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> electricity has to be paid for but no, you steal it

so spirobel wants to get rid of dynamic blocksize?

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> (srbminer was a stupid descision but...)

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> nioc: spirobel wants to move to a state of the art consensus algorithm. that is close to the inevitable end state of private p2p cash.

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> spirobel talking to about himself

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> (absolutely not a proof that asdfqwfe is his alt i swear)

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> i just did it to be cute

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> okay seriously what do you guys think the situation is in 5-10 years?

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> are we really going to wait half an hour for 10 blocks to arrive?

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> grab some coffee while the transaction finalizes

*tea

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> maybe pet your cat, water the plants...

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> plot twist, how are you going to pay for the coffee?

tea is cheaper

<t​orir:matrix.org> There is a layer 2 payment channel thingy for XMR in development.

in development? link?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Grease

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> remember lightning. press f to show respect

<t​orir:matrix.org> I hesitate to change emission just for the sake of changing emission, especially when the difference between deflationary and inflationary is so divisive. Inflation rate is already low and will become effectively even smaller over time. How much, really, is the difference between keeping our tiny rate and removing it entirely, especially when making that change might threaten our <clipped message>

<t​orir:matrix.org> ability to upgrade the network at all?

<t​orir:matrix.org> Grease: github.com/grease-xmr/grease

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Not his alt. Great minds think alike :)

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Her*

thx

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> practically we have negative inflation staking. like eu thieving from large bank account with negative interest rate. we do this because we need to do an electricity offering to the cpu gods.

<t​orir:matrix.org> There are going to be other hardforks in the future anyway, more chances to make changes to emission. We don't really need to settle this now.

<t​orir:matrix.org> It's not the same as negative inflation. The current model still has the effect of marginally reducing the value of the Monero in people's wallets.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> There will be hfs in the future, but changing stuff like emission is fed reserve lvl rugging

<t​orir:matrix.org> I'm not in favor of changing inflation at this point, I'm just saying, now isn't the best time to fight for it.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> "we decided to reduce inflation. Insert NGU upgrade" "weve decided we made enough $. Insert NGD upgrade"

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> I'm just throwing out random ideas out of my head dont mind my conspiracy theories

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> its his/him dont misgender me or i will report you to hr ofrnxmr

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> since when?

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> who is monero HR?

ofrn

<t​orir:matrix.org> I suggested a chance to emission some days ago and came to realize that it's sort of against Monero's principles to change emission without a really good reason.

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> circular dependency detected

<t​orir:matrix.org> change to emission*

more like a really really really good reason :)

like existential

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> yes you are right Torir practically we are a jungle tribe that does a very expensive ritual for no good purpose. lets hope we can reach modernity before we go extinct

<t​orir:matrix.org> And no, saying "inflation is bad" and "deflation is good" is not going to be convincing to this community. You'll probably want research papers to back it up.

<t​orir:matrix.org> If you want to remove inflation from Monero, make a rational argument for it and publish it as a paper. We are more likely to listen to that.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> This does raise the question of how Monero is governed.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> It's not a democracy or a corporation.

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> emission-free 👍️

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Being present for particl (pos. On chain voting) discussion to change (lower) their emission from 7% to 1%, shows that whales who own majority of the stake want to reduce the inflation after earning 7% for years

need emission for dynamic blocksize

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> it becomes like nano, where the only way to increase your holdings is to buy off of a bag holder

<t​orir:matrix.org> The problem is that changing emission is a violation of a vital social contract: the supply of Monero is supposed to be predictable and not controlled by anyone. The social contract is what makes Monero money and not an expensive waste of electricity.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> tail emission is to pay for pow miners. if those are gone we can get rid of it. inflation is downstream from that. its a purely technical discussion

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> tail emission is for dynamic blocks.

<t​orir:matrix.org> Tail emission does still serve a purpose in dynamic blocks. It creates a cost for miners to grow the block size.

<t​orir:matrix.org> That won't go away with PoS, at least not with the immediate changes we are likely to make.

<e​longated:matrix.org> We are not getting rid of pow 😅 atleast rn if hybrid fails then it’s pos only

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> i hear people say a lot of times the benefit over btc is tail emission so we can pay for pow into eternity. dynamic block size is not really a topic because the economics of proof of stake are so much different and non of this has any relevance in the discourse around modern consensus algorithms

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I maintain that this the easiest and most straigh forwars solution to finality

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> > idea: add 10 lines of code to tell a node to checkpoint itself 10 blocks from its tip, and 10 more lines of code to tell it to ban peers that send alt chains that start before that cutoff 🧠

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Can you elaborate on this?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Doesnt rewuire a hard fork, and ensures that unlocked coins are immutable

<t​orir:matrix.org> There are good economic arguments against Proof of Stake. I originally didn't like Monero because I was like, "ew, proof of work coin", but I saw there were good reasons to use proof of work at the time and many of those are still valid.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The emission is penalizes when tx fees are high enoigh to grow blocks

<e​longated:matrix.org> Please push a pr so it can be tested while cubic is around

<t​orir:matrix.org> It might work. It might create a hard-to-resolve chain split.

<t​orir:matrix.org> Especially since such a chain split could likely not be resolved without invalidating decoys and requiring resending transactions.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 11 block reorgs invalidate decoys

<t​orir:matrix.org> Yes, miners have the option to include more transactions in a block by sacrificing some of the emission and having that offset by transaction fees. It is designed so miners only do it when the network needs higher throughput and don't do it just to collect every fee possible.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> our 10 block lock is arbitrary.. and unprotected

<t​orir:matrix.org> If we could ensure that every node agreed on the *same* checkpoint block... oh wait, that's the point of a finality layer.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Chain splits would only happen on nodes that allow invalidating txs. Mining pools are incentivized to not allow deep reorgs

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Why do we need to use the "same" block? Everu node's should have tip-10+ blocks as "the same"

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> i don't see why we need an "authority" beyond our own node, to finalize 10 confs

<t​orir:matrix.org> I'd love to see a paper on it or even just an attack outline, but without a finality layer it might be possible to present an 11 block re-org to a node right before it gets to see the 10th block that would cause it to checkpoint and cause it to checkpoint a different fork from the rest of the network and be permanently stalled.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> because once your off the checkpoint chain thats it

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> your node is gone

<t​orir:matrix.org> If an attacker can publish an 11 block reorg at once, they could absolutely choose to publish it, carefully timed, to some nodes and not others.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> you cant present an 11 blocks w/o being banned

<b​oog900:monero.social> You can have 10 blocks while the main chain is at block 9, then when you see block 10 on the main chain you would send out your chain

<b​oog900:monero.social> To hopefully split nodes between the 2

<t​orir:matrix.org> You wouldn't even have to hide your whole chain. Publish 8 blocks of your chain while the network is at 9. As an attacker, you are likely highly connected to the network. The moment you see the honest miners block 10, you publish your block 9 and 10 (which are empty so they transfer quick) to 50% of the nodes you are connected to, and publish the honest block 10 to the other 50%. <clipped message>

<t​orir:matrix.org> The nodes who get your block 10 lock on your block 1, the other nodes lock the honest block 1.

<t​orir:matrix.org> You just split the network, congrats, because you controlled the order that nodes could see blocks.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Somethings not adding up

<t​orir:matrix.org> The consensus model has to consider that an attacker might have a lot of control over which order blocks are presented to nodes. If all nodes could always get all blocks in the same order, we wouldn't need a consensus mechanism.

<v​enture:monero.social> How is the proposal to require miner to sign blocks received?

<v​enture:monero.social> How is the proposal to require miners to sign blocks received?

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> venture: , the "enforce solo mining" thing?

<v​enture:monero.social> yes, that one

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i don't think it has been discussed in much detail. everyone's clamoring to get proof of steak into the protocol :(

<v​enture:monero.social> it doesn't enforce solo though, p2pool mining would still be fine. IMO

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Couldn't an attacker with 51% just generate a bunch of Sybil signatures?

<t​orir:matrix.org> The point is to remove large pools by making it possible for miners to steal the block reward from the pool, by requiring the PoW incorporate the private key for the pool reward in some way. It would affect 51% by making it hard for a pool to acquire that percent. It wouldn't change the attack if performed by a single entity.

<t​orir:matrix.org> It would kill the Qubic attack, since Qubic is essentially just operating a large pool.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Hmm, it sounds like a promising short/medium term solution.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Wouldn't really do much against nation state attackers.

<t​orir:matrix.org> There is some complication, like for instance pools could force miners to stake coins before mining so the pool could take the stake if the miners cheat.

<t​orir:matrix.org> So you need a version where it cannot be determined who took the coins, and that requires a lot of work to develop. Might be too slow for the present crisis.

<v​enture:monero.social> I read up about this on the github issue. seems no silver-bullet

<v​enture:monero.social> monero-project/research-lab #136#issuecomment-3185600624

<t​orir:matrix.org> One suggestion would be to add an instruction to RandomX that signs arbitrary data with the miner's key (with some limit so it doesn't trigger too often and slow down the mining). That would be very difficult to offload to a server.

<v​enture:monero.social> actually, read for yourself.. the comment i just tagged was invalidated since the signature would be in the hash.

<v​enture:monero.social> ^ sorry, i'm just reading up on this. should think first before typing :)

<t​orir:matrix.org> You are learning to think critically. Our community always wants more of that.

<v​enture:monero.social> yeah, it's interesting how this could play out. At least I would assume a huge hashrate drop, but that's doesn't mean lower "network security" necessarily.

<v​enture:monero.social> equating high network security with high hashrate completely misses 51% attack vectors. Seems like fighting fire with fire to some extend. You could have network hashrate of Zetahashes and still be insecure w.r.t consolidation. consolidation might even be more likely, with higher hashrates.

<v​enture:monero.social> *enforcing solo mining would result in a hashrate drop

<v​enture:monero.social> \*enforcing solo mining would result in a hashrate drop I guess

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The primary point of PoW would be:

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> 1) Decentralized pseudo-leader election (reducing conflicts during consensus without using a leader consensus protocol)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> 2) Trade-offs if we want to assume synchrony to some degree

<a​rticmine:monero.social> In my view the community is panicking. This is simply not the way to make such profound consensus and even more important critical changes to the Monero economic model, such as emission rates to fund this vaguely defined POS proposal.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> How above some hard numbers on the proposed changes to the emission rate?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> As a start

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/plljvpssAvPFstmpdMAhSvjH

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Yeah, let's not panic

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> The community SHOULD be panicking. That is the correct thing to do when your marketcap drops 20% and it becomes common knowledge how easy it is to 51% your coin.

<b​oog900:monero.social> so easy they failed to do it

<b​oog900:monero.social> not to down play that this is a potential issue but the house isn't burning down

<b​asses:matrix.org> but may in the future when a richer CEO attack Monero

<h​bs:matrix.org> if only the panicked hodlers sold their coins instead of suggesting quarter baked solutions to misunderstood issues

<t​orir:matrix.org> We aren't about to rush into a stupid solution. People are proposing things left and right but the core team is doing the usual thing and writing proposals and analyzing various suggestions.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Let's also remember that this is happening at the same time that governments are making a coordinated attack on privacy in general

<h​bs:matrix.org> I think you can probably ask all those politicians about Monero and very few would have heard of it

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Qubic is failing with their so-called 51% attack.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> They are being successful with a SOCIAL attack.

<t​esttank:matrix.org> Their hope was that with all the free press their shitcoin would 10x then at that point they really could’ve 51% attacked Monero, do we really want to be at the mercy of regards?

<t​orir:matrix.org> Politicians are currently targeting Signal and the like for the most part. Monero is on the radar, but only as a bullet point in the larger realm of cryptocurrency.

<h​bs:matrix.org> Hanlon's razor usually applies

<e​longated:matrix.org> Exchanges have stopped withdrawals/deposits due to perceived reorg/51%attack that has caused more issues

<b​asses:matrix.org> and force Monero to switch to PoS

<h​bs:matrix.org> use Retoswap

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> services increased their required confs as well

<b​asses:matrix.org> his plan is _clearly working_

<e​longated:matrix.org> Not easy for normies

<a​rticmine:monero.social> That is actually reasonable and responsible

<b​asses:matrix.org> is there any way you think it could be further improved?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There are actual serious conflicts of interest issue here.

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> This is reminding me of the old block size wars with Bitcoin and Roger Ver's book about Hijacking BTC

<e​longated:matrix.org> Retoswap ? Normies don’t use desktop much, maybe a mobile app will help in adoption.

<b​asses:matrix.org> there's already an app in development

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> to an extent. Its harder to reorg 10 compared to 1 or 5 (and evict tx back to mempool w/ empty blocks), but still neither is going to remove the tx from the mempool. Issue is if attacker maintains enough empty blocks to prevent txs from gaining finality, for 72hrs

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Vet's argument in Bitcoin was a conflict of interest involving developers

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Ver's

<h​bs:matrix.org> mainly because there is a mining industry in the Bitcoin space with a lot at stake

<l​ordx3nu:matrix.org> x.com/DesheShai/status/1956001181546709005

<b​oog900:monero.social> Seems pretty reasonable

<e​longated:matrix.org> x.com/desheshai/status/1956003870498337144 ?

<b​oog900:monero.social> Well that part less so, but it still isn't unreasonable to say that

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Many ASIC-mined coins have been actually double-spend attacked with >51% hashpower.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> ASICS aren't a magical defense

<e​longated:matrix.org> I feel a hybrid approach with enough research is the way ahead.

<b​oog900:monero.social> I agree but any CPU friendly PoW has to deal with how easy it is to rent CPUs

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Eth Classic, Bitcoin Satoshi Vision, Bitcoin Gold, to namea few. Source (sorry for long URL):

<r​ucknium:monero.social> moneroresearch.info/index.php?actio…23dcfff0d18fe706fb1cd1edac20644e31c

<b​oog900:monero.social> Fwiw I still think asic resistance is a good thing

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Was Firo's PoW ASIC-mineable when they were 51% double-spend attacked?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> forum.firo.org/t/firo-51-attack-pos…em-and-vote-on-attackers-funds/1084

<r​ucknium:monero.social> isthmus's analysis: mitchellpkt.medium.com/new-forensic…-2021-firo-50-1-attack-ad8bae6efdc0

<b​oog900:monero.social> The algorithm claims to reduce the difference between asics and CPUs: github.com/firoorg/firo/wiki/What-i…an-ideal-Proof-of-Work-algorithm%3F

<t​orir:matrix.org> Didn't Monero change to RandomX in response to a private ASIC being developed?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Sure. When the house is on fire we order an untested highly complex and very expensive fire engine that would be delivered weeks or months down the road.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> We need to be focusing on putting out the fire NOW m.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Wow that’s pretty bad it seems

<a​rticmine:monero.social> We need to look at node relay solutions that while not perfect can frustrate the attack and am be implemented without a hard fork.

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> although the relay solutions could be a fun time to hard fork with e.g. the randomx update that's been sitting around forever? put everyone on the new relay rules

<a​rticmine:monero.social> During the Bitmain attack people were not drafting CCS proposals. The community was working collaboratively to address the immediate attack, while a long term solution in the form of Random X was found

<e​longated:matrix.org> In this attack, ppl are asking to apply bandaids and not actual solution

<a​rticmine:monero.social> . and by the way Bitmain was a far greater opponent that managed around 90% of the hashrate on a sustainable basis. Qubic is around 25% on a sustainable basis

<e​longated:matrix.org> Just waiting for them to scale

<a​rticmine:monero.social> We apply the bandaid first, while we find the long term solution

<a​rticmine:monero.social> This is what happened in 2017

<e​longated:matrix.org> Ccs is for long term solutions

<e​longated:matrix.org> We just replaced asic miners with botnets to secure network

<a​rticmine:monero.social> CCS can wait. Let us get private financial interests out of the equation. We do not have time for this now

<e​longated:matrix.org> Ccs can be done in parallel, no harm on working for long term solutions

<c​aptaincanaryllc:matrix.org> can enforce p2pool decentralized protocol to all monero mining pools, and stop all other pools from contributing to hashrate?

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> no, FiroPoW is GPU iirc

<a​rticmine:monero.social> It clouds the choice of a long term solution if we have people advocating for their own financial interests

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Hm, i see. If a ccs is funded, people are more likely to stop looking at alternatives, and donors / community is more likely to be swayed towards the already-funded research path

<a​rticmine:monero.social> This is what is going on not

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Now

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Correct

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Maybe it’s because there’s no financial incentive to mine monero in the first place. which makes it easier for some random dude with a random coin to do a 51% attack in the first place.

<e​longated:matrix.org> You mean pos ?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> We need to discuss all options in a rational and unbiased manner. Then we can make an informed decision.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> When people are pushing their financial interests one never gets a rational discussion

<e​lias:dfri.se> How about, as a form of bandaid, get people to donate to p2pool in order to make p2pool stronger?

<e​lias:dfri.se> Like, "donate here and the money gets distributed to the current p2pool miners" (those addresses are anyway seen on the p2pool chain I think)

<e​lias:dfri.se> Then let everyone know that such donations are happening, creating incentive for more people to start mining through p2pool.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The world is run by financial interests my friend.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Who will judge which options are rational or unbiased ?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The issue is that, users are a minority. Whether qubic can be classified as a botnet, is up for debate. But other botnets are/were the only reason qubic couldnt get their 51%

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Users -> individual miners

speaking of CCS proposals, just posted repo.getmonero.org/monero-project/ccs-proposals/-/merge_requests/604

<e​longated:matrix.org> Can’t depend on botnets someday a larger botnet can attack

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Cant get rid of botnets and not also get rid of rig rentals or qubic

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The judge must not have a financial stake (pardon pun) in the judgement

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> there is no need to stifle free discourse, Artic. If there is no panic we have time to hear all sorts of different opinions.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There are good proposals to get rid of botnets. Such as the block singing proposals

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Then you might as well say that anybody who mines monero or owns monero has no say, because it’s in their best interest for monero to do well. This is nonsense

<c​aptaincanaryllc:matrix.org> can get rid of all of those and solve the problem? Solo and p2pool only

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Does this do anything to stop qubic or rig rentals?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> No I. Mean someone who is selling. a particular option

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> is there a need for urgent action? even in the worst possible outcome they wont double spend. the best might be to ignore them until they get tired and move on to something else. they have already hinted at mining another coin

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 1. The global hashratw would be like 500mh

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 2. Pools already mine on top of p2pool

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I ended up doing a very brief outline for CCS, though obviously I expect the completed work to be similar in content/thickness as my FCMP++ paper (albeit angled for wider understandability throughout the community). repo.getmonero.org/monero-project/ccs-proposals/-/merge_requests/604

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There is a strong case for mitigations

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It’s important, because theirs nothing stopping someone else from doing something similar.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> .bbl

<a​rticmine:monero.social> We don't need the perfect solution now.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> so, what about GF renting some... ?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Nobody is saying there is a perfect solution, but I just think monero should move away from POW. But what do I know

<c​aptaincanaryllc:matrix.org> can make p2pool protocol standard and enforced for all existing pools? Decentralizing miners while retaining hashrate

<e​longated:matrix.org> Obviously we are at a stage we can’t let them go away, that’s why hybrid so that we are not fully dependent on them.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> what are the mitigations? the outcome of yesterdays meeting was that anything short team wouldnt make a material difference. correct me if i am wrong

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> what are the mitigations? the outcome of yesterdays meeting was that anything short term wouldnt make a material difference. correct me if i am wrong

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Yesterday's meeting was a mess

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> it was alright. we made good progress.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There was little rational discussion of mitigation that could be implemented without massive controversy. Instead it focused on drastic and highly controversial protocol chagges

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> the question if it is an attack. it seems more like a marketing campaign at our expense. that had the positive side effect to bring some motion into the pow vs pos debate. in the long run this benefits us greatly

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Changes

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> it is not as controversial as we think it is. in the bitcoiner pow maximalist bubble it might. but this bubble is getting smaller by the hour

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It was a marketing stunt, but it was a marketing stunt that hurt the reputation of monero and it shows that we’re vulnerable to a 51% attacks in the future.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> arguably monero switching from pow to pos will be a bigger problem for bitcoiners than for monero.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There is a lot we can do with the existing POW, before even considering POS.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> pow is played out. asics are not in the cards and gpus are not in the cards.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Exactly! Most Bitcoin is held by a very small group of people or exchanges. That just isn’t the case for monero. The distribution of monero is much more spread out and most exchanges have already delisted monero anyway, so the fear from centralized exchanges overblown in my opinion.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> You mean former Bitcoiners? I plead guilty

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> monero was always against maximalism and pro changes and pragmatism. switching away from pow will make the bitcoiner holdouts look goofy. especially because we will be able to put numbers on how much more expensive and attack would be against monero

<e​longated:matrix.org> Temporarily yes, let’s patch ; next move to hybrid for a long term solution

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> monero was always against maximalism and pro changes and pragmatism. switching away from pow will make the bitcoiner holdouts look goofy. especially because we will be able to put numbers on how much more expensive an attack would be against monero

<c​aptaincanaryllc:matrix.org> does anybody have a quick-fix proposal?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There are several.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> we discussed that yesterday there is nothing that can be done

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I disagree

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> What’s your short term solution?

<c​aptaincanaryllc:matrix.org> I would like to hear also

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Sech1's signing proposal with 1%

<a​rticmine:monero.social> ... and trevadors's proposal

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Both combined

<b​oog900:monero.social> signing blocks didn't work for wownero + doesn't stop renting CPUs

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I still believe sech1's proposal is likely marginal and easily avoided.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> tevador's proposal definitely makes sense when there isn't a knife near the edge of a table.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Marginal sure, but anything that helps a little is better than nothing

My "proposal" was just a random idea, but I see it's already living its own life

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I believe it is so marginal, it is not worth rushing a hard fork for.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Do you have a link to the proposal

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I think it fails complexity/benefit tests, as despite being simply, I think it has almost no effect if any.

<b​oog900:monero.social> I am unsure if either together or alone either proposals would stop renting a ton of CPUs to cause a huge reorg

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> there is a chance that demanding a deposit will frustrate Q* users ... ?

<v​enture:monero.social> can you qualify that? isn't the impact defined by the percentage given to the miner who finds the block?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I disagt

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I disagt

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I disagree

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There is very limited downside.

<b​oog900:monero.social> the fact it needs a HF is quite a big downside IMO

<b​oog900:monero.social> for what? what is it actually going to do?

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> any new release should increase Q* maintenance costs.

<b​oog900:monero.social> one heroic chain did signing with all the block reward ... and it failed

<b​oog900:monero.social> time to startup the 6 month HF cycle again? /s

<v​enture:monero.social> nvm, found your concerns

<v​enture:monero.social> monero-project/research-lab #136#issuecomment-3187508575

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> 1. there is no immediate danger to monero 2. the attack cost on proof of stake is vastly more expensive than what we have now. Is there a rough consensus that this is the case?

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> not jet :)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Requiring miner's sign blocks can be beat with deposits, beat with a statistical edge, or by sharing an encumbered key with the user.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> It forces miners to run their nodes, and put the control over the block on the miners and not the poo l

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The key in my mind is the %. 1% works 100% fails

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Because of that, it has no actual benefit yet adds complexity to the protocol.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Tevador's proposal requires miners run nodes or incur a nontrivial bandwidth penalty every 2 hours.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> No deposits dose not work. To conpkex

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> SGP had notes due to how it's a fixed bandwidth penalty though, not a bandwidth penalty variable to the hash rate, so pools could just only service miners with enough hash to justify the penalty.

<b​oog900:monero.social> a pool can just ask for 99% of the block reward with the miner keeping 1% as a reward for finding the block

<b​oog900:monero.social> or it can take the 1% away from their returns already assuming the got a lot of shares before finding the block

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> If the percent is small enough, I think it has no effect other than making the protocol more complex.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Yes. But the pool does not know beforehand which miner will sign

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (such as 1%)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Except pool payouts are issued after the block is mined.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> So the pool does not get to sign the block

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> So long as the miner's shares are worth less than 0.006 XMR, then yes, the pool can post-deduct the 1%.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Which can be achieved in most cases a minimum floor payout of 0.006 XMR?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> You give a 1% bonus to the signing miner

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> ... minimum payout of 0.012 XMR with 0.006 XMR left with the pool?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> And the pool can simply deduct that 'bonus' from the amount it otherwise would've paid the miner for their shares.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Minimum payment to the finder of 0.006 XMR

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> if we could figure out where we stand on these two questions we could have a more productive discussion

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Regardsless of the finder miner hashrate

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> > Default payout limit is 1 XMR and can be adjusted from 0.11 XMR and up to 10 XMR

<a​rticmine:monero.social> 1) I say there is no immediate danger

<a​rticmine:monero.social> 2) Not even close

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I don't think Nanopool, who has a 0.11 XMR minimum, will mind a lucky miner having spontaneous 0.006 XMR payouts it can simply deduct from the not-yet-paid-out shares.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The pool only loses money if a miner who hasn't reached a pending payout of 0.006 XMR gets lucky and mines a block.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (and then stops mining and leaves)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The pool loses a fraction of 1.5 USD in that case.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The pool does not loose money

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The pool can recoup the bonus paid to the miner by counting it as a payout from the pool though ArticMine

<v​enture:monero.social> I agree with kayabanerve , it's easily recouped by pool fees, payout floors and other things I guess

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The bonus is built into the pool cost

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> That way, the pool maintains 100% of the block reward.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> This was raised by boog900:

<b​oog900:monero.social> So you agree it doesn't stop pools?

<b​oog900:monero.social> Why do you support it then?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> spirobel @spirobel:kernal.eu: We aren't agreeing on PoS overnight, even if you believe it obvious BTW.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> That's why we're not primarily discussing why PoS should be decided on tonight.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The point is that the pool does not create the block

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The miner does

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The next step is an explanation to inform discussions IMO, hence my CCS.

<b​oog900:monero.social> It can create a block with an empty sig

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> ArticMine: but... Signing the block was never meant to do that.

<b​oog900:monero.social> For the miner to fill in

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> It would've just signed the pool-issued template *with each hash*.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Your CCS is biased to a particular solutions

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Tevador's proposal was to have miners run their own nodes or face a bandwidth penalty. It still doesn't cause miners to self-build blocks.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> ArticMine: My CCS, to explain and reason for a specific solution, is biased towards a specific solution?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> It is part of the solution

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I wonder which 🤔

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> Rucknium will look into the literature regarding number 2 if PoW or PoS is more expensive to attack. how expensive to we assume an attack on monero is currently? to have a rational discussion on how to harden the consensus this is really the core question.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (Yes, obviously my CCS to inform a discussion on a PoS finality layer and advocate for it is in favor of a PoS finality layer)

<a​rticmine:monero.social> At least POS is actually mentioned

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Clarifying: the next step *for PoS* is my CCS. I was replying to spirobel's repeated calls to discuss PoS.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The next step *in the PoS FL discussion* is my CCS IMO, or an equivalent alternative.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Why not just say so

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I did not mean to say the next step *in this entire meta of discussions* is my CCS.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Apologies if that was misinterpreted.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> Off Topic: My idea was from the beginning, that we do not control the resources on which our consensus mechanism is based. We do have a working community and a big p2p network (with some ugly faces). I don't have an answer, but maybe we can find a way to levarage our own resources.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> kayabanerve: i dont assume that. to move forward we should put clear numbers on the table. I am just skeptical of these half half hybrid solutions because they side step the core question of pow vs pos

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Thank you. I really felt that jargon was being used to obfuscate what was really going on.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Make POS prominent rather than the finality layer. Refer to Trusted Execution Environment rather than TEE

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> ArticMine: My work on a finality layer will primarily focus on PoS because a proper finality layer requires an agreed set of validators. Either we swear to pledge allegiance to the four? active members of the Monero core team, or we have a decentralized selection process.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> While I'll cover various ways to, I've already said why I don't believe selecting block miners works.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> But technically, it won't explicitly be staking XMR and would explore options from a modular standpoint.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> If you come with your own idea to select validators, you'd be welcome to add it to the book, make your own recommendation there, and reuse the rest of the components for what to do once you've decided a validator set.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> This was not made clear at all. I brought up the question of POS

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> ArticMine: your main contention with pos is that someone can open a short against their stake and then perform the attack, right ?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I have very serious concerns regarding POS going back over a decade

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> >an agreed set of validators -- thats key; Maximum Stake is not the only way to select them

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> To quote my CCS,

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> > The book would cover the basic premises of synchronous vs. asynchronous consensus, data availability, possible goals of any finality layer, potential methods of selecting validators, potential methods to decide on finality, features from there, and various trade-offs. Also included would be the role of Proof of Work in the remaining network, compared to its role currently.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> that is the gist of it though?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> What do you mean]

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> *?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> ?

<h​bs:matrix.org> One thing that eludes me so far is how would the validators be incentivized?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> That quote is the primary aspect to my CCS, and the above comment on having a modular focus is accurate.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> This is also my question

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> hbs: Altruism, transaction fees, or block rewards.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> *or emissions.

<h​bs:matrix.org> this is what I am missing, fees and block rewards still would go to PoW miners right?

<h​bs:matrix.org> So additional emissions on top of the current tail emission?

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> ArticMine: i mean what is the contention besides opening a short? the same thing could be done with pow. shorting a coin and renting cpus to attack is much cheaper.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> hbs: I'd propose a portion of the existing emissions.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Fees are a complete non starter to compensate POW or POS

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> monero-project/research-lab #136#issuecomment-3172739650

<a​rticmine:monero.social> We are left with emission to compensate the P Of S validators

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> >First and foremost, it is a cost. People decide if they benefit enough from it, in terms of securing a network that provides them a useful service, to justify their cost of participation. Looking at it from a profit-making perspective is just completely wrong.

<h​bs:matrix.org> And either increase emission/inflation or lower the PoW layer emissions

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Yes

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> transaction fees are enough. the argument for emission was that we need pay miners for their costs. those costs dont exist for stakers. so they dont need to rewarded highly.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> This is what is really been proposed

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> nominal inflation is pointless

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Stalkers expect yield

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Stakers

<a​rticmine:monero.social> ... and typical yield rates are way higher than Monero

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Tail emission

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> but that is not our problem. we just want to secure the network. nominal inflation is completely pointless. it just gives people the illusion of an APY and I would say we are better of without these kind of people

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> Validators DO have costs;

<a​rticmine:monero.social> So an effectively uncompensated PIS?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> POS

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'd actually propose burning transaction fees and keeping emissions.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Not as part of this mess, just in theory.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> That is what effectively the current penalty does to a degree

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Except it doesn't burn all TX fees.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Yes

<a​rticmine:monero.social> ... but miners do need an additional incentive to include transactions

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> As uncompensated as PoW, today

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Eh, that one I'm actually fine leaving to altruism.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (and the benefit to the Monero price)

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Worse

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Tevador's proposal also works to ensure miners do run nodes. All they can save is a mempool if they were to be so disruptive.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> you mean, these peanuts? They are helping to keep a network alive, they see value in it, as a payment system.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> It also stops miners from spamming yet recouping the fees.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I can see the argument for a partial fee burn but not be 100% of fees

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> the end state of p2p digital cash is zero inflation. I don't see why people would prefer a system with nominal inflation over one without. whales currently have the option to sell some of their xmr to buy hashrate and secure the network. effectively this means a negative inflation PoS. people have to pay to secure the network. people still do it because they believe in monero. a <clipped message>

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> high APY is counter productive for security. opportunistic stakers are like rented hashrate that is willing to switch to qubic when the price is right.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> This whole POS idea is little more than a major distraction at a time of crisis

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> there is no crisis. and there is no good argument against PoS being more expensive to attack than PoW or at least they haven't been broad up.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The onus on making the economic case lies with those who want to drastically change the social covenant

<e​longated:matrix.org> POS is part of solution not a distraction, crisis came because we were complacent

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Not with those opposed

<a​rticmine:monero.social> There seems to be a disagreement between the POS proponents on whether there is even a crisis

<e​longated:matrix.org> Ppl are ok with hybrid, full pos is a no go

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The devil is in the details

<s​gp_:monero.social> I see no evidence whatsoever that the two PoW tweaks combined would meaningfully mitigate the rentable hashrate risks. Which is why I'm not enthusiastic about pursuing them as an emergency response

<e​longated:matrix.org> Details need to be worked out, nobody is rushing for pos part right away

<v​enture:monero.social> it's offtopic slightly (qubic), but regarding no crisis, i would watch moneroconsensus closely. if their current numbers are remotly true and not broadcasting any blocks, it means they are building a long side chain to be broadcasted eventually.

<v​enture:monero.social> qpools.qubicdisciple.info

<v​enture:monero.social> claiming 56% right now, with no blocks being broadcasted

No, they are mining blocks normally

<a​rticmine:monero.social> So why is this even being discussed as a response to Qubic?

We're watching what chain they're mining on. It's the main chain

That page is broken, it's missing all recent blocks

<v​enture:monero.social> ah, that's a relieve .. somewhat :)

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> its on us to objectively compare the different systems and make sure the consensus is secure. It is not hard to just take a look at PoW and PoS and put a number on how expensive an attack would be. I am not advocating for one of the other. I just want to see a rational discussion about it.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> I think kayas work can help a lot on this

<s​gp_:monero.social> Fwiw, I don't think any reasonable comments here are saying "proof of stake has no downsides whatsoever", but the support for considering PoS in TFL form seems to come from realizing that it's likely the most realistic option with the potential for the least harm and most retained Monero PoW benefits. At least that's my logic for being interested in TFL

<l​ordx3nu:matrix.org> Are they getting ddosed? Or misreporting their hash rate?

<h​bs:matrix.org> Because you see hash rate being rented alongside access to a node?

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> i just hope it does not start with the premise that the outcome has to be a hybrid TFL. just approach it with an open mind and find the best solution

<h​bs:matrix.org> Isn't a lot of the HR available for rental from botnets?

<h​bs:matrix.org> It is a huge blow to decentralization if I understand it correctly

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/uBgkVXcBcdAYzlrENUuLHmlE

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> wtf

<s​gp_:monero.social> I'm not sure about what the source is currently, but there's not much stopping someone from renting a datacenter and running a node there as well

<h​bs:matrix.org> there are thousands of miners, there will not be thousands of validators, so going after them all is perfectly feasible

<h​bs:matrix.org> for hashrate which is not stolen sure

<v​enture:monero.social> i think it will be important how the community will react to eventually >10 block re-orgs. TFL is too far down the road, but in the meantime, there will likely be no harm, other than reputation. (I don't see them performing a double-spend)

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/MwPDcsbxdRMlcHRHXesviiqQ

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> their stats reporting site is already down :D

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> they cannot do a double-spend publicly, it's illegal to attack a computer network

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Why can't they split the block reward 90=10?

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Why can't they split the block reward 90-10?

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> miners and validators

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> as that point validators are providing some of the security as a result of their "work", so it's somewhat compensated. But it's not the majority of the security, so it's not the majority of the block reward

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> tbh i feel bullish. the energy in the community feels stronger than ever. who cares about short term price / reputation. the potential from this is that we get rid of 10 block lock time and make the network more resistant while reducing costs

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> numbers can be tweaked, obviously

<h​bs:matrix.org> still unclear how validators would be selected and what their quorum would be

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> honestly every single small cap PoW coin should be laser focused on Monero right now. What happened to us WILL happen to them.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Firo has masternodes. 1000 collateral. I know masternodes are a dirty word in Monero circles, but collateral does incentivize the validators to act honestly since they have "significant" stake.

<s​gp_:monero.social> Some split of the reward is likely, but it'll come down to the details

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> and the elephant in the room: bitcorn.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> will happen to Bitcoin too, but they're too high and mighty to pay too much attention to us, so we'll let them have their own panic attack when they get to that point

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> The people here have been harping for years on the fact that Bitcoin's fee market-only thing is unsustainable, and becomes so well before their block reward goes to 0. But this isn't a Bitcoin room. ;)

<s​gp_:monero.social> I like to think that most validators will be interested enough in validating with the possibility of profiting for correctly slashing someone malicious :) idk how to properly model that though

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> The truth is that there is a very limited amount of PoW coins that can be reasonably secure in this world.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> And I think that number is much smaller (uncomfortably so) than most people think

<h​bs:matrix.org> but if there are too few validators they can be coerced

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Correct. Or easily sybil'd

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> nothing against firo and zano, but i am skeptical of these type of solutions. thats why i hope kayas proposal approaches this with an open mind. we cant end up in this kind of category of obscure microcaps. we need something better

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I don't disagree. At present every single solution is "unproven"

<s​gp_:monero.social> They'd be coerced to destroying their own value, the stake. It's a tough sell

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> just existing in the wild with a solution live as a microcap coin does not equal "proven"

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Does anybody have a rough guesstimate for how long it would take to implement the PoS finality layer?

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> it just means you're too small for anyone to care to attack you

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Also, what is the governance... Who makes the final decision?

<h​bs:matrix.org> what if a majority is coerced? they could then act maliciously

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/axMqyGLbCQEBHPgteNvMOxCH

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> But this is exactly the problem here. If the game theory completely breaks down when someone doesn't act in their own economic self-interest, then it's actually not robust. Because Qubic is NOT acting in their own economic self-interest here. They're losing money. But they're gaining headlines.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> In addition, nation states will ALSO not care to act in their own economic self-interest if they attack a coin. They are willing to lose money to break something down.

<n​tma:matrix.org> Moneroconsensus.info down?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> worked for me

<h​bs:matrix.org> indeed, and a small validators set makes it easier

<b​oog900:monero.social> its probably under a lot of load

<s​gp_:monero.social> Economic self interest is the only realistic bound we have, without trusting someone

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> This game theory breakdown is literally why we're having this conversation to begin with. And if we set up the next set of consensus rules on the same game theory, it may be harder for smaller groups like Qubic to take advantage of, but ultimately doesn't stop the big boys from doing so.

<s​gp_:monero.social> An unlimited resourced adversary can destroy anything

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Right. I hear you. And I agree. I don't purport to have a solution.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I have my smart four on this too btw

<h​bs:matrix.org> true, but decentralization makes execution of order 66 way harder

<s​gp_:monero.social> I'd like to see anyone here with eth connections reach out to researchers there who did their PoS research

<h​bs:matrix.org> Eth had a centralization issue given the 32 Eth staking per validator

<s​gp_:monero.social> The counterargument against this is that you don't need to coerce even a single party to execute an attack with PoW

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> while this is true, if we add something to an existing system (like PoS), we want the sum to be harder to attack than if it wasn't added

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> so adding complexity to the attack surface for something that can be pretty easily attacked via coercion, well, might as well not add anything?

<h​bs:matrix.org> this whole discussion may require a throughout risk assessment, it seems we are focusing on a single risk and kind of forgetting what the Monero ethics were trying to protect us from

<n​tma:matrix.org> Anyone looked at decred's hybrid PoW/PoS model for ideas?

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> This may be inappropriate to say, but this is kinda fun. :P

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Monero isn't really going anywhere, and we have a hard problem on our hands that's bringing in all kinds of smart people to work on.

<v​enture:monero.social> smart people + me :)

<s​gp_:monero.social> Reminds me of 2019

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> some of the best Monero times

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> We just came back from Defcon btw (me and some of my CS team). TONS of Monero lovers there.

<b​asses:matrix.org> how many feds

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> they're all feds as far as I'm concerned

<s​gp_:monero.social> How was it at the mini-village?

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Was really fun! We had a lot of traffic.

<s​gp_:monero.social> Did you bring any pro Monero pamphlets? :)

<n​tma:matrix.org> researchgate.net/publication/337831…_51_Attack_in_Cryptocurrency_System

<n​tma:matrix.org> Just sharing

1:47 PM ​<m-relay> ​<d​iego:cypherstack.com> ​Monero isn't really going anywhere, and we have a hard problem on our hands that's bringing in all kinds of smart people to work on. <<>> come to monerkon next year

<a​rticmine:monero.social> electriccoin.co/blog/the-trailing-f…ng-stone-to-proof-of-stake-in-zcash

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The Zcash Electric Coin Company is considering the Trailing Finality Layer as a stepping stone to migrate from POW to POS

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I am not a fan of POS. What I am really categorically opposed to is trying to pull wool over people's eyes.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> If the real agenda here is to migrate Monero to POS, it is best to be open about from the beginning.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> there is also this seanbowe.com/blog/tachyaction-at-a-distance

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> i agree. it would be better if we could just talk frankly and spell out what the endgame is for p2p cash. It means almost instant finality, zero inflation and lower node requirments. (no need to keep all key images around to verify transactions, see Tachyaction)

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> will be so bullish when people see this

<a​rticmine:monero.social> The proper approach to this discussion is for the POS proponents to make the case for POS as a stand alone protocol. The proponents keeping POW can also make their case

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Please don't muddy the waters with hybrid solutions.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> If the result is a hybrid solution, we could get the best of both worlds.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> On another note these finality layer proposals should not preclude improvements and tweeks to the existing POW.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> After all the POW side is hardened this improves a hybrid solution

I've not kept track of today's chat, but "Please don't muddy the waters with hybrid solutions" is not a fair ask, as a hybrid solution might have plus (as well as minuses) that are due to being a hybrid, and which would be missed by looking at PoS and PoW in isolation.

<s​gp_:monero.social> I'm personally going to be supportive of combining whatever elements result in the best output at the end

(though I am biased in saying this since I adopted a hybrid system in Townforge)

<r​ottenwheel:unredacted.org> what mini village? what'd I miss? [@diego:cypherstack.com](https://matrix.to/#/@diego:cypherstack.com)

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Looking at POS and POW in isolation is part of the process . We first need to get an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of both POW and POS

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I do agree that two weak systems can be combined to create a hybrid where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. In fact Monero's current approach to privacy is a perfect example.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> In order to maximize the benefits of a POW POS hybrid we need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of both POW and POS

I agree with this, if this is only a first step to divide and conquer the problem spae.

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> Please by all means, I want to see a (PoS xor PoW) and (PoS and PoW) constructive discussion. I'm tired of seeing the same empty shilling message all day

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I agree

FWIW, my goal in TF was to require a would-be 51%er to not only have 51% of pow and/or pos, but also a sizeable portion (though less than 50%) of the other, on the assumption that people would typically not be in a position to acqiore both at once.

Admittedly a fairly naive goal - I did not go through all known issues to assess how the change mattered to them...

(and I don't stake the currency itself, which has pluses and minuses, but I digress)

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> We had a space at defcon.

I also must admit I am intrigued by the idea of PoS blocks without a block reward. After all, PoS incurs not much cost (at least compate to pow like electricity).

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Which many of us knew nothing about

So the benefit of protecting one's own balance should be enough for someone to stake. In Townforge, the PoS reward is 5% of hte PoW reward, because I saw a small % is enough as an incentive, but I had not finished the thought process to reach 0%...

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> "<m​oneromooo> So the benefit of protecting one's own balance should be enough for someone to stake." >>> well, sorta similar logic exists for monero. You should be mining to protect the network you are in.

0% however means one would not bother making a block absent txes. Which would probably not happen in monero.

<b​lurt4949:matrix.org> Removing the block reward is not necessarily a good thing. The tail emission results in a stable circulating supply, which you could argue is preferable to deflation if we do actually view monero as a currency. petertodd.org/2022/surprisingly-tail-emission-is-not-inflationary

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> but that didn't really happen, enough, apparently

Yes, I am talking about monero here.

<r​ottenwheel:unredacted.org> Great job on marketing it, first I hear. 😂

I meant no block reward for *PoS*. The block reward for PoW would stay untouched.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> You weren't target audience ;)

PoS would just get tx fees. Or N% of the tx fees.

<b​lurt4949:matrix.org> oneromooo: Ah, my bad, thank you for clarifying

<b​lurt4949:matrix.org> m​oneromooo*

yeah. but assuming people are going to do something because they should because it protects their investment might be a tall order

<a​rticmine:monero.social> For self custody this works very well . It is custodial wallets with both regulated and un regulated custodians that concern me the most

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> They won't. Pretty much guaranteed.

Qubic started reporting hashrate again: miningpoolstats.stream/monero

because apparently it is a tall order for the existing monero ecosystem

Not really. If it costs next to nothing, which PoS does, and gives people peace of mind...

<a​rticmine:monero.social> Find a way for the network to detect self custody

But if an actual reward is needed, 0.01% is ~0.

I don't think they are orphaning blocks either

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Wow 45% is nothing to sneeze at

<r​ucknium:monero.social> ArticMine: Did you comment on the suggestion to use the General Fund to rent hashpower as a short-term countermeasure? monero-project/research-lab #136#issuecomment-3186908147

hash rate ATH for them

there's no way to tell its real unless they create blocks

Wow 45% is nothing to sneeze at

45% of known hashrate, plus unknown

Wow 45% is nothing to sneeze at

<a​rticmine:monero.social> No I have not

(not sure why I'm saying that except it's fashionable)

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I'm a trend setter, it's true

gingeropolous: you can see a bit more in different ways. the hashrate is real, but also they were quite unlucky

wow its moneromooo a real monero celebrity

/nick diego:cypherstack.com

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I think this is outside of the stated usage policy that binaryFate stated, but it could be effective now: reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/1iixgk…l_fund_transparency_report_february

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> lmao

oh this is like phase 2 of their marketing plan

<r​ucknium:monero.social> It was unfortunate that the MRL meeting yesterday was messy. I will try to do better next time. Suggestions for meeting format & rules are welcome.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> guys it's ok. Zooko says it's nothing to worry about: x.com/zooko/status/1955679269792927795

rent a bunch of hash rate when they go back on the public API

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> This was unprecedented. Not your fault.

whatever at least they are not orphaning blocks

they say only once 51% is reached

FWIW, the "spend > block reward" is a known PoW failure mode since PoW relies on econonic incentives.

what happened to supportxmr lost 300 mh

<a​rticmine:monero.social> In my view you did the best under extremely difficult circumstances

<l​ordx3nu:matrix.org> It looks like qubic got some hashrate from supportxmr

(this applies to whether the PoW is ASIC based or not, ceteris paribus)

<s​gp_:monero.social> I think you did a very good job rucknium

yeah

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> totally

Agreed. This is a free channel, you cannot (and arguably should not) be expected to herd cats more than that.

Is there a way to view a wallet with only the view key?

No right? you need pub address?

The private view key is enough. But you won't be able to tell the target address, just the amount.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Rucknium: It isn't your fault. It's a very opinionated subject with many heads. We potentially should handle each head individually, and start cutting some down (such as sech1's proposal, which while well-received, seems wayyyy too easy to avoid via several methods IMO and likely can be dismissed. Sorry for the drive by sech1, just seemed like the clearest example).

<a​rticmine:monero.social> One of my biggest concerns is that the POW improvements or tweeks were dismissed or attacked in order to promote POS hybrid solutions.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> If the real objective is to create a hybrid solution, surely it makes sense to strengthen each component individually.

yah know, that hashrate... 3 GH/s.. comes out to 33 thousand of the dual epyc 7h12s that i have

the HR support lost is compared to 30 July not yesterday

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Not even that. Need key images.

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> Yes I feel like there is a lot of hype over the hybrid solution and I'm interested to learn about it but dev/maintainer burden needs to be taken into consideration. I said earlier in this chat that PoW hardening could be implemented way faster than PoS/Hybrid

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> Let's not lose the current state of affair

guess it depends which data you look at re HR

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> sight on the current state of affair*

<a​rticmine:monero.social> How does implementing Sech1's proposal prevent a TFL?

PoW hardening can probably be done quickly in a fork. Doesn;t need to be a either/or/

i just can't believe it. but if you entertain the idea that its asics somehow, the attack doesn't make sense, cause they would be killin the network they just made a device for.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I didn't say it did ArticMine?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I said this discussions has many heads and we can focus the discussion by cutting some off.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> sech1's proposal, IMO, is the most discussed yet easiest to close.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> So why the vehement opposition?

It's not ASICs, it's rented hashrate and miners voluntarily joining for profits.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Because it

which one is sechs proposal?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> s a bad proposal and I have an opinion on it?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> *the proposal was an idea thrown out by sech1. It isn't a bad proposal because it was never such an extensive concept. it's just an ephemeral idea which should've died days ago.

Stop pinging me :D

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Miners signing blocks to decrease pools.

Sorry sech2

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Am I not allowed to have an opinion that certain changes to PoW are pointless and shouldn't be done solely because I'm also advocating a finality layer?

I didn't even push my proposal, because I know the limitations of it. But people can't seem to stop discussing it

er... wowsech ?

<a​rticmine:monero.social> In it's original from I actually did not support it. I do however believe that it could be improved

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Which is why I'm saying it should be sent to the chopping block lol

<s​yntheticbird:monero.social> two interpretation of chopping up here?

I have thought a little bit more about the 0% PoS thing. 0% will actually centralize, because only M% of holders will decide to stake. Adding a subsiy will decide more people. Now, how close is M to 100 is a damn good question.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> There should be a subsidy such that it's profitable and worth doing

Well, "worth" was "I don't lose anything, and I gain security". vs Pow being "I lose electricty and again security and block reward".

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'm unsure how any variant of 'miners sign blocks' could be successful as that concept seems fundamentally flaewed, but if ArticMine, you want to own and remix the proposal, I can't stop you and I won't try to call for its end until I understand it _and then_ disagree with.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> But that doesn't stop me from disagreeing with 'miners sign blocks' and calling to end that

Good outlook, kayabanerve.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> You lose 'the cost of a server'

<r​ucknium:monero.social> moneromooo: I agree. From what I understand, this is a classic public goods problem. With 0 direct financial reward, small users won't stake because the marginal cost to them is higher than the marginal benefit.

Hnn. I kinda assumed most holders have a always online machine already...

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i doubt it

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> well, an always online machine running monero..... probably not

I quit dial up in 19... something...

OK fair.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Eh, they're still giving up a portion of their bandwidth

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> 'oh no, I can't run a monero node right now, I'd lose 10 fps. How can I stake if I can't always run a monero node?'

<r​ucknium:monero.social> In Townforge it make a lot of sense that users would have the machine connected to the network usually because you have in-game tasks to do often.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> AOL is only finally shutting down dial up, so it only now lets us drop it as minimum target hardware /s

Hrm. well, the idea is that you *don't* have to do game tasks often :/

At least after you've set your stuff up.

<a​rticmine:monero.social> I may do just that

But OK, point taken about even piddling stuff being enough.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I am for hardening PoW FWIW

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'm just for doing it in ways which benefit Monero

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'm also in support of a finality layer

but how do you harden pow against an adversary with access to all this general compute, and a mining economy that just searches for the highest profit?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> pos finality layer

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> :P

bring back the timelock, and institute a mining bond, where super awesome block rewards mature in 50 years?

its not inflation if its in the future

i still think there's an option 3. get someone to pump the price

we dont talk about price, but perhaps we should talk about price

Tell everyone to "set unit micrononero", see price go x1000 because idiots.

we're trying to fight economics with code

eeesh 3.2 gh/s

whatever you guys want to do it might have to be done very quickly at this rate

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> ^

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> quickly is what they want

quickly, rushed, not thought out, reactive

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> moneromooo: Want to merge my CCS immediately despite having effectively no community review 🥹

They are running out of money porbably, so they need to reach their marketing goal soon.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I think it has one upvote and zero downvotes. That's technically review

well if they actually do hit 51% and then actually do orphan all other blocks it will turn into a fix thats needed immediately

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (I'm joking, I promise)

their will be a big re-org

woopty doo

there. damnit

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> We can do Ethereum within a month if necessary but ugh. The best bet may be by-default DNS checkpoints _if and only if_ the checkpointed chain is one hour (30 blocks) old.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Obvious issues are obvious, but immediate solution is immediate.

yeah, that thing was set up to be training wheels, so might as well use it

their hash rate is back down to 2.96 gh/s

they might just rent a bunch of hash rate so it shows as 51% on miningpoolstats, they can get their screenshots for twitter, and then move on

i mean, if pool miners just hop to the most profitable pool, should we really keep them around and not kick them off with the block signing thing? :P

Quick vassalise us to eth for security might be a terrible ideas in monero reputation

zombie thought will not die

Now might be a good time to rent some hashpower for ourselves.

monero reputation? how do you think monero's "reputation" will be if qubic is mining all blocks

how much is available tevador

I know

but sovereignty is as important as security

They might rent hashrate? They rent whole datacenters

I think at this point only desperate good solution is rent more hashrate than them meanwhile we search for a real fix

well start renting then lol

im doing

I see 200+ MH/s on nicehash

I rented 20 mh/s the other day but only for a few hours

DC-2 and DC-3 are totally not sus in this list p2pool.io/u/edafad62eed4f695/Screen…%20from%202025-08-14%2022-11-16.png

yeah we really suffer from economic doing this battle against AI huge market funding

Their AI is just a marketing BS.

lol do they really label it as DC?

yep

DataCenter??

no, District Columbia :D

Distributed Computing

we lost the matrix bridge

Their AI tasks = calculating popcount using AVX2. I have disassembled their binary.

why disassemble it if they have source code

They do?

tevador: Sure I just mean the market economy give them ALOT of ressource

This is the reference code. They run some optimized version

It doesn;t look like the source of the binary I saw.

probably more than what we can chew..

having a fix ready should be priorities at this point

tevador: pools develop their own miners

<v​tnerd:monero.social> They/qubic may want to keep this rate for an extended period of time for another marketing round. Their site shows ~55% hashrate because difficulty adjustment hasnt fully happened yet. This seems vaguely accurate to a passerby because some of the same numbers are on other "neutral" sites. Real hash is still probably in the high 30s though as previously. Or that's my best guess anyway

don't know about high 30s

theyre at 3.12 gh/s

thats what the pool API is reporting.

Yes, their pool software downloads binaries from the pool and executes them. It looks a lot like C&C for some botnet.

<e​longated:matrix.org> I am mining at 10 gh/s

I think they've been fairly honest about their reported hash rate

how they get it is up for discussion, but I haven't seen them outright lie about their hash rate yet

<a​tomfried:matrix.org> Are you for real?

tevador if looks like a botnet, walks like a botnet and quacks like a botnet...

yes

the raw number

yes, all their pool miners download binaries from the pool and run them. These binaries get updated often.

I know their sites always overrepresent the % pool share

> [1:48 PM]soupersoup: we kind of are a botnet😂the only difference is our pool is made up of willing participants not other people’s hijacked systems

i wonder if they're trying to get for that 50 blocks in the last 100 stat

Yes, because actual botnets won't touch it. They can get taken over themselves if they just run some random binaries from someone.

they've already had the 50 blocks in last 100 I think they are going for the % of known hash rate on miningpoolstats now that they are reporting api again to it

<v​tnerd:monero.social> Yes, what I said but shorter

<v​tnerd:monero.social> I guess we'll learn how many people understand difficulty adjustment

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/HxIEQOXhjWwlFqCQpRSwfQUV

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Then how is the hashrate 6.9ghz when the total network is only 5 ghz

thats like a 24 hour average

they just started reporting again with like the past hour or 2

Network hashrate is an artificial number calculated from the target difficulty.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Oh ok so on average they get around 38%

Now might be a good time to rent some hashrate...

Yeah

maybe

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> POW enjoyers losing their minds right now

<e​longated:matrix.org> Botnet operators?

<c​aptaincanaryllc:matrix.org> my monerod reporting net hash 5.39 GH/s

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> <t​evador> Network hashrate is an artificial number calculated from the target difficulty. <> @captain

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Your monerod reports hashrate as what is presumed based on the rolling 720 block difficulty

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> It will never show an accurate number unless the hashrate remains static for 720 blocks

<e​longated:matrix.org> Modify code to show it for last 10 blocks ?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> if someone mines with 10gh for 360 blocks, the monerod hash will only show increase of 5gh

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Its a function of the difficulty adjustment, which is 720 blocks

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Also, when qubic selfish mines, the difff doesnt go up

<v​enture:monero.social> but the DAA is also based on the rolling 720 blocks? so hashrate wrt to difficulty / likelihood of winning blocks is accurate ?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Yes

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Which is why more, if not selfish mining, more blocks will be added to the chain than every 120secs. If selfish mining, they replace blocks and avoid diff adjustment

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> That’s the same with miningpoolstats. Are they lying about their hashrate?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Man, for the 3rd time

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> <t​evador> Network hashrate is an artificial number calculated from the target difficulty. <> [@barthman132:matrix.org](https://matrix.to/#/@barthman132:matrix.org)

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Oh thank you I’m dumb

100 block estimate ia ~7 GH/s, so it matches

<s​needlewoods_xmr:matrix.org> for a more accurate estimation we would need to do something like this arxiv.org/pdf/1707.00082 afaik

<s​needlewoods_xmr:matrix.org> > "if miners regularly broadcast status reports of their partial proof-of-work, the hash rate estimates are significantly more accurate at a cost of slightly higher bandwidth"

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Righr, @tevador. Unless qubic mines for 24hrs, the monerod reported hashrate wont hit 7gh

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> if they choose to mine honestly, looks like they are only 500mh away from 51%

<v​enture:monero.social> if it's really a botnet, it would explain why they do it intermittently.. those marathons might be risky for them loosing bots if users notice?

<e​longated:matrix.org> A cloud provider renting hashrate while they have less load ?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Can be bought for cheap as its idle machines anyways

<e​longated:matrix.org> No need to panic, right ? ArticMine

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> tevador: It's @binaryfate you'd discuss that with, if you wanted to.

22:48:47 <m-relay> <v​enture:monero.social> if it's really a botnet, it would explain why they do it intermittently.. those marathons might be risky for them loosing bots if users notice?

the intermittent is based of their internal tick number

it's fuzzy but all nodes go on based on that

it'd be more noticeable if it's spinning fans every 60m

<v​enture:monero.social> ah okay

kayabanerve: I'm just suggesting it. Use of the general fund should probably be decided by the core team.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Yes, but binaryFate is the one who actively spends the general fund and the point person to ping.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> also [@articmine:monero.social](https://matrix.to/#/@articmine:monero.social)

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Luigi1111 probably doesnt care

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> (i mean, he'll likely say yolo"

<m​r_x_tcv:matrix.org> kayabanerve @kayabanerve:matrix.org: I was looking at your list of possible solutions for strengthening Monero's proof of work, and was wondering, why doesn't Monero implement delayed proof of work like Pirate Chain (ARRR) by notarizing on BTC's blockchain every 10 blocks? Pirate notarizes on Komodo every 10 blocks, and Komodo notarizes on Litecoin every 10 of its blocks. An at<clipped message

<m​r_x_tcv:matrix.org> tacker would have to simultaneously attack all 3 chains in order to attack Pirate. Can you add this proposal to your list?

<c​aptaincanaryllc:matrix.org> does anyone have an estimate of hashrate costs vs. contents of general fund? ie how long could it fund x hashrate, to determine likelihood of outlasting adversary

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The concept is listed within the table, that isn't the security properties of Komodo's implementation, and I'm unsure anyone in Komodo actually benefits from Komodo's implementation.

I'd suggest to rent ~200 MH/s for 15 hours. Their "marathon" should end by then.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Using Bitcoin as a finality layer (in the table) would require simultaneously running a Bitcoin node and only require attacking the Bitcoin blockchain to perform a re-org, so long as a minimal amount of PoW was performed on Monero as to find _any valid block_.

binaryFate: ^^^^^^

re renting ~200 MH/s

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I pinged them on Matrix

<m​r_x_tcv:matrix.org> @kayabanerve:matrix.org: I was looking at your list of possible solutions for strengthening Monero's proof of work, and was wondering, why doesn't Monero implement delayed proof of work (dPoW) like Pirate Chain (ARRR) by notarizing on BTC's blockchain every 10 blocks? Pirate notarizes on Komodo every 10 blocks, and Komodo notarizes on Litecoin every 10 of its blocks. An attacke<clipped message

<m​r_x_tcv:matrix.org> r would have to simultaneously attack all 3 chains in order to attack Pirate. Can you add this proposal to your list?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I’m purchasing more hashrate. I suggest everyone else do the same

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> can anyone help? always getting 127.0.0.1:3333 127.0.0.1 connect error: "connection refused" when trying to start XMRig

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> tried on two different computers

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> both WIN11

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> is it my router?

<v​enture:monero.social> renting hashrate instead of aws only makes sense if the workers are currently offline.. but I would guess, if they are not rented out, the owner mines anyways?

<p​laneroad72:matrix.org> I did purchase for 500 usd

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/CRJCNBIuFTiNUDkGJweNQjvU

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> also getting this error

<v​enture:monero.social> start p2pool first

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> plz go to [#monero-support:monero.social](https://matrix.to/#/%23monero-support:monero.social) , [#monero:monero.social](https://matrix.to/#/%23monero:monero.social) , or [#p2pool-log:monero.social](https://matrix.to/#/%23p2pool-log:monero.social) for support .

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> On win11, you might have to exclude the folder containing gupax from windows defender or your antivirus

always add an exclusion to any folder that has anything mining related, this includes monero itself

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> 🤦 thx, somehow I missed that part in the video

<c​howbungaman:matrix.org> Why isn’t Monero’s total hashrate at a new all time high right now? Given Qubic and everyone’s “all hands on deck” response.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> It is - its 7gh

<c​howbungaman:matrix.org> Ah kk

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The monerod reported hashrate is avg of past 720 blocks. Qubic doesnt mine for 720 blocks straight, so their hashrate is underestimated

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> thats around 3.1 for qubic and 3.9 for everyone else

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> yeah im reading through MRR and can't tell if the available rigs are already mining for the owner

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> but i imagine they would be. you wouldn't want to offer your rigs up for rent and have them sit idle

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> gg to the supportxmr miner who sold out to qubic. insane tactic to bet on the ponzi scheme chain for some short term profits while risking trust in the one chain committing to CPU mining for the past decade

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> Will P2Pool download the whole blockchain?!

p2pool doesn't

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> the fuck are you going to do with all that hash after the qubic ponzi unravels? mine raptor coin?

monero node might depending what you use

we have #p2pool-log / #p2pool-mini for general p2pool conversation (they are bridged to matrix with the new bridge as well)

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Kawaii's rental goes from mining xmr for kawaii -> being rented to mine xmr

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> using gupax, it says "2025-08-14 21:37:02.8695 SideChain add_block: height = 11457572, id = c819fba59938321b07835c87a4d25537f82ef0feeb55f2d53da877711d46d99e, mainchain height = 3477592, verified = 0"

<e​longated:matrix.org> Trying to explain it to a kid in basement running botnets which don’t last forever ?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> So yeah, ginger, there maybbe a way to see (not sure), but possible that you are renting a rig that is already mining

that's p2pool's sidechain

it just needs a few recent blocks, the rest is pruned/not needed

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i bet the archetyp admin would have had a way to deal with this situation

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> how convenient that they got him just a few months ago

<u​ser2570:unredacted.org> free archetyp admin

<e​longated:matrix.org> Maybe xenu can help 🤣

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Archetype did nothing wrong

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> xcancel.com/kawaiicrypto/status/1950967882747134402 [@gingeropolous:monero.social](https://matrix.to/#/@gingeropolous:monero.social)

Reg the general fund to rent hashes: does this just not make attacking monero good for business? Even promotes more people to park more reseources available for people to rent (with both good and bad intentions) - if there are only x hashes a available now - then all this renting is going to make the situation worse in the future

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Rental price on MRR seems too high for those rigs to be already mining. Just an observation.

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/TAnRhXHgAqiIiDxbmfSWENkX

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> mining now!

He was renting to someone who was being naughty last week, and now he gets general fund moneys at 4x the. Normal rate because of that? xD

<v​enture:monero.social> yeah, the premium there is crazy.. it's like mining for 500$/XMR

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Interesting why have there been so few orphaned blocks so far today?

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> they must have changed their strategy, lots of push back and negativity from the community

<e​longated:matrix.org> Why orphan when you get paid in xmr ?

they have not done selfish today at all

their stuff broke or don't have the power to achieve it consistently, or forgot to do it

<e​longated:matrix.org> Thank cumfrmbrhind

<b​bmatrix:matrix.org> how many XMR per day on 10,000 H/s 😅

<e​longated:matrix.org> Not much but it’s honest work

so beside renting more hashrate what are the eventual solution for future protection ?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Because they dont have to increase the difficulty (which increases their chance of success)

<e​longated:matrix.org> Success of reorg or double spend

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Plowsof, i tend to agree 🙃. i said as much on trocador room

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> That renting hashrate may actually be paying qubic directly

Renting hash from qubic :p

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And that the hash you rent may be used against you when you stop renting

<e​longated:matrix.org> Where are they getting that hashrate? Servers or botnets?

<v​enture:monero.social> lol

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> who knows where the rental hashrate comes from

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Someone offers 50mh for rent, where could this possibly come from?

Turn your miners OFF and park them available to rent

$$$$$

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Some miners on p2pool have 80mh. Where does this come from?

<e​longated:matrix.org> If it’s consistently mining, its rented servers and they have good budget

<v​enture:monero.social> fighting fire with fire... something is sketchy :D

what if we do like qbic and mine let say 30% of the time for AI so it pay the miner much more and attrack hashrate

<e​longated:matrix.org> Ai with cpu, right lol

ikr

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> qubic's ai is vaporware. They probably just mine xmr

idk maybe something to dig

<e​longated:matrix.org> Doesn’t help with current state of xmr

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> ~40% of the last 100 blocks are found by qubic.

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> I assume they have same hashrate around 40% of total network, the same as they was used to selfish mining and block orphaning, but now its “honest mining”

<v​enture:monero.social> no no, can't you see? the ticks are actually the heart-beat of the AGI being coming to life. the technological singularity, the beast system everybody bows to /s

everything of this happen bc price of xmr too low, its so sad.

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> +100 qubic

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> i have some orders for 180-200 after looking to weekly chart

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> But didn’t you hear? According to “very smart people” the price of Monero actually doesn’t matter. /s

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> its true

i know :(((

there a very weird culture inside xmr

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> monero have its own value

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yes even with 40 the botnets will defend xmr /s

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yes even with $40 the botnets will defend xmr /s

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> /voteban elongated :>

<e​longated:matrix.org> Thanks

what if those people are actually real states sponsor bots

so part of community is already hijack

or some 'faction' at least

botnet has contribute to this equally to the 'anti capital anarchist' faction

PoW need capital to function securely

and also redistribute to real people and not a malware owner

<h​bs:matrix.org> with tevador proposal of basing the data set on blockchain data, the botnets would not be usable but hashrate rental would require it is provided alongside nodes, right?

<s​gp_:monero.social> Yes, the miners would need to get node data from somewhere (local node or from a pool)

plowsof: thx for the rig rental perspective lol

<c​howbungaman:matrix.org> Just an intern over here but would this idea make sense and be deployable quickly?? :

<c​howbungaman:matrix.org> What if we use general fund to sweeten the p2pool payouts? So rather than putting funds towards renting hash , we put funds towards adding a bonus payment to anyone mining on p2pool . They get their standard mining payouts it plus the bonus. I think xenu may have alluded to this . I don’t if others have discussed. Is this possible and easy to deploy?

my mind doesn't think in schemes :(

Too pure sadly

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> i can rent hash and put it on p2pool

rent from me

plowsof: I was trained by Cat

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> only if you charge me 2x the xmr that will be earned

<c​howbungaman:matrix.org> wont gonna compete

<v​enture:monero.social> first time seeing current effort going down over time rather than up :/

honestly xmr need to x10 to see real gain in security and hashrate

we need a long term solution here imo

<v​enture:monero.social> on nano at least

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Take out loans and buy up the orderbooks

either finite layer or hybrid seem the fix

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> See, the problem with price is that we base it on exchanges that often dont have xmr for sale

we need a mechanic that make 51% virtually impossible

at the same time keep our sovereignty

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And we promote an environment that avoids using cexs _for acquiring xmr_, while simultaneously using those same exchanges as tour price oracle

id say lets focus on code as dev cannot control the market :))

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I think, as a oart of this effort, if you use a dex, you should raise your prices 10x, and cause a raid on exchanges

the problem with talking about solution to bring technology to help adoption is it take incredible time to create

like dex and stuff

also will depend on market reaction which is hardly calculable

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> yeah. This isnt monero-markets, but that room isnt bridged to irc. So, sorry but i had to say it

<e​longated:matrix.org> And price affects miners and that affects security

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> If were talking about security budget, the biggest psyop is that we base everything on what cexs say, while avoiding them.. makes no sense. Raise your prices

really need something in the code that prevent any 51% attack and retain our independences

<e​longated:matrix.org> How do you raise it when buyer can’t withdraw it ?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Raise on dex*

I dont fully understand finite layer, but as for hybrid I think the staking system will work in our favor to help price for the PoW compenants

we will have to deal with botnet also .

100%

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> electriccoin.co/blog/the-trailing-f…ng-stone-to-proof-of-stake-in-zcash

thanks

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> miningpoolstats.stream/monero

<a​sdfqwfe:matrix.org> Are these numbers accurate? Or can Qubic be faking their hash rate?

30 block window I see qbic owning 56% of the block

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Csn they fake? Ya. Are they? Not likely

01:03:13 <hi585858> 30 block window I see qbic owning 56% of the block

that is some major cherry picking, they will win more, less, same as all pools

100 have 43, and can't bother with longer periods

tendency is they win a little bit more each day, until the day happen...

tendency is worrying, why waiting for fatidic moment to happen

they aren't even selfish mining atm, that'd get them a couple more like last time

01:04:33 <hi585858> tendency is worrying, why waiting for fatidic moment to happen

we gonna end up with " we need a fix the next hours or so"

there is no "monero" ceo that can push an update

the community has to agree. every node operator

<e​longated:matrix.org> Even reaching close to 51 is a point of concern

you are looking at monero with the eyes of a token with central devs/core team and while we have several members that are core to monero, they don't "own" it

any "fix" that breaks consensus means chain split. so it'd have to happen in the long term future

there are still some people on previous monero hardfork

that was 2022

at this rate qbic gonna chain split without our consent

that's not a chain split

I mean with 51% they can

even thats not their goal

nop, chain split is breach in consensus, not orphaning

meaning two incompatible chains due to code. they cannot agree with each other no matter how long they are

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s pow, hashrate rules

how they can refuse all block after 51% but the whole community cannot refuse block from qbit

we holder more than 51%

holding

refusing/orphaning is not a chain split

they can attempt to orphan everything. but if someone later mines on the orphan chain, they could make that be the main one

a chain split makes that impossible due to consensus differences.

hm

say when Bitcoin split into BTC / BCH / BSV etc.

they effectively become different coins and networks

<e​longated:matrix.org> They can keep mining empty blocks as long as they like and halt our txs

there is no central call list to tell people to update nodes. we don't even know how many total are running, we can just estimate

<e​longated:matrix.org> There is a list for exchanges

<e​longated:matrix.org> ArticMine should we panic ? Or everything is fine and wait for actual attack

a change could be made to filter blocks that match a certain rule until it's part of other chains, but that can be bypassed

--enforce-dns-checkpointing does exist

also --enable-dns-blocklist but that's mostly for active attacks against monerod peers

our attacker gain hashrate increase each couple day or so

<e​longated:matrix.org> core needs time to think, no hasty decisions

waiting for something to happen is just suicidal

sure I agree

jumping off a cliff just to do something is suicidal

also doing nothing is suicidal at this point

I mean how suicidal is double spend

are top 10 coin ever been double spend ?

kinda suicidal on speculative potential

?

the community is banded together so things can probably move faster than usual

but again, a release going out that instantly makes a change will do chain split

that would kill anything

suddenly two moneros

<e​longated:matrix.org> Monero is tiny, if we do have a double spend our record will be tainted forever

<e​longated:matrix.org> Maybe rename to something else after that

meh, monero classic exist and we exist

change and fix shouldnt be view as suicidal

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s only been a few days

it's open source, make a change

submit it

<e​longated:matrix.org> Been sleeping on botnet problem for years

<e​longated:matrix.org> Takes time to realize

<e​longated:matrix.org> And gulp

it then will get reviewed. maybe it's good to release

<e​longated:matrix.org> yup

then people need to update, which, might not be reachable for months

as said before, bandaids are needed

and longer term changes have been discussed

id say botnet are 50% responsible for this attack to happen bc they took large part of the pie that should goes to dedicated miner who would has reinvest otherwise into security

ok hi585858 what do YOU want to do

botnet doesnt reinvest, they malware more and sell more

the long term is going to to be the actual solution in a way that community agrees

botnet = literal cancer

bandaids, these can be suggested here. some are quick, others less so and depend on people updating, but can be done safely

at this point we should implore qbit supremacy to not kill us and leave us alone lol

they live on marketing and hype

lets gave them the win

so they stop

what win?

idk official annoucement you guys win you can stop

Lol

again official announcement

there is a sort of small consensus of people regularly doing work for monero but none own it

there is no Monero CEO

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> i can be Monero CEO if you vote

this is not a discord hype project

lol

see dezinfik, that IS an actual suggestion

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> no one respects the privacy

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> they will

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> one day

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> i think this was all planned, now monero will sky rocket to +500$

fix now fix now is not a suggestion and everyone is aware of how important it is. people here are volunteers or somewhat donation driven giving their time to monero

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> today i sold my stash of btc, won't touch xmr

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> elongated: hey how are you?

<e​longated:matrix.org> R u drunk

<e​longated:matrix.org> Sober

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> do you remember me ?

there is no "dev fee" that goes to a group of people by default. there is a core fund where people can donate from what is more or less agreed is the group of people that have importance in Monero

well donation driven is losing steam each and every day

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> oh you don't :)

because thing plumetting

for price talk go elsewhere, please

the 90xmr for dev is now worth 60

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> but i do know some things about you, stay sober <3

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> i go to clean now, that's my job

sure I now dev working hard behind the scene

again, this is not a speculation room or based on delivering pure trading gains to people

no, you don't. there is no appointed "dev"

nobody as spoke anything about trading gains lol

I am just a random data hoarder as well

<d​ezinfik:matrix.org> i know something but i can't really speak about it, in next days i will reveal everything

their dev monetary goal reducing so developpment might reduce, its all link

?

dev monetary goal?

most are volunteers

30k for 3 month now is 20k

some specific tasks are funded via bounties or similar

again

for price talk, go elsewhere

its part of why we are incapable to secure the PoW concensus against a qbit fruads

I run p2pool observer for fun, for example. one day decided to just do it as I saw p2pool appear

wrote all the stuff, done

we chose pow so we are fundamentally link to price

<e​longated:matrix.org> That is a problem you know ? Devs need to pay bills

stop talking like it doesnt matter

its time to agree on this

price is important for the functionality of privacy

its core fundamental because POW

personally idc, I want privacy, could be 1$ or 1000$

as an example of what I mean on why it's hard to move fast hi585858 here's some monero nodes monero.fail

these are tracked nodes. probably no one knows who runs about half of these

mining pools can update, exchanges can

but then suddenly for years after people discover they are on the wrong chain when loading their wallets :)

so again, hi585858, what would you do as a "fix" or suggestion to do now. a bandaid

as long term solutions are on the work

Lol i knew since 2018 CPU only without fixing botnet will bring shit

<e​longated:matrix.org> Price depends on xmr market gdp in long term

randomx at least killed the web mining :)

for things node operators can do now, --enforce-dns-checkpointing is a thing

should have stay on asic and slowly develop from there

> If encountered block hash does not match corresponding checkpoint, the local blockchain will be rolled back a few blocks, effectively blocking following what MoneroPulse operators consider invalid fork

that lets someone in a basement decide which chain is legit.

at least they can't go back in time that way

hm

but it's not designed really to work with short reorgs

they did slowly develop from there, and the ASIC were way more than 50%, I don't have the number, but was it 80 or 90%? controlled by a single entity

they were worse than qubic is but they stayed silent and never marketed/hyped stuff up to make the news

should have block them and open up discution with multiple manufacturer

kaspa has done it

the block was to move to randomx

months later their asics found their way to markets

qbit 50 last block is 56% now

they have the hashrate to achieve it, but remember, it's their long term output. compare full 24h they are doing 24/7 mining instead of specific segments

luck can go up/down and you might find 10 blocks (and suddenly get 100% in 10 block range) then nothing for hours

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I look forward to Shai's analysis. I know he's being paid for his work here, but he's not a Qubic or Monero lover. I think it'll be somewhat impartial.

refer to effort probabilities here (not time) for effort and cummulative time p2pool.observer/calculate-share-time?hashrate=1&magnitude=1

the numbers are long term

but look at the real variance irc.gammaspectra.live/5bd5dbc09d616e2d/image.png

sorry, empty pic

irc.gammaspectra.live/05deffee08eeb80a/image.png

clipboard loves trolling me I guess

p2pool has gotten several blocks back to back

<e​longated:matrix.org> He already posted on X

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Not a full review

yeah, preliminary results on x.com/DesheShai/status/1956001181546709005

full one across multiple marathons is what they are trying to get a record on

this addresses the point that they hit 80% of blocks in a specific window, but, that does not mean they had 80% hashrate of the window

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> right, of course

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> mine long enough with a high percentage of hashrate and you can take a screenshot at the right time to make it seem like you have way more than you do

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> and of course it's fishy that cfb turned off reporting at that time, claimed 51%, and turned reporting back on after many miners selfishly (not using this term in a derogatory way) defected from other big pools and so it shows a very high percentage

what I can tell you is that chain was proper long

and they waited for the network to catch up to release it

to make a longer orphan chain

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> All this to say, I think 51% is unlikely. I also don't think them reaching 51% actually matters. They've shown what they've set out to show.

but as they are experimenting with, if they don't care about profits directly from mining a coin and just care about pumping other coin or not even, just want to harm monero or bitcoin. someone can dump money into it until people move

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> And very interesting to see the ramifications over the past few days in the XMR community. I know my faith in PoW is definitely deeply shaken

long term solutions are being discussed in various room about this, it's very nice to see

<e​longated:matrix.org> How is it unlikely? You can rent servers and mine, just need enough budget which state actors have; he just shy away from having 51%

<l​ordx3nu:matrix.org> I really love random x so this is a tough pill to swallow

PoW assumes a logical attacker and ... security budget

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I once read something about how PoW is a good way to distribute coins. Bootstrap a network. Then maybe PoS. I, like articmine, have concerns and issues with PoS.

no matter the security budget you could get to a point where you buy a country just to produce CPUs or ASICs

if someone wants to burn enough money

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> same. And you know what? I'm not frustrated we did randomX. Monero tried for the true 1 CPU 1 vote dream. Nothing wrong with running that science experiment. But it is important to be able to say when an experiment goes awry, or outright fails. Bitter pill to swallow indeed.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> and, hate me if you want, I'm glad it's a little coin like Qubic that showed this than an actual powerful actor that wanted to harm Monero more than pump their little shitcoin

<e​longated:matrix.org> You have concerns about pos securing the chain ? Hybrid is not acceptable?

we should do peer review of every block coming in :)

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I'm actually probably happier with hybrid stuff than most people on here. I appreciate Firo's masternode finality scheme. It's literally just an incentivized finality layer with high collateral.

pow was also seen for anyone to be able to mine a couple of monero for their own use, in secret

this also has this feature: anyone can do that. and they can bring more power

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> My faith in pow isnt shakened. But i think monero has design issues that make some things more dangerous than other chains (>10 block reorgs are relatively harmless to users on other chains)

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Yes. This was the true dream. Moving ASICs around, you can get stopped and they can get confiscated. But everyone has a computer. So someone with no XMR can still get some by taking a computer across borders and mining.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> With PoS, you need some of the coin first. It's non-accessible unless you are sold the coin. Hence PoW boostrapping.

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I'm of the "PoW sucks, except for all the other methods which suck worse" point of view

yes I dont like fully pos but hybrid seem best of both world

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> whereas before I was "PoW is pretty good, all the other methods suck" point of view

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> some pos chains are clearly dominated by small groups of VCs or early investors

I haven't followed the long discussions here that much but finality layer and keeping pow would still allow someone let's say with 90% of pow to ... not include transactions they don't like

pow is only good as long economic fallow

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> With 50-80% of the coins stakes at all times

which is happening in bitcoin with specific pools

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I've obviously known about PoW weaknesses, but sometimes it takes something smacking you in the face to get it to go from head knowledge to heart knowledge :P

hm

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> or exchanges, although that's not as big a problem with Monero since we're not on many exchanges :P

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I really, really dont like "buy-in pos"

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Same.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Yeah. Coins like zano are secretly staked by exchanges

im from the schoool whjere I think price is independent of the number of exchanges, we can be on 0 exch and be 1 trilion dollars, depend if people hold or not

<e​longated:matrix.org> Okay, fork date cubic comes with 51% and only they can stake

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> Can't blame them either. I'd stake them too if I owned the exchange

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Particl has like 0.75 users who own 0.05% of the supply, and 7 whales who own the rest%

01:54:02 <m-relay> <o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I really, really dont like "buy-in pos"

this I agree with. but there were comments I need to read also showing why it was a bad idea to be mining only

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> So you have 8 million coins staked, indefinitely, while sitting on a ledger somewhere

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> If a coin starts as PoS, I think it's doomed from a distribution perspective

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> These whales dont provide liquidity, they just hoard. They dont use the ecosystem, rhey just hoard. Ans once NGU, theyll dump

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> If a coin is boostrapped with PoW, I think it mitigates a lot of the scares of migrating, especially if PoW stays in the picture

so pow to pos has somewhat more natural distributive attribute

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> again, not advocating a migration to full PoS

<e​longated:matrix.org> You are seriously concerned with ngu

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> its been argued against, but i'm still only OK with bootstrapping POS with coinbases

<e​longated:matrix.org> Don’t worry, we have vendors who will sell daily weekly for their supplies

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Me?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> No, stakers are

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> They ruin the ecosystem by hoarding the supply like some sort of stock investor

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yes, pos is not just about number game; just pow can’t protect a small coin like xmr

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Some dude had 2 million coins, but you cant buy that anywhere

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Has*

yeah, the yields% that are usually done for by staking is ... waay too high to what monero, already on tail emission, is

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> These past few days have been busy with defcon, but I've been trying to stay up to date with the happenings. After some thought (for whatever my opinions are worth), I've come to the conclusion that there is only room for a handful of PoW coins in the space.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> "small coin" << so youre the one talking about ngu then?

and changing that is a no-no

<e​longated:matrix.org> Dex liquidity issue ?

qbit has over 51% last 80 block and it keep rising