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github.com/bochum-crypto/subexponen…l/blob/main/subexponential-ecdl.pdf new paper (does not affect us, only meaningful for extremely large prime fields on the order of 2^(10^16) bits)
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<slowbeardigger:matrix.org> @syntheticbird: Birb
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<rucknium> Pirate Chain just posted their counterfeiting exploit postmortem:
medium.com/piratechain/consensus-ex…t-it-means-for-holders-2eb534e45146
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<rucknium> The counterfeiting transaction would have been rejected by the mempool, but it was accepted in a block that the counterfeited mined themselves.
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<gingeropolous> dayum
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<rucknium> That's something I've worried about in Monero, but in the opposite case: a tx might be accepted into the mempool, but not accepted within a complete block. AFAIK, Monero nodes validate txs as they enter the txpool and accept a block containing them as valid without re-validating the whole block.
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<rucknium> So you could have an exploit based on that if everything isn't done correctly, or at least a chain split of nodes that were online during the problem tx and nodes that validated whole blocks after the fact.
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<rucknium> FCMP might add another risk with batch-validation of txs in complete blocks, but single-validation of txs in the txpool. I don't know if batch-validation is in the implementation code at the moment.
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<rucknium> * accepted in a block that the counterfeiters mined themselves.
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<interestingband:matrix.org> it's not FCMP might add another risk, it's ppl who wrote that code, they are capable of creating such risk in any code they touch.
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<yahniukov:matrix.yahniukov.com> @interestingband:matrix.org: you really wanna piss monero team off, as I see))
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<interestingband:matrix.org> definition of the "monero team" ?
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<interestingband:matrix.org> I'm wonedring who is a member of it from your perspectiev
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<interestingband:matrix.org> @yahniukov:matrix.yahniukov.com: I already did that just by pointing out flaws in the code after submitting PR with written fix, and it's more like conflict of interest (personal vs project) rather than desire to piss someone off
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<boog900> > <@rucknium> That's something I've worried about in Monero, but in the opposite case: a tx might be accepted into the mempool, but not accepted within a complete block. AFAIK, Monero nodes validate txs as they enter the txpool and accept a block containing them as valid without re-validating the whole block.
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<boog900> The txpool and block flow was simplified a lot here:
monero-project/monero #9135. The consensus rules were consolidated. Only semantic checks are directly skipped when adding blocks, these checks just depend on the HF. We re-validate the whole pool on a HF, so this is fine. The input signature checks are [... too long, see
mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/5a6gurkLeEVHeTFm ]
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<boog900> @rucknium: We already do batch-validation of txs in complete blocks, but single-validation of txs in the txpool
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<boog900> For the BPs anyway you can't batch CLSAGs
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<lordx3nu:matrix.org> vuvuzela is a rat
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<lordx3nu:matrix.org> lol > <@spirobel:kernal.eu> no. monerotalk had "joel vuvuzela" on as the "expert"
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<lordx3nu:matrix.org> i hope the vuvuzela nickname picks up. he is a clown
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<slowbeardigger:matrix.org> @lordx3nu:matrix.org: Yup
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<rucknium> Looks like the March 2026 Litecoin MWEB exploit was caused by a similar flaw
litecoin.com/news/litecoin-mweb-security-incident-postmortem
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<rucknium> > That check existed in some paths, including normal mempool and block construction paths. But it was not fully enforced in the block connection path. This meant a transaction created and mined by an attacker could bypass the normal paths and rely on the block connection logic accepting mismatched input metadata.
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<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Funny cuz iirc seth reported it like a month earlier
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<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Ltc just told us to resync out nodes. the malformed block corrupted our blockchains because we were running a newer/latest version
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<rucknium> Seth's report there was after the exploit and hotfix had been introduced AFAIK. You mean seth's report suggested that the hotfix was inadequate (which is was)?
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<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> There was another hotfix after that iirc
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<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: As in, they told me to mqke sure i was running 21.4 (released oct 2024), but this first issue was even a couple months before 21.4 was released.
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<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Burkett is the mweb guy, and he investigated seths issue. Im not sure / it doent sound like they had the issue even discovered at the time of seths report
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<skitzomaxxing:matrix.org> oh gosh, seth
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<skitzomaxxing:matrix.org> "Set (also known as Seth or Sutekh) is the ancient Egyptian god of deserts, storms, disorder, violence, and foreigner."
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<skitzomaxxing:matrix.org> ```"I am a man of a million cubits, whose name is Evil Day."````