after fully syncing 0.18.4.0 and turning it off I just synced 2.5 days (1800) worth of blocks

so the blocks were past the checkpoints

speed was 1.913 blocks/second

seems the same as before

so just under 16 minutes

so 6.3 minutes/day

<u​manx:matrix.org> Hello Everyone,

<u​manx:matrix.org> I am a systems architect, I have been involved in the fintech space since 2013 (Before Crypto I was also involved in Exchange Market Data Solutions for Brokerages and Financial Firms). My specialties are SysOps, DevOps, Infrastructure and Dev.

<u​manx:matrix.org> Anyone out there looking for a solid resource, I am free. Time or project based, I have worked for notable open source projects, organisations and startups around the globe.

<u​manx:matrix.org> a Bit about myself. I am a South African, but have made a home in the asian mountains with my wolf and husky. I grow my own food, have a fishery and a good woman.

<u​manx:matrix.org> Left my corporate existence in 2012 and started exploring the world. I have beem involved with and built payment solutions around Crypto Assets and supported projects like BTCPay, LND, RTL, NBXplorer etc.

<u​manx:matrix.org> I am a no-nonse sense guy and I get the job done.

<u​manx:matrix.org> Send me a message on Element / Telegram (UmanX) or here: umanx.org/me/umanx/?profiletab=about

<u​manx:matrix.org> (edited)

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Thank you for clarifying

hey, which fs type do you use for keeping a blockhain on linux? is there anything faster for big databases than ext4?

<k​evino:tchncs.de> no i don't think fs has that much difference in performance. most use ext4

<k​evino:tchncs.de> by changing fs you may not see any visible difference

lmdb.tech/bench/microbench/july I found this page (its unsecured) with a filesystem comparison at the very bottom. The difference looks to be noticeable.

Im going to try ext2, because it doesnt have the journaling overhead

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Hi, can anyone please confirm that on github.com/trezor/trezor-suite v24.5.4 is tagged as "Latest" ?

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> (By default bottom right corner of the webpage without scrolling)

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Also, generally what are your opinions on Trezor devices?

<k​evino:tchncs.de> that data looks so old though.

probably, but the filesystems are still the same :D

<k​evino:tchncs.de> also you may have to consider OS and kernel stability with different fs.

<k​evino:tchncs.de> thats why i generally don't mess with the file systems.

<i​ty:itycodes.org> Oh god

they've been good for me forevernoob

sorry, i meant ledger :p

i have a trezor that hasn't left the packaging

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Initial observations:

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> 1. It appears that they're pointing to an outdated version on their GH page. The "real" latest version doesn't include .AppImage files.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> 2. Latest version's help display is from their KB, but the images / screenshots are unable to be expanded / zoomed in. Clicking through to their actual KB, it's not possible to copy their link. And then this happens:

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/FuxwluSPVkIlDrgQjtMQpDBa

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Kind of feels like a half-baked product.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> And they're considered industry-standard in the crypto community?

<c​oincat:matrix.org> No hardware wallet is worth it if security is a major concern. If you’re here, you should understand how to use virtualization, such as QubesOS, to isolate your wallets. Hardware wallets are inherently dangerous because they leak information to the manufacturer. When a database is inevitably breached, you’ll be putting yourself at significant risk. I don’t trust Trezor’s p<clipped message>

<c​oincat:matrix.org> romise of data deletion, as it cannot be reliably verified

<q​8monero:matrix.org> i think the best wallet should be getmonero portable wallet

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Interesting.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> > Hardware wallets are inherently dangerous because they leak information to the manufacturer. When a database is inevitably breached, you’ll be putting yourself at significant risk. I don’t trust Trezor’s promise of data deletion, as it cannot be reliably verified

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> What databases are you referring to in this specific case? AFAIK Ledger had leaked e-mail addresses associated with the purchases of their devices, do you think Trazor maintains a similar list? In my case I just used a temporary e-mail address not associated with anything else.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Interesting.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> > Hardware wallets are inherently dangerous because they leak information to the manufacturer. When a database is inevitably breached, you’ll be putting yourself at significant risk. I don’t trust Trezor’s promise of data deletion, as it cannot be reliably verified

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> What databases are you referring to in this specific case? AFAIK Ledger had leaked e-mail addresses associated with the purchases of their devices, do you think Trazor maintains a similar list? In my case I just used a temporary e-mail address not associated with anything else.

<c​oincat:matrix.org> When you order, you’ll need to provide your address, full name, email, and phone number

<q​8monero:matrix.org> that's why i love mining

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Ah ok yeah I see. In my case I faked all of that info and delivered it to a post address.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Ah ok yeah I see. In my case I faked all of that info and delivered it to a pickup delivery point.

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Trezor also logs telemetry data when you use Trezor Suite

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Ah right, same as Ledger AFAIK. It's opt-out by default which is again pretty insane in an ecosystem where privacy is valued so highly.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Still, you could use all the best virtualization / isolation techniques, but bad hardware (UEFI bugs etc.) will kind of make these things moot, right?

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> A hw wallet is a 2nd factor authentication system which assumes a compromised "main / host" machine, so in that sense, isn't it improving security overall?

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Still, you could use all the best virtualization / isolation techniques, but bad hardware (UEFI vulns etc.) will kind of make these things moot, right?

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> A hw wallet is a 2nd factor authentication system which assumes a compromised "main / host" machine, so in that sense, isn't it improving security overall?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Privacy isnt valued by 98% of the value held on those devices

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Trezor is also vulnerable to these vulnerabilities. That’s why the firmware needs to be updated regularly

<c​oincat:matrix.org> There’s no way to be 100% secure, unfortunately. It depends on your threat model and the amount you’re planning to store. I could argue that while hardware wallets offer an extra layer of security, they introduce more vulnerabilities because you must trust all the libraries Trezor uses within their firmware

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Specifically:

<c​oincat:matrix.org> core: Trezor Core, firmware implementation for Trezor T

<c​oincat:matrix.org> crypto: Stand-alone cryptography library used by both Trezor Core and the Trezor One firmware

<c​oincat:matrix.org> legacy: Trezor One firmware implementation

<c​oincat:matrix.org> python: Python client library and the trezorctl command

<c​oincat:matrix.org> storage: NORCOW storage implementation used by both Trezor Core and the Trezor One firmware

<c​oincat:matrix.org> tools: Miscellaneous build and helper scripts

<c​oincat:matrix.org> vendor: Submodules for external dependencies

<c​oincat:matrix.org> It only takes one smart, rogue employee at Trezor to backdoor their firmware

I keep all my montero on a boat in deep water

I wonder if it is still there

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> You guys have monteros? Lucky

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Ive been mining for 2yrs and no luck

<c​oincat:matrix.org> I remember someone who stole billions of dollars worth of Bitcoin and kept their private key in a Cheetos tin on a piece of paper. I don’t recall their name

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Found it

<c​oincat:matrix.org> en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jimmy_Zhong

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Does anyone know if thefuzzstone is on Matrix? I need to tell him something important

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> hes on twitter and simplex

<c​oincat:matrix.org> I assume @TheFuzzStone:matrix.org is him?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Probably

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Havent seen him online / interact here in a very long time

<p​lowsof:matrix.org> thefuzzstone.github.io

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Thank you. I don’t use any of those social media platforms :(

<p​lowsof:matrix.org> that fuzz has been active in #monerokon:matrix.org under that matrix org account, you can pgp encrypt a message using his pub key to be sure coincat

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Acknowledged. Thank you plowsof

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Haha. Makes sense that _I_ havent seen him, haha

probably been asked a lot, but any ETA on full membership release? I remember something about mid-2025 being a target

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Mid 2025 for testnet

Sweet thanks

Grateful to all the contributors making it possible <3

<c​oincat:matrix.org> That’s happening so soon :D

Oh i've had a question about running your own node and privacy. So if I run a node over tor but don't set it as public, is there a chance multiple transactions could be linked to me because they are broadcasted from the same IP? I know Tor has delays between circuit changes and monerod doesn't support circuit rotation natively

Is there more value to privacy if I have it set as public so that I also broadcast other trasnsactions and participate in dandelion?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> for the second message. Not "set as public". To do what you're talking about, you want to allow incoming connections

Gotcha. Can you have a public node that proxies everything through tor via the proxy config?

Everything listening on localhost

<c​oincat:matrix.org> storagemonster, How did you initially download the blockchain? You’re also exposing your IP address by doing so

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> `--proxy`

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> docs.getmonero.org/interacting/mone…od-reference/?h=#tori2p-and-proxies

coincat: i downloaded the initial blockchain over clearnet but i didn't broadcast anything when downloading. Then i turned on the proxy config before broadcasting anything

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Can I send you the message and have you relay it to him?

<c​oincat:matrix.org> Even if you don’t broadcast, I believe nodes can still log your IP address unless I’m mistaken

<c​oincat:matrix.org> While downloading the blockchain

Oh yeah I'm fine with that, it's running on a remote server. I was just more concerned with specific transactions being linked to the server's IP address

Even with dandelion the first server in the relay would still be able to determine the origin no?

so i was just guessing it'd be better to be a public node and help broadcast other transactions

<c​oincat:matrix.org> storagemonster Yes, assuming it is a spy node, the first server can determine the origin

<c​oincat:matrix.org> node*

Hm okay i'll try out the public node setting then

If you send XMR to an anonymous exchange in 2 back-to-back transactions would they be able to figure out both transactions are the same person? I'm thinking this is possible due to UTXO tracking

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> "<s​toragemonster> Even with dandelion the first server in the relay would still be able to determine the origin no?" < no

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> "<s​toragemonster> Hm okay i'll try out the public node setting then" < dont

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> "<s​toragemonster> If you send XMR to an anonymous exchange in 2 back-to-back transactions would they be able to figure out both transactions are the same person? I'm thinking this is possible due to UTXO tracking" < no, not unless the utxo's are related (one is change to the other, or both split off of the original output)

ofrnxmr: why do you say don't do the public node?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> "storagemonster Yes, assuming it is a spy node, the first server can determine the origin" < this is false. The node sending the stem tx isnt necessarily the origin node. Nodes stem in multiple hops

hm if i send from same account on the monero gui wallet won't those utxo be related?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> They wont be related unless the outputs themselves are connected tl one another.. one being changer from the other, them being split off of the same original output etc

<c​oincat:matrix.org> I was able to send the message. There’s no need to worry

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The wallet (or address) that they are stored on doesnt matter

oh i see. I assumed if i send 1 XMR then send another 1 XMR, the second tx would use the change output from the first tx

like in bitcoin if i have 3 btc and i send 1 btc the change output from that is used on the next tx

the wallet keeps sending the remaining btc to a new address

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Only if the second 1xmr IS change the first

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> In which case, the outputs are related _on chain_

but by default the monero gui wallet doesn't do this?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Btc uses utxos. Different situation

is there one master address and it's just spending that balance

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Every time you receive xmr, it is a different output

but if i only received 1 transaction on that account

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> if you done spend it all at once, youll get change back

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> That change is related to the first output

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Its a "child" of the first output

right so i receive 3 XMR, then i spend 1 XMR at exchange A, and then i spend another 1 XMR at exchange A. Exchange A can figure out the two transactions are the same person with a high likelihood?

ofc assuming i haven't KYC or have an account at exchange A

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> i wouldnt say "high", but likely

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Especially if there are other indicators, such as same amount, coin pair, timing, etc

gotcha i'll keep that in mind

i've always wondered why people say don't use a public node though. Wouldn't it be okay if you were on Tor and rotated the node per tx?

i know there was the whole debat after the chainanalysis video

i alwys felt that it would offer more privacy vs running your own node esp with having to wait for tor circuit change

<e​longated:matrix.org> With fcpm++ does the tx get created on hw wallets or on pc/mobile devices?

<e​longated:matrix.org> With fcpm++ does the tx get created on hw wallet or on pc/mobile devices?

tobtoht said in the feather room "> iirc the plan is to offload most of the work to the pc/phone and have the hardware device do a relatively inexpensive operation to sign the tx"

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Be that as it may, the goal AFAIK is to have a multi-sig type situation where coins can't go missing if the host device is compromised.

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Aren't hw wallets supposed to have a much smaller attack surface? The stuff that you mentioned is developed as open source which, while it does not guarantee more eyes, certainly makes things easier, no?

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> In regards to that, I tried restoring my old wallet into Trezor Safe 3 and getmonero GUI only asked me for the passphrase. Is the passphrase and wallet password the only thing standing between my coins and an attacker?

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> Wallet fully synced, yet 0 XMR. This calls for some inquiries in #monero-gui:monero.social perhaps.

/join #monero-offtopic

/join #gnu

/join #gnu-offtopic

<b​asses:matrix.org> I find it ironic that Monero GUI have globe image in setup process but their translation platform is done for 2 years and not even translated properly/fully

<b​asses:matrix.org> is down*

<f​orevernoob:matrix.org> nvm, apparently you need to recover the seed using the Trezor Suite app, and _then_ use getmonero to do stuff.

<3​21bob321:monero.social> Soon ™️