<a​nddn:matrix.org> Is Judecoin developed by the Monero core team?

<a​nddn:matrix.org> Judecoin claims to be developed by the Monero core team

anddn: I doubt that's true

<a​nddn:matrix.org> It can't be true

<a​nddn:matrix.org> judecoin is a fork of Monero, and it is impossible for the Monero core team to fork their own project

its spam

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Take judecoin topics to -judecoin or -offtopic, not -dev and -community

<s​nowman:tetaneutral.net> Can my public Monero node running as a tor hidden services utilize the new Tor PoW protection mechanism?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> why do you go for 12 months in one go ofrn, you know that wont pass

<a​nddn:matrix.org> It should be possible, as long as the node is on the TOR network

Bcuz i like it like that. Who says it wont pass? The length wasn't an issue on the first one, the up front payment and the unconventional scope was

<r​ottenwheel:kernal.eu> Attention whoreism?

yea, you just need to add the pow config lines to your torrc

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> isnt it unconvetional scope if you scope it for 1 year when some of our top devs have to re-submitt every 3 months

nobody told em to do that. They do it because they choose to, sometimes because of volatility

Some do 2 months, some do 1, some say 3 and go for 6

they dont _have_ to resubmit every 3 months. Its a personal choice

And some also like to raise rates every 3 months

i have already have support on this ccs from two "3 month ccs devs", mrcyjan and 0xfffc. Their work also changes more frequently, which is another reason why they might choose shorter terms

our top devs dont have to scope for 3 months, one of them does it due to volatility

<ofrnxmr> Bcuz i like it like that. Who says it wont pass? The length wasn't an issue on the first one, the up front payment and the unconventional scope was <<>> the length was not a issue compared to the upfront payment and unconventional scope.

One of the big reasons for the max 3 month rule was price volatility resulting in changes in work/completion or people crying that people made $$

Another issue was proving a new contributor. Although this is a first CCS it is a continuation of work that has been ongoing

1 xmr = 1 xmr as stated in the proposal addresses the volatility. Is that enough of a guarantee? .shrug

<a​nddn:matrix.org> judecoin is a fork of Monero, and it is impossible for the Monero core team to fork their own project <= why would this be impossible? That said I've never heard of judecoin.

is this the same judecoin that wants to be added to xmrig sech1 lol

or the one where tevador linked to the 1 million pre-mine in their source

so many monero forks, what a time to be alive

No, it's different

luigi, case in point (depending on definition of "core dev"): townforge

Ik moo doesnt identify as core team. So bad example maybe.. but yeah theres nothing stopping anyone, incl core, from forking to monero

<r​ottenwheel:kernal.eu> Monero is a fork itself. Doh.

read comments for the full context. geonics issue for info regarding the monero trademark monero-project/meta #730

<r​brunner7:monero.social> You can't make that stuff up: Those self-confessed Monero spammers that claimed to bring down DNMs with hard drugs now seem to have offers for such drugs on their very own BBS: antidark.net/board/viewtopic.php?t=24

<r​brunner7:monero.social> (Probably a case of mod sleeping, but still.)

<r​ottenwheel:kernal.eu> Nice. Lol.

have they published the keys of the wallet to verify :(

<r​brunner7:monero.social> Don't think so. And as was opined in yesterday's MRL meeting: Truth told, we don't really want to float view keys for any of those spam wallets around. Privacy impact.

they are malicious so they would want to do that anyway , hinting toward them not being the culprits

combined with them selling things the whole thing looks like marketing

correction* they are not selling things, someone spammed their forum, so i retract the above

<r​brunner7:monero.social> I can't really follow that reasoning. They *claim* they are the good ones, and try to do good, for the children and all. If really so isn't it only logical they don't add further to the damage done to Monero with publishing those view keys.

<r​brunner7:monero.social> Yeah, I think that's just a hilarious piece of spam on their board, in any case.

not exactly sure on how the have framed it, but they see monero as enabling evil people so they attacked it. releasing keys would have a privacy impact on those evil people

<r​brunner7:monero.social> Anyway, however the truth may be, we have to mitigate, and we are on the way to do exactly that, by working full steam towards getting rid of rings which make "black marbles" possible in the first place, and by stress-testing the Monero daemon further.

<r​brunner7:monero.social> Both endevours are coming along nicely IMHO.

release of the keys would allow us to add one of those custom black-marble lists as to not use any of their decoys, so they could use that to not do it

<r​brunner7:monero.social> Stressnet had numbers of transactions and block sizes reached that went well beyond what their spam wave reached, by the way

true, it had a net positive on Monero and no transactions where dropped , nothing stopped

<r​brunner7:monero.social> At one point there were freaking 3 MB blocks if I remember correctly

<h​ardenedsteel:monero.social> > didn’t prove they really made the attack

<h​ardenedsteel:monero.social> > Take a look at the post once again. Try it out yourself. Post back the results. Really simple for the smoothest of brains to understand.

<h​ardenedsteel:monero.social> monero.town/post/3785880/5249182

black marble / sharing of keys reminds me of something

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Tor friendly link pls 🙈

hardenedsteel "try it out yourself" > the method for spamming is well known / there are open source repos to perform it sponsored by magic. just because its simple to do doesnt mean they did it

300k in donations too, without proof.. seems profitable

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> 7mb

what kind of person would work with chainalysis companies to share keys though and harm out privacy if they where released, surely nobody here?

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> Well we can wait for another attack instead of increasing ringsize and fees

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> And wait for fcmp and bigger blocks to be all tested in a single update

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> /s

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Your sarcasm of terribly misguided

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Bigger rings dont solve anything

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> and we tested bigger blocks, over 10x bigger than this spam attack

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Something like 40+tps and 7mb blocks

@plowsof Regarding the "proof of reserves" feature you suggested: We think it would be a useful feature with little to no drawbacks. I've added it to our roadmap and opened a GitHub issue for it: comit-network/xmr-btc-swap #1743

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> "<p​lowsof> what kind of person would work with chainalysis companies to share keys though and harm out privacy if they where released, surely nobody here?" <<plowsof trying to moonbait me

<m​onerobull:monero.social> Plow

<m​onerobull:monero.social> The "donations" was them draining DNM wallets

i wondered what the quotes meant lol thanks monerobull

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> Incognito admin couldn't catch a break lol

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> First lost 300k eth wallet then drained by these guys then tried to exit scam and was arrested

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Didnt he get arrested

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> before the spam?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> My timeline is probably off, iguess

<h​ardenedsteel:monero.social> they call “donation” to collateral damage

<s​hadow06:matrix.org> link?

<e​scapethe3ra:matrix.org> ofrnxmr: !482 milestones from January > August should probably be 2025 (not 2024)

<e​scapethe3ra:matrix.org> ofrnxmr: !482 milestones from January > July should probably be 2025 (not 2024)

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Ty

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> It does help to keep effective ringsize higher than 5 😅 + add higher fees and it’s much much more expensive for the attacker

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Ask wownero how that worksout

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> Ain’t you a wow moon boy

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Higher fees? In per-unit expenses, we spend as much as bitcoin

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> More rings != more privacy u mess those rings are guaranteed to be clesn

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> You can buy a ton of xmr for a single btc

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Im not a moon and not a boy

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> And? Theres less xmr than there is btc AND we both pay abt 0.00004 for a regular transaction

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Monero != fiat. Are we supposed to hard fork to change the fees to account for usd price? Lol

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> This is a convo for #monero but im not allowed in there some reason diegoooooooo Diego Salazar:

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> Xmr is a target, btc isn’t ; keeping fees low = inviting spam attacks , it maybe irrelevant after fcmp but till we use 15 decoys we are vulnerable

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Btc isnt a target? So then why is it constantly spammed

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Why is 15 a magic number for you?

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> Btc etf ? Spammed by miners increased feeeees

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> 16 ? 15 decoys

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> decoys are the weakest part of monero privacy and whether you have 1 or 16, a churn wont save ya

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> Bump decoys ? Isn’t it common knowledge that effective ringsize was 5 during spam attack

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> maybe if you had 1000 decoys, youd have plausible deniability when spending multiple outputs together

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> 15 decoys is better than 5 decoys

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> But 16 is a waste if blockspace.

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> We can wait for fcmp, but we are just waiting for another spam attack that lowers xmr privacy

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Its not though.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> if i send you known outouts and you ever mix that change together and send it back to me, ill know youre the spender

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> And the spam attack wasn’t wasting any blockspace ? Reason there was spam is because it was cheap and effective to lower ring size to 5

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> unless there are sooooo many decoys that your outputs are constantly being referenced by other people

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> No. Spam attack was garbage.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> wasting blockspace = fake privacy. Bumping ring size to 22 wont fix anything, can still spam your effective ringsize down to 3 just as easily

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Spam = paying for blockspace, and those blocks werent even big

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Barely did 100ktx/day

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> Need to bump ringsize to match fcmp tx size + some bump in fee

<s​trawberry:monero.social> There's a case for increasing ring size so that tx size is roughly what it will be with FCMP, but the most obvious immediate solution is to artificially raise fees so that there's a fixed cost to create 1 output

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> On stressnet, were doing 5000 tx/block

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> No

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> The most obvious immediate solution js to limit outputs to 2 and 16

<d​ave.jp:matrix.org> No use, it’s still uses those spammed decoys

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> And increase the effective ring size by not allowing users to oust themselves by having 3-15 out transactions

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Youre not listening

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Rings are polluted by _rare_ transacrion types.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Your effective ringsize is always low because our decoy selection also will select coinbases and also out wallets let you spend non-standard transactions

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> our* wallets

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Non standard = 1in5out transaction (etc). Anything that isnt 2 or 16

<s​trawberry:monero.social> There are reasons you might want to ban 3-15 out txs, but I don't see how it helps with increasing effective ringsize

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> This is why it was so easy to track the ccs wallet hack

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> you have bad decoys that use those

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> When i come to your store and soend some money and you look at the ring full of coinbases and 8-out's. You can exclude those as the true spend, they are all black marbles

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> The real tx is a 1/2

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Sorry, a */2

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> And if its s 5/2, and youre spending at a central service? and those 5 inputs are change from a central service? Extremely easy to know which outputs are the real spend

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Tldr: rings are trash. Believe in steath addresses and CT, dont rely on rings or churning to save you unless you are meticulous with your coincontrol or never spend at centralized services

<s​trawberry:monero.social> I see, so it can't be fixed by changing decoy selection to avoid non standard output count txs, since that would leave people withdrawing from exchanges with less privacy

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> people withdrawing from exchanges are often batched (16 out)

<s​trawberry:monero.social> By requiring 2- or 16-out only, exchanges will wait for 16 withdrawals, or fall back to 2-outs

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> 16 out and 2 out are extremely common transactions (present in 100% of rings and 30% of rings, respectively)

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> You can send a 1/5, it would just create 11 dummy outs and appear as a 1/16

<c​t:xmr.mx> cursed username gave me a ping. But yes, stealth addresses and confidential transactions are solid

<c​t:xmr.mx> (my fault really)

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> hahaha

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> So thats why they call you ct. Mr confidential

<c​t:xmr.mx> its unrelated

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> If we limited outputs to 2 and 16 + segregated coinbase (mrl 109), rings would be much closer to reality

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> but cmon. Its a ratio.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> if someone sends 80% of the transactions, theyll own 80% if the decoys. Doesnt matter if its 16 or 32

<s​trawberry:monero.social> Why did the spam attack use 8-outs? It'd be cheaper to use 16 if they wanted to reduce effective ringsize

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> And if there are 32 decots, but you spend 3 known outputs together, the original sender can just watch the chsin to see when multipke known outs are consolidated. Its easy to exclude the fake outs

<d​iego:cypherstack.com> I'm not an admin there am I?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Banhammer

<3​21bob321:monero.social> How can you not be an admin in all the rooms

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Cuz admin should be the person who champions the room, not just a bureaucrat /politics

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Example: scott shouldnt be admin in any room

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Yet.. he is in every room

<3​21bob321:monero.social> If you have access to banhammer, then you have access to all the protected rooms anyway

<j​babb:cypherstack.com> I created github.com/monerojs/monerojs 6 years ago

<j​babb:cypherstack.com> I want to update it but do so usefully; I'd rather contribute to an up-to-date project rather than probably redoing a lot of work someone else has already done.

<j​babb:cypherstack.com> I see github.com/PsychicCat/monero-nodejs was also last updated 6 years ago

<j​babb:cypherstack.com> Can anyone please share any similar JavaScript or TypeScript Monero JSON RPC libraries to which I can contribute rather than updating my old code?

<j​babb:cypherstack.com> is github.com/mymonero/mymonero-core-js the preferred JS lib?

no lol badly out of date but i'll release mine in a sec. just as soon as i get literally a few hours to myself