<rbrunner7> How about a Ledger backdoored with the help of an LTE module with an e-SIM that sends your seed out through mobile networks? gizmodo.com/ledgers-crypto-wallets-…-in-crypto-already-moved-2000824372

<rbrunner7> Mark Karpelès has photos on X, e.g. this one: x.com/MagicalTux/status/2108095743525625998

<pw:xmr.mx> I read that as magic carpets has photos on X - I must sleep :-)

<torir:unredacted.org> So... the tamper-resistant hardware device got tampered with?

<321bob321> The authorized re seller one ?

<torir:unredacted.org> Coinkite had a robust-looking method to prevent tampering with the hardware during shipping, and documentation to help verify that the packaging was intact. It's too bad Coinkite had that software vulnerability.

<torir:unredacted.org> The Ledger devices in question from the reseller may have been physically altered. Not completely certain at this point, but very likely. However, it could just be one device in the Twitter post and the hacked ones had something else done to them.

<torir:unredacted.org> It would be a bad idea to blame the reseller at this point. There's likely a long supply chain and the attacker may have set up interception at any point along it.

<torir:unredacted.org> Considering the apparent complexity of the operation, I wouldn't be surprised if post office workers were bribed or in on this.

<torir:unredacted.org> I take it back, these Ledgers are clearly not meant to be tamper-resistant (besides the secure element obviously), so it isn't part of the threat model for them. But they should still have included anti-tamper packaging. > <@torir:unredacted.org> So... the tamper-resistant hardware device got tampered with?

<torir:unredacted.org> But if you can get a Pixel phone, install GrapheneOS, shut off Wi-Fi, and have a reasonably comparable level of security to the Ledger, what is the point of buying a hardware wallet?

<torir:unredacted.org> (Using the GrapheneOS phone as an offline wallet, a configuration supported by multiple Monero android apps)

<torir:unredacted.org> Especially when even just buying the hardware wallet could end up with your address being in a data breach and leading to a potential physical attack.

<torir:unredacted.org> You won't be a target for a crypto-attack if you only bought a phone, even if your address for that purchase is leaked in a breach.

<pw:xmr.mx> @torir:unredacted.org: purchased used and fresh flash gos.

<pw:xmr.mx> won't need to show any I'd then!

<torir:unredacted.org> Actual real-world attacks against hardware wallets have been, for the most part, not attacks against the hardware itself. And those non-hardware attacks are better addressed by not using dedicated hardware, but general purpose hardware hardened to suit the purpose.

<torir:unredacted.org> Because it provides deniability and better privacy, and resistance to supply chain attacks.

<torir:unredacted.org> That could change, and hardware wallets could become better again, but it seems unlikely to me that will happen anytime soon.

<torir:unredacted.org> There's always a trade-off though. Hardware wallets are easier to set up in a secure fashion compared to converting a phone to a secure offline signing device.

<cookingnan:matrix.org> x.com/umbraXMR/status/2109310540820443308