<3​21bob321:monero.social> Magic gets free promo at the expense of false info…winrar

<j​ordan_sanchez:matrix.org> Hello everyone, it appears the Cointelegraph article has caused some commotion.

<j​ordan_sanchez:matrix.org> I’m not sure if anyone has reached out to them but I wanted to mention that I have Jeff Milligan’s telegram, so if anyone wants to help clarify the record, I can reach out to him.

<m​mxxx:monero.social> link to article?

From Prototype to Marketplace: Maturing the XMR-BTC Atomic Swaps Ecosystem is now fully funded! ccs.getmonero.org/proposals/mature-atomic-swaps-ecosystem.html @luigi1111

<j​ordan_sanchez:matrix.org> cointelegraph.com/news/chainalysis-leak-monero-traceability

maybe send him this and ask for a comment

here’s the article they should’ve written if they were competent: digilol.net/blog/chainanalysis-malicious-xmr.html

<m​mxxx:monero.social> thanks jordan_sanchez, iunno why i expected anything interesting from cointelegraph

<s​hortwavesurfer2009:monero.social> I wonder what's going on with the transaction count? It was at like 23,000 and now it has shot up to just above 34,000.

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> Attempted attack again maybe?

<s​hortwavesurfer2009:monero.social> Maybe

<s​hortwavesurfer2009:monero.social> I'm not aware of any external event that has occurred that would be responsible for the increase.

<k​arano:poddery.com> 34k is not that abnormal i think

<k​arano:poddery.com> some payment processor sent xmr to large number of customers

<k​arano:poddery.com> some payment processor sent xmr to large number of customers ?

<s​hortwavesurfer2009:monero.social> Could be, it's not so much that 34K seems abnormal as that it seems abnormal to go from 23 to 34 all within a very short amount of time.

<k​arano:poddery.com> creating 10k additional transactions are not that difficult i think

<k​arano:poddery.com> yeah it could be abnormal , but whether its organic traffic or intentional spam we don't know

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> Could just be a tornado event from a whale to mix

<k​arano:poddery.com> 🤔

<k​arano:poddery.com> i was thinking about that. like dnm trying to use monero

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> Yes it’s probably archetyp cleaning their funds lol

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> Getting ready for an exit scam

<k​arano:poddery.com> but the fact is that monero doesn't require that mixing.

<k​arano:poddery.com> they could transact millions in few monero transactions

<k​arano:poddery.com> unless they transfer from like multiple Wallets. ,like thousands

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> You’re right it doesn’t, but what if they were the defcon 10 paranoia level

<k​arano:poddery.com> doing tornado with monero , would be foolish 😂

<k​arano:poddery.com> also there is no public monero mixer

<k​arano:poddery.com> but the fact is that monero doesn't require that mixing.

<k​arano:poddery.com> they could transact millions in few monero transactions and be private.

<k​arano:poddery.com> they won't mix between their own wallets

<k​arano:poddery.com> we forget about exchanges though.

<k​arano:poddery.com> could be a legitimate exchange trying to sort out their funds with users.

<k​arano:poddery.com> but don't know why would they settle all accounts all of sudden.

<k​arano:poddery.com> even binance delisting didn't have significant spike in transactions

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> It creates more obfuscation by mixing outputs and can confuse analysis tools, and what about if there is significant adversarial control over the Monero network that we’re not even aware of, if that did happen to be the case you can deanonymise right? If you spread it across multiple nodes it might be harder for a single entity to correlate the activity

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> Please tell me if my understanding is off 😛

tx count? there are now 58 txs in the mempool

now 102 0_o

<k​arano:poddery.com> why use multiple nodes when you can run yours own ? 🤔

<k​arano:poddery.com> even chainanalysis tracking suggested using your own node would make your transactions anonymous

<k​arano:poddery.com> also question is with whom are you mixing your outputs ?

<k​arano:poddery.com> the piconero attack can be overcome by churning wallet balance to a new address

<k​arano:poddery.com> so with a few number transactions you can make millions of xmr untraceable

<k​arano:poddery.com> well , Anyone can correct if i missed something 😅

why does sending to a new address mean anything when addresses are not on the blockchain?

<k​arano:poddery.com> piconeros ?

bbl, cats await me

<k​arano:poddery.com> sorry i am not sure about the details of the attack 😅

<k​arano:poddery.com> but apparently sending small amounts of xmr to target wallet , and see if they transfer that balance to a kyc exchange

<k​arano:poddery.com> so maybe the input and outputs could be co-related to that target

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> I see, I’ll assume you’re right! but if you send a transaction you can still be known as one of that 10 people that could have sent it right (depends on the amount of people in the ring signature)? If you do thousands of transactions that becomes 1 of several thousands possibilities of people?

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> I guess I should have used the word wallets instead of people their

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> I guess I should have used the word wallets instead of people there

<r​ucknium:monero.social> kevino: Dusting attacks are much harder in Monero than transparent chains. An adversary needs to have the target's address. Monero addresses don't appear on the blockchain, so the adversary needs information from another source.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> I wouldnt say "much" harder

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Well, i guess "much" is fair. But not to imply that its unrealistic

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Dusting wallets would force cospends with the default coin selection, leading to 2/2 transactions

re: > so with a few number transactions you can make millions of xmr untraceable, I'll say: a few txs provide a few hops of plausible deniability/uncertainty; the more txs, generally, the better (although if you make too many txs that stand out from the "background noise" in some way your efforts may be counterproductive)

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Churning the dust definitely helps

*Freezing the dust helps

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Donating the dust works too 😂

Dust ofrn's wallet :)

cointelegraph do say sorry sometimes (see cointelegraph.com/news/clarificatio…sharing-false-spot-bitcoin-etf-news)

nice how 1 donation completed binary barron's CCS and yet was overfunded by 1.xx xmr :D

we can put that toward the work night out

congrats binarybaron and einlitre💪

<k​arano:poddery.com> how many times do i need to churn to become almost untraceable ?

<k​arano:poddery.com> also assuming after fcmp++ we won't need to churn

First of all, you need to run your own node, before you even consider churning

<p​reland:monero.social> Wdym, can’t Chainalysis do it for me? /j

proper churning protocol is unknown

except that you should definitely run your own node

or use one you "trust" (don't trust, run your own node)

<k​arano:poddery.com> i run my own Node + vpn turned on

only 1 layer of vpn??

/s

<k​arano:poddery.com> yes

<3​21bob321:monero.social> Lol

churn 2-3 times at with random intervals (hours to days between churns)

and don't combine inputs

<k​arano:poddery.com> okay

<k​arano:poddery.com> wdym by not combining inputs ? i should churn each utxo separately ?

<k​arano:poddery.com> are these steps mentioned in a guide somewhere ?

<k​arano:poddery.com> wdym by not combining inputs ? i should churn each utxo separately to different address ?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> yes

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Or to same address. But each utxo must be separately churned.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> you want it to look like a 1:2 in the blockchain as 1:2 and 2:2 seam to be the most commons.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Having a 7:2 glow more

<k​arano:poddery.com> ok i didn't knew this

<k​arano:poddery.com> we should have a guide about this practice for people from DNM

TCMP will make this moot

*FCMP

<j​effro256:monero.social> Total Chain Membership Proofs

<p​reland:monero.social> Future Chain Membership Proofs 🔮