<yushanren:matrix.org> is there lean language proof of monero?

john_r365 It was Claude Code harness

<monerobull:matrix.org> Lol > <@jpk68:matrix.org> The patch to fix the exploit was also co-authored by Claude

<321bob321> Arsonist and fireman at the same time > <@jpk68:matrix.org> The patch to fix the exploit was also co-authored by Claude

<fafo757badnewzcoming4u:matrix.org> Gosh I guess running ancient code is not that secure

<syntheticbird> I will still argue that PRs like vtnerd new serialization in epee is essential long-term

<syntheticbird> after P2P SSL is merged i would be happy to see it being rebased btw

<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> See what rebased, serialization or?

<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Pr*

<syntheticbird> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: yeah new serialization

<syntheticbird> monero-project/monero #8867

<syntheticbird> oh its been rebased 3 weeks ago

<syntheticbird> incredible

<kayabanerve:matrix.org> Considering monero-oxide has reimplemented all the proofs thus far, and Cuprate the state transition, LLM historical review seems ill-founded. I think there's explicit questions we could further discuss the formal security of instead, or we should double down on FCMP++ reviews as it finally introduces an arithmetic circuit int [... too long, see mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/3pDKwooLOFcyZ0dl ]

<jpk68:matrix.org> @kayabanerve:matrix.org: Do you think multisig fits in here? As in, attempting to improve/standardize it?