<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> right but they can't do that and simultaneously mine their own chain

<b​oog900:monero.social> by that "auditor" that is getting a paid a ridiculous amount

<r​ucknium:monero.social> That's the downside to mining longer and longer attacking chains with minority hashpower: you're gambling. Satoshi actually referred to it as similar to the "gambler's ruin" problem in the bitcoin white paper.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Ya they can. at least for the initial block

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> its exactly like the crash gambling game

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> I mean, they can split their hash power....

<b​oog900:monero.social> they will be mining to a different wallet?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> 500/hr 🤣

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> redirecting the block to their own pool

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> youtube.com/watch?v=iDaB8N7n2kU

<b​oog900:monero.social> yeah but they wont be getting any XMR from it, just causing a problem

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Find share with difficukty greater than block target -> intercept it and send it to qubic instead of supportxmr

<b​oog900:monero.social> I think they would rather the money

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> the block template you mine has to have the pool operator's address to be a valid share

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> you can't just "send it to qubic instead"

<b​oog900:monero.social> you can hide the block

<b​oog900:monero.social> and mine ontop of it secretly

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> gotcha

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> pool operator's would do well to monitor for this type of behavior and issue bans as needed

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> it seems detectable, if you have a alrge miner with much worse luck than you'd expect

<b​oog900:monero.social> the fact they just failed that reorg that they were building up tells me they dont have 51%

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> What happens if we give Belarusian IPs to Ukrainian SBU?

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> B)

<p​reland:monero.social> I stg if cfb is this century’s Franz Ferdinand

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> 11 confs on my transfer 🥲🥲. Lets see if she dies

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> SBU is Ukraine Intelligence

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> They could have been unlucky :P

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> they are building one again

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> CFB = Century Ferdinand B)

<b​oog900:monero.social> I wonder how much selfish mining would affect the global hash rate 🤔

<b​oog900:monero.social> seen as the are not mining the same blocks as everyone else I would guess their hashrate would not apply to the total

<b​oog900:monero.social> or at least most of it wouldn't

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i wonder what the ... economics are.. of using rented HR to mine monero vs. using the same rented HR to mine another CPU coin

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> i guess it depends on how much of the attack HR is rented

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> I have two visions of what might have happened:

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> 1. they are pure propaganda and don't want to do a 51% attack because CFB's head would be being hunted by Dread users (you must already know what happened with that supposed team that did the spam attack on Monero, supposedly it did), and it would also be very costly.

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> 2. CFB said it would try during 08/11 (and this argument can use the first argument).

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i bet its a decent chunk

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> what happened to the guys who spammed?

<b​oog900:monero.social> we would need a count of all alt blocks, that percentage is probably comparable to the percentage of missing hashrate, if I had to guess

<b​oog900:monero.social> by all alt blocks, I mean including the ones they hide

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/1lizib…team_who_spammed_monero_network_got

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> standart cpu VPS rental is ~100.000 $/month for 1GH -- IF available (~150 servers, Intel 8 core) IIRC, rough estimate

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> is that `100000` dollars

<b​oog900:monero.social> within the range of a marketing budget ....

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> cheap 1btc

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> especially if it boosts your marketcap by 200M

so can the top 3 or 4 pools just exclude qubic blocks or what

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> yeah, difficulty only adjusts for accepted blocks

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> So you could have w parties with 5gh, but if half of it has its blocks dropped, the network diff only adjusts for 5gh

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> maybe we should include alt chain difficulty in the diff targets, which could(?) Limit reorgs to 1 block, since you'd have to include the alt chain in your history ?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Problem there could be that an attacker could withhold their alt chain, include yours, but invalidating yours because you didnt include theirs. :/

<b​oog900:monero.social> yeah

<b​oog900:monero.social> also that would just slow block production as selfish mining is a function of real hashrate not the claimed hashrate of the chain

<b​oog900:monero.social> the difficulty adjustment algorithm keeps blocks at 2 minute intervals on average, the global hashrate is just the real hashrate that would cause that difficulty. Selfish mining makes that last step invalid as the hashrate is not real when selfish mining as it is split between multiple chains most of the time.

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> > Last block: 1m ago

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Excuse me for speaking in cursive, but iirc there are chains that do something similar to what i said above

<b​oog900:monero.social> could we do something where the deeper the reorg the more ahead the chain has to be 🤔

<b​oog900:monero.social> i.e. every 5 blocks the amount the other chain needs to be ahead increases by 1 or something

<b​oog900:monero.social> meaning if the other chain has enough PoW to maintain their lead we'll switch to not cause a net split but otherwise we'll stay on the current chain

<b​oog900:monero.social> meaning if the other chain has enough PoW to maintain their lead we'll switch to not cause a chain split but otherwise we'll stay on the current chain

<b​oog900:monero.social> I guess it is just checkpoints with extra steps, still has a liveliness requirement

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> we have liveliness, so leveraging that is an idea

<b​oog900:monero.social> not every node is active all the time, for all of history

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The issue here is that you can just spam 1 block reorgs, but i guess thats harder than mining a secret chain?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Hyc proposed years ago a "hash of hashes" rolling checkpoint system

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> For bootstrapping, this could require sybils to circumvent. Since most of your peers should agree in the hash of the Nth block from the tip

<b​oog900:monero.social> I mean we have a lot of fake nodes operating now without that big of an incentive

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> would prob. need some byzantine agreement imho. Yep, fake nodes stand in the way.

<l​ordx3nu:matrix.org> is the mined blocks on miningpoolstats inaccurate? it looks like it isn't updating with the reorgs

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Is it possible to cap the monero supply in the future? I know a lot of people don’t want to hear this, but if monero doesn’t increase in price and make mining monero more profitable. Monero likely wont exist in 5 years from now.

<v​tnerd:monero.social> It ruins the calculations for the variable block size limit. So it's not a simple change to a config value somewhere

<b​oog900:monero.social> lack of supply cap isn't keeping price low, bitcoin currently has a higher inflation rate

<e​longated:matrix.org> No, yes if we depend on botnets price isn’t going anywhere

<b​oog900:monero.social> if you want to increase miner revenue you should increase the inflation rate not decrease it

<e​longated:matrix.org> Someone can mine btc without investing in hardware?

<b​oog900:monero.social> mining monero is never going to be profitable for the average user IMO

<e​longated:matrix.org> It was before randomx

<b​oog900:monero.social> when ASICs existed?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yes even with them

<b​oog900:monero.social> Why do you think RX failed?

<b​oog900:monero.social> failed the average user*

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> At this point they need to get rid of Random X in my opinion. It didn’t really bring down centralization, because groups like SupportXMR had around 40 to 50 percent of the hash rate for years. It just making mining completely unviable.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Simple botnets have upper hand

<b​oog900:monero.social> why didn't they with cryptonight?

<e​longated:matrix.org> No investment easy to mine

<b​oog900:monero.social> different from RX?

<e​longated:matrix.org> They did, but gpu were profitable

<e​longated:matrix.org> That was randomx related reply

I was mining xmr when the asics arrived after which mining became unprofitable

<b​oog900:monero.social> yeah I fail to see how you are competing with ASICs

<e​longated:matrix.org> Profit reduced it wasn’t like randomx

<b​oog900:monero.social> I would bet you would be more unprofitable now with cryptonight than RX but we'll never know

<b​oog900:monero.social> I think your argument that botnets are worse than ASICs doesn't really work when you look at the profitability of popular ASIC coins vs Monero

obv to profit from mining you need to have some cost advantage

<e​longated:matrix.org> No legit miner is going to invest in mining xmr or support price when they know its going to be mined by a entity which has no cost to mine

<e​longated:matrix.org> Monero was sabotaged when we switched to randomx

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> okay so, 33% RandomX, 33% new CroptoNightR variant (hopefully more ASIC resistance), 33% Litecoin merge

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> They needed to get rid of Random X years ago. The only thing that might save monero now from a 51% attack from Quibic is that they have a halving next Wednesday. Qubic got 50% of the hash rate last Saturday.

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> I mean they probably didn't

<b​oog900:monero.social> they didn't

<b​oog900:monero.social> and no individual is going to mine an ASIC coin?

<b​oog900:monero.social> without an ASIC^

<e​longated:matrix.org> Individuals don’t buy for any hardware for anymore.

<e​longated:matrix.org> I don’t have issue with asic if they are securing the chain, just get it developed in America if china was such a perceived danger.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Chinese will do cpus soon

<e​longated:matrix.org> What will you move to then ?

<b​oog900:monero.social> targeting RX by targeting all CPUs is going to be tuff

<b​oog900:monero.social> "hey guys look at this nice list of all the people who have bought ASICs we should go to their place and shut them down for mining Monero"

just target the company producing them

<e​longated:matrix.org> Go dual/triple pow don’t depend on botnets

<e​longated:matrix.org> Enough of this no investment led mining it’s only brought trouble home

<e​longated:matrix.org> There are no legit miners left

<b​oog900:monero.social> your ASIC side is still vulnerable to targeting the ASICs

for triple pow would I need 3 types of hardware or would it be profitable to only have 1 type?

<b​oog900:monero.social> > There are no legit miners left

<b​oog900:monero.social> that is just wrong

<b​oog900:monero.social> but it would be correct to say there are no average people mining bitcoin without specialist equipment

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yah who are these legit miners ? Someone with 10-20 machines ?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Which average person is mining monero ? There are average person mining bitcoin with asics

<e​longated:matrix.org> It would be profitable atleast one of those pow

<e​longated:matrix.org> It would be profitable atleast on one of those pow

<b​oog900:monero.social> The same people are mining Monero with their CPUs

profitable even if I am mining only 1/3 of the time?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I mine with all the CPU I got (some of them do variable load depending of the sun)

<e​longated:matrix.org> You are mining 24/7

<e​longated:matrix.org> Good for you, but you are not average

<b​oog900:monero.social> how do you know?

seems like a longer roi mining 1/3 of the time

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Granted, main reason I mine is to keep my offgrid setup healty... If I dont mine the batteries are full at 10:30-11 am. So I actually need to purge as much electricity I can.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Dude runs nodes and shit a average Joe can just plug and play asic miner

<e​longated:matrix.org> Difficulty will adjust to those levels or price will

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I even mine with the radeons (It use more electricity than the cpus)

<b​oog900:monero.social> I meant average Monero miner, how do you know the hashrate is mostly botnets?

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> can mine just one, look to tari for an example although I think they picked dumb algos

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> you would have three different independent difficulties with a target block time 6 minutes each, to keep an overall 2 minutes

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> 51% just one algo gets you jack shit, you gotta get to 50% overall still

<e​longated:matrix.org> Same question every time, I know you guys run botnets and making money

<e​longated:matrix.org> Just milking it while it last

<e​longated:matrix.org> Good luck with your botnets

<b​oog900:monero.social> lol

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yah keep laughing

<b​oog900:monero.social> sounds like a wannabe ASIC farmer

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s free money after all

I mine during heating season and a bit beyond, Cat loves it

not during summer

<b​oog900:monero.social> I mine to keep all the zombie computers warm, I hope their cats like it too

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I do mine with the Epycs too, 24/7, with low priority to not affect other services

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I which I could optimize ram on epyc shit

<e​longated:matrix.org> I don’t even need asics, go dual triple mine ; give a gpu friendly asic ; run your botnets

<e​longated:matrix.org> Just depending on botnets will kill xmr

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yah every next door kid has epycs

there are some very large miners which might indicate botnets

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> The point is simple.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> You have hardware, you can mine on it... Yay

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Dont buy hardware to mine except if you actually want to build a farm or something

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> But mine with the shit you already have

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Last time I brought shit to mine was like 2012 or sometime

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yah tell that to attackers, this is just one kid from Belarus ; wait for state actors

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> The rent a shit lot of hash power

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> They pay to attack

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> To counter that you can rent shit (no, its not profitable) so they cant rent the shit you rented

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I did rent like 10MH last weekend, of course it was not worth it, bit it was 10MH less for qubit (and not 10mh more for monero, because the rig for renting mine even when not rented)

<b​oog900:monero.social> state actors can take out ASICs/ build a shitton of them

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> If the FBI seriously wanted to do a 51% attack against monero. Do you really think, they would have any trouble getting rid of it. They could destroy Monero tomorrow if they really wanted to.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I mine 24/7

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> If the FBI seriously wanted to do a 51% attack against monero. Do you really think, they would have any trouble getting rid of it? They could destroy Monero tomorrow if they really wanted to.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> They 3 letters people want monero to trive, they need a monero

<e​longated:matrix.org> Good, thanks for than 10kh/s

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Do you have an asic? If not, why not?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Good, thanks for that 10kh/s

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Youre welcome

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> ^^ well, do ya>

<e​longated:matrix.org> Does xmr support asic ? No, that is the reason

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Do you mine monero?

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Wrong answer; you're typing on your ASIC right now :P

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> You can get a cpu based antminer if they still make them. If its even profitable now.

<e​longated:matrix.org> I did roi, it’s not profitable to mine xmr

<e​longated:matrix.org> I am broken ai, running on a gpu

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> so you dont mine anything?

<e​longated:matrix.org> No, I don’t mine anything after randomx came

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Why dont you go buy an asic, and sell those coins for monero?

<e​longated:matrix.org> And do what ? When xmr itself is not secure

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> ok, then why are you here?

<e​longated:matrix.org> For transactions and my old bag from 2017

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> ^ why dont you dump your bag and move to something with your desired asicpow, like arrr

<e​longated:matrix.org> What kind of shitcoin ? Is this how you deal with ppl who don’t like botnets ?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> do you think massice corporations mining bitcoin is any more "fair" than botnets?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Average joe with a single asic might find a block every 100 years lmao

<e​longated:matrix.org> Obviously they are more secure than your botnets

<e​longated:matrix.org> Pools

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I dont think you understand how blocks work. You arent contributing unless you mine a block

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Your hashpower has no effect on the global difficulty if you dont produce blocks

<e​longated:matrix.org> And you are not securing your network with botnets which are available to rent to others for a right price

you can still produce a block mining on a pool

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> right, nioc, but you end up donating those 3btc

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> In exchange for 0.000001 or whatever your single asic hash is worth

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Doesn't Nicehash allow you to rent hashpower for other cryptocurrencies

<e​longated:matrix.org> See the available hashrate there and their global hashrate

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Don't you want to compare their hashrate to the combined hashrate of individual miners (both solo and pools)?

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> If you look at global hashrate, you'll include those big mining firms that are antithetical to security

<e​longated:matrix.org> Global

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> I see 2.2028 EH/s in "EU - West" and 3.6137 EH/s in "USA - West" for Nicehash's SHA256ASICBOOST, and 891 EH/s for global hashrate according to mempool.space, for Bitcoin

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> now check for xmr and see the % diff

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> I don't know where best to rent Monero hashrate lol...you want me to check Nicehash for that too?

<e​longated:matrix.org> miningrigrentals

MRR you get back 60% what you spend

<e​longated:matrix.org> Doesn’t matter to attackers

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> 566.82Mh/s available, 315.43Mh/s in use, out of 5.251 GH/s total

so most of what is available is not being rented?

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Don't ask me

<b​oog900:monero.social> 6 block reorg just now

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Wow

<t​esttank:matrix.org> I think one of the reason they don’t is they are worried they’ll trigger a GME type event

<t​esttank:matrix.org> And they know that if they try to kill it another one will pop up. (I’m not sure about this Monero is kinda special)

<t​esttank:matrix.org> Monero 2.0 would have probably a pre mine

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> That’s kinda why I don’t think this qubic guy is working for any state actor, if he really was he would have definitely succeeded by now

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Could state actors be inspired by Qubic?

he's been around for many years

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> (Even after Qubic is done with their thing, assuming they don't succeed, aren't we still in danger?)

<e​longated:matrix.org> Reorgs will be memes soon

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Qubic was founded a year ago and the guy running it was already responsible for like 2 rug pulls. Thankfully Qubic is halving next Wednesday, so if monero holds on we should be in the clear

<e​longated:matrix.org> Can’t devs do something? Run more botnets?

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> What is with you and botnets

<e​longated:matrix.org> Well they are securing the network

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> We both know botnets don't spawn out of this air

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> We both know botnets don't spawn out of thin air

<e​longated:matrix.org> Sure, so devs can’t do anything 😔

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> Wedneday you say is 13/08?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Next Wednesday

<l​ordx3nu:matrix.org> it's not this wednesday

<f​iatmoneysucks:matrix.org> Okayy

<e​longated:matrix.org> Halving as if it’s going to change anything on that meme tokens

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It’s a huge deal, because it reduces their miners profits by half, so if they can’t get a 51% attack before then. Why would they be able to get one after?

<l​ordx3nu:matrix.org> i don't know if the halving is even a factor now to be honest. seems like they have access to a lot of hashrate that they might be hiding

<e​longated:matrix.org> They will just pay more coins, it’s a centralised shitcoin

<t​esttank:matrix.org> We need Serai Dex to go live, then Monero goes to 3k thanks to all the people that will able to finally swap easily from ETH/BTC to XMR

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The main reason why Qubic is attractive. is because they pay their miners much more than the other monero pools. But if this profit is reduced then it gives less incentive for their miners to keep mining on their pool.

<e​longated:matrix.org> With reorgs hanging over the shoulders?

<t​esttank:matrix.org> I know millionaries that want to get into Monero but can’t bacouse it’s either a instant swap site which can decide to freeze your money or nothing

<e​longated:matrix.org> They haven’t heard about reorgs

<t​esttank:matrix.org> If Monero 10x the hashrate 10x

<e​longated:matrix.org> With same botnets 😂

<c​haser:monero.social> tell them to use Retoswap. it works.

<t​esttank:matrix.org> Which means you would now need a shitcoin with 2B market cap to 51% attack Monero not one with a 200m cap

there are swaps that don't freeze your $

<t​esttank:matrix.org> To hard to use

<t​esttank:matrix.org> They cant be bothered

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Tell them to send it to me, i'll swap for them

<t​esttank:matrix.org> It’s gotta be retard proof

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Wrong room for this convo

<c​haser:monero.social> real millionaires have personal assistants who can be bothered. if they don't already have XMR for the safety deposit, they can also use Bisq too.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I am retard proof

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The fact that monero is being threatened, by a random 200 million dollar cap shitcoin is really hurting my confidence in the coin overall. They need to find a way to boost the price of the coin and make it easier to mine

<g​ingeropolous:monero.social> whose they

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Do you think monero is rhe only chain that reorgs?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Its, in part, why btc has 10minute blocks

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Nioc

<e​longated:matrix.org> Other chains depend on decoys

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> What?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Dont* depend?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Reorg 10+ blocks and many txs are invalid

<t​esttank:matrix.org> MoneroChan

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> honestly i think this is just a poor design choice

<e​longated:matrix.org> So is depending on a botnet fondly pow alone

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> nah. Randomx > whatever youre larping about, mr non-mining ngu dude

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I dont think you asic shillers understand that the price and hashrate are in equillibrium. Botnets leave = difficulty falls = cost to mine falls = price falls

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Botnets arent the reason that you're not a millionaire

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> They are the reason that xmr cost's $250 to mine 1XMR

<t​esttank:matrix.org> Bitcoin had the luck of being considered a joke until it was already to big to die, Monero does not, so it has to go bear grills mode

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Without them, cost to mine 1xmr would be $50. I'm not defending botnets, but if you think asics solve a centralized pow issue, youre just wrong

<e​longated:matrix.org> It was 0.01 btc before ramdomx

it was also 0.001

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> did you mine with an asic

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> @Elon

<e​longated:matrix.org> Gpu

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Did you profitably mine xmr when the emission was 20xmr per block

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> When is FCMP++ expected to be released?

<e​longated:matrix.org> I mined till randomx came into existence

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> My fcmp++ blocks are 15mb right now

<e​longated:matrix.org> Imho 2026 eoy

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Software feels like its 80-90% finished

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> if all goes well, i think we could seen it by EOY 2025

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I believe late 2025 or early 2026.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> i've been running it for months. EOY 2025 is possible, if audits checkout and code reviews go well

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> EOY2026 is crazy work. Were not 18 months away

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The audits seem to be going well. I saw this one that was recently completed and published. magicgrants.org/2025/08/05/Veridise-Gadgets-Circuit

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> yeah, theres a lot to be reviewed still. That being said, functionality is there

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Also its pretty performant, surprisingly

won't be 2025, you need months lead time for the fork after it is ready

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> nioc, we're going to release something for this qubic stuff wirh 0 lead time

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> True. ASICs and latching onto another chain are the worst two moves to make. CPU optimized mining should stay as long as Monero exists. PoW + PoS is a preferable solution to introducing an algorithm that offers ASIC advantage. Not as permissionless and introduces a supply chain attack.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> for integrations, probably only have to deal with HWWs. The rest should be plug n play with the wallet api

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Example: tob had feather running fcmp txs already

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> So, nioc, i disagree that we _need_ months lead time. We uaed to haed fork every 6 months. We need like 1 month lead time

the days of 6 month HFs are long gone

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> We dont have 99 exchanges to deal with this time either. Biggest reason for lead-in would be randomxv2

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> hard disagree PoS is preferable

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I dont really think we have to modify block production methods, really. Just rules around what we consider valid

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> If CFB and Qubic do get the majority of total network hashrate and decide to kill Monero, then we take the big fat L(oss) plain and simple. The only way I think this could've been prevented technically on Monero's side, ex-post, if Monero gets killed is that we should have implemented PoW + PoS earlier

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Like rejecting deep reorgs and empty blocks when they shouldnt be empty

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And i dont agree that bootstrapping is a good reason to avoid rejecting deep reorgs

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> elaborate. I don't necessarily think PoW + PoS is necessary, but if we get killed by this CFB guy and Qubic then in retrospect the only technical change that could've prevented it is PoW + PoS. But even then I don't think PoW + PoS allows us to prevent empty block or near empty block attacks

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> At this point for monero to survive it needs to grow

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Well no dip barthman

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Obviously if Monero had more bag holders and normie enjoyers like BTC then there would be higher price and more "honest" hashrate. That doesn't necessarily mean that hashrate would be more distributed between pools though.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Normies are excluded

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I mean I don’t think monero needs to be worth 5,000 dollars a coin, but at this point it needs to be around 500 to 800 dollars per coin in the next 5 years to realistically prevent more of these 51% from being pulled off.

<t​esttank:matrix.org> Even though i lost all my moneros, i hope this doesn’t happen. But if they kill it means that we almost won . (Rubicks cube won’t kill Monero i mean a state attack)

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> And honestly I'm not even sure that PoW + PoS would've been able to stop Qubic if we already had it deployed. He may not be able to reorg deep, but would be able to mine empty blocks. But perhaps there is a gimmicky way to still prevent that with PoW + PoS

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The solution to empty block, in my peabrain, is simple: reject them

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Bitcoin has empty blocks, but those are _only_ when the second block is produced before the block template is able to add txs to it

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> The tricky thing with Monero is that the more successful it becomes, the safer it becomes from these gimmicky attacks like CFB and Qubic, but the more of a target it would become for state attacks. A succeeding Monero would be more likely to garner the attention and anger of fiat print boiiiiss

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> If someone sends me an empty blocks 30 seconds after i had added a full block to my database, why should i even consider jt

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Yeah, but then CFB could just choose to include some small number of transactions. Say 5 to 10 per block

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> He just find workaround plain and simple

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> If my txpool is 10mb and someone sends me 10 empty block, why shoukd i accept them

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> If my txpool / local template says block should be 287kb, why would i accept anything less than.. lets say 80% of that?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Anything to slow him down is helpful, even if he would be able to eventually find a workaround

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Here's my take, if CFB and Qubic do get majority hashrate and start mining empty blocks for a consecutive prolonged period, then users could just boost their TX fees way up to incentivize other pools to include their TX. Basically stupid high fees like Bitcoin when they get congested haha.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> this already happens

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> But other pools lost the blocks

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Why do they lose the blocks?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Fees dont help if the good blocks get dropped

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> bottom line is the security budget needs to be higher. only way I really see to do that is merge mining or higher fees, and Idek if fees can cover it. the emission curve was simply too steep, under 1% inflation on a coin after only , what, 8 years? kinda nuts

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Why do they get dropped

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Because they get reorged

<e​longated:matrix.org> Other pools would need enough hashrate to mine blocks

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> When there is a 7 block deep reorg, there are 7 "honest" miners that lose their blocks

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> All of the txs and their fees end up back in the txpool

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> This happened to me earlier. My tx was confirmed by 2 different pools, and dropped twice

<b​oog900:monero.social> ofrnxmr @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: people can just add 1 tx to the block that they made to get around this rule

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The third time it was mined, the miney got the txfee

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> how so?

<v​tnerd:monero.social> False dichotomy. Asic friendly algo could have different outcome.

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> You make a good historical observation. But touching the emission is a no go. Price needs to go up and people need to learn about Monero. But most people don't care. Maybe they are right. Honestly if you think about it, most normies don't need Monero for anything because they have high trust in the fiat system and low threat models.

<b​oog900:monero.social> When I mine a block just add my own tx?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> My txpool says blocks should be 450kb, how is a 1 tx block going to change that?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> At this point the only thing saving monero at this point is the Qubic halving, if that wasn’t happening then they would be likely to eventually pull off the attack. Also the guy is a straight up serial scammer, so he probably will rug pull eventually.

<b​oog900:monero.social> Ahh I thought you just meant reject empty blocks

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> I understand, thanks for the explanation. But if people are paying like $5 or $10 fees then that could help bring more hashrate online toward the honest pools. Just has to be a juicy enough pot of fees to collect

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> nono, i mean, if my monerod would be hashing 300kb, then i shouldnt accept blocks at are much below that. Obviously nodes on the network dont have identical txpools, and not all miners create the same template (monerod vs p2pool vs xmrig), but it should be within a range

<b​oog900:monero.social> Still gets iffy rejecting blocks because they are too small, the tx pool is not shared between nodes, you'll open a new attack vector

<v​tnerd:monero.social> If qubic had mined "honestly", the outcome would've been similar. The reorgs are (probably) about messing with people's perception of what's going on, and what should've happened

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> My understanding is similar to mr. boog

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The counter from attacker would be to inflate their own pools (sending txs tk themself = 0 cost) and not share txs

<b​oog900:monero.social> Selfish mining does get you more rewards than you should do by normal mining but yeah most of those 7 blocks they shouldn't have had anyway

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The difficulty would have increased to account for the extra / ophaned blocks (if they just built on top)

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Ok, but if a bunch of normal monero users are throwing out $5+ fees that is a big incentive for honest pools and hashers. I'm not sure I can say whether or not Qubic is profit motivated or not yet.

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> We'll get to see CFB's true colors if he does indeed get majority hash

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> honest pools are _doing their best_ already

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And losing 7 blocks to a reorg

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The fees dont change anything

<e​longated:matrix.org> We are dead if that happens

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> It might be an incentive for _qubic_ to start including the txs

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Doing their best given the current incentives. But if there are a bunch of high fee transactions in the mempool then it may incentivize new CPUs to spin up and join pools

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> that assumes qubic doesnt have another 10gh in their back pocket

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Were approaching this issue as if qubic cant possibly have the hashrate necessary, when we should be assuming that _someone_ does (ahem, amazon etc)

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Not necessarily. I can see multiple scenarios where it is not in CFBs interest to kill Monero. But if he does choose to kill it then the probability of him being FED/gov affiliated goes way up

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I don’t think so, because if that was the case why didn’t he use that last Saturday when they were at like 50% hash rate?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Why should he? He coukd have done this last week too

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> their reported hashrate hasnt grown

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Its been 2.5gh for over a week

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> But they, imo, must have more than that, considering their abilitt to neat 4.5gh of "honest" hashrate

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> They’re at like 35% right now

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Monero was only 2.5gh a few months ago - globally

<e​longated:matrix.org> Some ppl like to see world burn, this related feels like one

<e​longated:matrix.org> Some ppl like to see world burn, this retard feels like one

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> I haven't heard many good proposals about what would protect Monero if someone like CIA + Amazon decided to attack. Because it is clear that they have a lot of hash power under their control. So at face value you'd need a way to stop empty blocks and reorgs. PoW + PoS stop the reorgs, but not the empty blocks or artificially low blocks.;

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> If the US government actually decides to go after monero hash rate. Then we’re done for, because only like huge cryptocurrencies like bitcoin can hope to survive an attack from a government as big as the US.

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> The risk and attack vector of CPU power has always been stipulated from Satoshi from the start. So I think it is an uncertainty that we will have to deal with for the time being, until someone can come up with an improvement on our current pure Proof of Work that IS NOT gimmicky and targeting a particular actor. But is more like a rule that can be applied to everyone participating<clipped

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> without breaking things and negative second order consequences

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Yes the US gov wouldn't buy ASICs that is stupid. They would do a supply chain attack or knock on the doors of mining farms in the states. ASICs in a sense aren't lying around that can be spun up into hashrate like CPUs, but the attack points of ASICs are arguably worse (supply chain attacks) and it is less open to the common folk

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Imagine this: qubicia has 100gh at his disposal - some nsa computing, or access to idle aws, and is using 5% of that (2.5% disclosed).

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> They would just go to abc asic farm / mining pool and use them (just like going to amazon or azure)

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> amazon could, at any point, decide to mine xmr with their idle cpu resources (juat like cfb "mines xmr with idle ai resources")

<b​oog900:monero.social> What is even the solution here, if we somehow prevent reorgs they can still just not mine new txs

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> This looks like barely a poc of a well known attack vector

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The thing about it is the fact that Bitcoin is so big. That it is likely impossible for any nation state to truely knock it out, so even with asics even the US government will likely have a hard time to knock it out. miningpoolstats.stream/bitcoin

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> if honest miners (and nodes) are rejecting their blocks, than their alt chain dies

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Or they can keep minimg their alt chain, but nobody accepts ir

<b​oog900:monero.social> Yeah but how do nodes know to reject it

<b​oog900:monero.social> They could include fake txs that they made to make it seem like the blocks are full

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Yeah this is my point as well. Ofrnxmr is positing a god-tier threat to the network, but hasn't really thrown in a solution yet. My point is that Satoshi's pure Proof of Work consensus might be the best that can actually be achieved and we just have to get used to living with the possibility that someone with a bunch of CPU's can throw them at Monero's network (or BTC back in the <clipped

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> early days before people mined with GPU's)

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> If the txs have $ attached? Then they are valid, no

<b​oog900:monero.social> They won't be mining anyone else's txs though

<b​oog900:monero.social> They would be just churning funds

<b​oog900:monero.social> With themselves taking the fees as they are the miner

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Yeah ^

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> You are correct. The problem is having a non-gimmicky way of identifying and rejecting their blocks that can't be circumvented by the attacker. The devil here is in the details of implementing this without breaking things or negative second order consequences.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Tldr: i havent "solved" that 🫠

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Which could arguably be worse, because theyd be adding large blocks to your db, instead of 15kb

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> I mean I'm not trying to be demeaning or discouraging, it's just that its a big problem to solve haha. I think the logical idea that would counter censorship would be honest users paying stupid high fees. Because even if Qubic creates fake transactions with inflated fees that they mine themselves, if sidelined cpu's see they can make more money because they get block reward + very<clipped

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> high honest user fees then an economic incentive for more hashrate emerges

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> preventing deep reorgs doesnt stop an attacker from reorging 1-2 blocks at a time either

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> This solves a little current actor at known levels, but not _the_ problem

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> I think the game theory here is that if CFB gets majority hashrate and mines empty blocks then either everything goes kaboom and to zero OR people wanting to make transactions boost their fees wayyyy higher OR some combination of those two things

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It’s just more profitable to mine Qubic right now and as such many miners will follow them until something changes

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> _the_ problem being that, no matter how high the hashrate is, it can be attacked by a state level actor

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> iirc there are hundreds of gh available on dataservers that would jump if president forced them to as some war-time act

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Code is law. You cant hope to secure the network with feel goodisms. Need the code to function on its own

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Well I do think it is possible to conceive of a future Monero where it is too expensive to attack from an economic or hashrate point of view. But that they would have to use outside of the network means of attacking such as hacking mining pools, targeted power outages or internet disruptions, DDOS attacks etc

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I mean we can barely fend off Qubic for Christ sake. How are we going to fend off a nation state. Unless the price of monero goes up rapidly

<v​tnerd:monero.social> Is the argument that the USA has virtually unlimited fiat to attack pow crypto? The obvious downside is that if word leaks they did this, USD probably tanks hard or something. I don't know if I believe this in all cases. Even with xmr there's the risk of leaks and looking weak, etc

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> no, because some large entity (like amd) would grow a military branch and start mining to combat the north korean / russian / chinese / hamas botnets

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Theoretically if Monero's price was high enough and had accumulated enough total network hashrate then the feds would have to rely on outside of network attacks

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Id say unlimited access to physical resources, like amazon, microsoft, amd, intel

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Is the cost for such an attack that high? The US could spend a few million and it wouldn't impact their debt that much...

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> they dont have to pay to use these resources

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> In practice I agree, but it is theoretically possible to imagine a scenario where total hashrate is just super high and fiat is down so bad and governments are weak and can't coerce cpu manufacturers, but as you can see this thought abstraction is highly unlikely haha

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> *Iran...I don't think a Hamas botnet would be very threatening 😭

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yes, but the problem is a lot of people in the monero community can’t accept the reality. that we need to find a way to rapidly increase the price for monero

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> There is no way rapid way to make number go up. It has to happen naturally

<t​esttank:matrix.org> IDF would bomb every person that has ever held xmr

<v​tnerd:monero.social> The problem I laid isn't just the debt, it's debt+secrecy. Everyone would see that USA is literally printing money to squash crypto, which could negatively impact all exchange rates massively. It's literally telling people the fiat game is over etc. I don't know how you pull such a massive operation in such secrecy, but maybe

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> If i was secretary of state, and monero was libya, id just reorg 7200 blocks at once

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> Increase adoption maybe :)

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Call it "operation no-nero"

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> the FCMP++ hard fork will include transaction chaining, which leads to us getting easy two-way atomic swaps with BTC, making XMR more accessible, right?

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> My current takeaway from all this is that despite Monero's amazing progress and excellent technological engineering, it is vulnerable to majority hash attacks as per Satoshi's whitepaper. I personally had grown complacent and hadn't accounted for how exposed Monero is. But that is just part of the game. Gotta live with it.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And i'd go on tc explaining how this undergrouns terrorist organizarion has been operating under out noses, and how i had the most wonderful opererarion and squashed this 10 year old threat out in an instant

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> How beautiful it was

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> You would think this, but the masses and normies are incredibly gullible and trusting.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The finest operation you'll ever see

<g​onbatfire:monero.social> Luke on Monerotopia mentioned that his Finality Layer proposal would take years, so apart from Tevador's proposal, what other thing could be implemented quickly?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yes I agree, but we haven’t been doing ourselves any favors. The fact that monero basically has unlimited supply. hurts it, because with so much supply the demand is always reached. Causing no price increases to happen. A big reason why people hold onto Bitcoin is because there is a limited amount of them and that drives up the price. There needs to be an incentive to hold onto monero.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The supply doesnt hurt

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> We have lower supply than btc and same inflation rate

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> You mean like, less inflation than Bitcoin till something like half of this century

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> I think tevador's is the quickest short term proposal. but even then I'm not sure everyone is on board with that just yet.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Bitcoin inflationary for another 100 years

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 2140

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> That's better 😂

<t​esttank:matrix.org> Use ethereum as stake, but that would kill Monero ideologically

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And depend on some 100% premined garbage

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> This is painful to read. Bro XMR's dilution rate is so low. That's not the issue in relation to price. XMR has the best terminal inflation model of all cryptos on the market. A supply cap is a horrible engineering solution as fees are not a stable method of securing a trillion dollar network.

<a​illia:matrix.org> Could Monero nodes integrate some adapted version of statistical detection methods like those in (nature.com/articles/s41598-024-55348-3 ) & flag suspicious miners?

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> It is my personal belief that the people who hold BTC are ignorant of it's engineering flaws relative to a currency like Monero. There are only are maybe 5 to 10 reasons tops that a BTC holder could genuinely use to justify holding BTC over Monero.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Call them ignorant all you want, but the fact there is a cap on the amount of bitcoin does incentivize people to hold onto them. That just isn’t the case for monero.

<c​ountbleck:matrix.org> If they can afford to be ignorant, then maybe they're doing some things right that we need...like a larger userbase?

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Dude Monero's dilution rate is 0.8% of stock per year roughly. That's nothing. Takes years and years and years for existing stock to double or be meaningfully diluted. What BTC has a bullshit narrative that retards who don't understand math or BTC

<t​esttank:matrix.org> Just wait until Dogecoin launches a 51% attack on it

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> halving schedule understand

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> The btc retards think that because at some way off point in the future the supply will be capped. So they think irrationally that inflation is automatically zero in the present or that they must automatically become ultra rich in future as there is a supply cap 100 years from now. It's a narrative based on false premises

<v​tnerd:monero.social> Yeah maybe, but the actual game theory on operation no-nero leak is probably nasty. Like, I guess you'd spin all crypto as conspiracy theory from team "R" to get a good percentage to fall in line, but I don't know how you'd get the other ~35-40% to buy in completely. Kind of playing with fire, but I guess that's why I'm not a politician or beaurocrat.

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> yeah but the coin is 5 years younger

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> anyway PoW only really ever guaranteed that attacks would be economically disincentivized

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> the idiots in the whitemarket and media talk about btc. It's been blasted on mainstream media long enough that people have bought into it even if only in small amounts. Monero will never be talked about by the silly media and whitemarket fools. Because they are scared of a such an effective tool

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yes, but new monero will always be mined and that just isn’t the case for Bitcoin. I actually agree with you that monero is a better coin than Bitcoin in terms of utility, but oftentimes utility doesn’t determine price.

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> exactly this is my current take on the whole situation. We are being reminded of the risks and limitations and caveats that Satoshi stated in the whitepaper. Does it suck that pure PoW isn't bulletproof to all attacks? Yes. But is it the best we seem to have at the moment. Yes, but the PoW + PoS idea does seem to have some merit

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Correct. But the dilution via mining is just rain droplets landing in the ocean. The issue isn't supply dilution of either BTC or Monero, it is related to demand. The supply issue is only relevant to btc because they don't have a perpetual emission

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> to properly and steadily incentivize miners

<t​esttank:matrix.org> The scarcity of an asset/commodity does give it any more value if it’s the only good property

<v​tnerd:monero.social> Plus like if one crypto fanboy catches wind, leak Chances go way up. You'd need to identify like minded people for operation no-nero, or people that blindly trust everything national security. Hmm dunno, still theoretical either way

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> People determine the value of things and people value the fact there is only going to be a limited number of bitcoin that can be created and as such people hold onto bitcoin far more than monero.

<t​esttank:matrix.org> youtu.be/QFgcqB8-AxE?si=NNVOP9PJ7CpA4oV0

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> True, but that’s been the case since the down of time

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> True, but that’s been the case since the dawn of time

<t​esttank:matrix.org> I hope one day they’ll stop, I’m delusional

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Should asics be allowed to mine monero again?

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> merge mine, yes

<p​laneroad72:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/FdkUYyYHIvJaAkkKbhDsKHgz

<p​laneroad72:matrix.org> Did they really reach 51% ?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> That red line is at 25% or something

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> ok 34%?? something like that

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/hFudCUEdpvtUjuAkUuvagWxo

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> No they’re at 37%

<p​laneroad72:matrix.org> Okay thank you

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> before cubic unknown was 5-10%

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> not all qubit is unknow, some unknows are legit too

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> so it's like 30% yeah

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I assumed 2% was like solo miners, because that was around the unknown rate before Qubic stopped publishing

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The unknown rate reached 51% last Saturday. They seem to pull all their resources on the weekends

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Afaik they never actually reached 51% (Qubic). But yes, they push more during the weekends. So far they tried many things they could try to do (with less than 51%)

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> I know for a fact they buy all hashrate they can rent during the weekend (all the one that is not overpriced that is)

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> so they also spend a lot on that project

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 98% if the money in bitcoin is from short term. Not some long term hodl microstrategy

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The unknown reached 51% last Saturday. Who knows the real Qubic amount, they reached. But they’re a threat and I felt like a lot of people in the community underestimated them.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> It costs $ to mine btc. Asics cost $ to manfacture

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Its a pyramid scheme

<e​longated:matrix.org> Zero cost to mine xmr, it’s magic money

How you doing guys

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Doing good

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> except it costs me 240$ to mine 1xmr

<e​longated:matrix.org> Sorry for your loss

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yeah it’s not very profitable to mine monero compared to many other coins.

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s not profitable for ppl paying for hw and power

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> 0 extra cost to mine XMR if you use the hardware you got (and did not buy extra for mining). And have free electricity.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Nothing really free

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> And well, it take a lot of hardware to mine "1" XMR

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> except if you solo mine and get lucky

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> What evidence do you have? How do you know that they buy hashrate?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> the miningrigrentals etc get bought up on weekends

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Does he have a source for this information?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Because I brought hashrate to counter them.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> ANd looking at the stat I see two possibility

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> The monero community did rent it all during the weekend

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Or Qubic rented everything that was not already rented

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I mean many people already rented hashrate before Qubic I believe

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Plot twist: qubic if the one offering hashpower to rent

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Rented Hash rate went from like 20Mh/s to 400Mh/s or something like that in less than one day

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> that was only one rent location, and the left over for rent was the overpriced shit no one want

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/hgAKYcxWXPltTQXXBkFqFtFU

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It seems like qubic is pulling back a little. Their hashrate dropped 5%

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> When there halving again? Wednesday?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Number should go down

20th

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It’s next Wednesday

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Miningrigrentals doesnt always have the chart correct due to reorgs

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Probably actually whenever they say so

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> True, but it’s the best we have currently

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> I don't think we are out of the woods entirely with Qubic until the price of Qubic dumps or CFB rugs. Which both could happen at the same time haha

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> er, i meant to say miningpoolstats

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> I dont think were out of the woods at at all

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Even after their next halving I wouldn't say we are entirely out of the woods

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Oh definitely not. This is a small w

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Were 5 feet into the rainforest

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Looking at the trees and not seeing the forest

they need price to increase from where its at in order to maintain profitability in mining

if price stays relatively the same past the 20th mining wont be nearly as profitable

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> lets dump it

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The price of qubic fluctuates wildly, so it’s hard to say if it will lead to a price increase or not

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> i meant lets dump xmr price back to 150

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> so ofrnxmr can mine 1xmr for 150

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that breaking Pool mining is a bad idea. By retaining Pool mining as is, it allows people to coordinate against attackers more easily

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Could be, but monero hashrate was pretty centralized by supportxmr for years before qubic

Hey guys, have we looked into checkpointing?

I also know p2pool has it's own relay system that allows it to send out blocks as fast as empty blocks, is there a way we can encourage pools to set that for themselves?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> We have checkpointing, but not dynamic

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Nodes wont reorg beyond the latest release. We also have (unused) dns checkpointing

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> Yes, but taking away pool mining is worse than keeping it. Just because hashrate was centralized in the past doesn't necessarily mean that is the fault of keeping the pool incentive scheme as is. It's more telling about people's or botnet's complacency in pointing to minemxr and supporxmr.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> P2pool doesnt send out as fast as empty blocks

ah gotcha, sech1 was telling me they did.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> P2pool sends out from many nodes at once

Like something similar to fibre from bitcoin back in '15

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> But it still takes longer to propagate a 300kb block than an 14kb one

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> All I’m saying is that monero has had trouble with centralized mining for quite a while. In fact if qubic just stayed in the 20 to 30 percent range. The hashrate would be more decentralized than it has been for a long time

<f​r33_yourself:monero.social> There are actually second order effects that may limit how much hashrate centralizes in a big pool. By pointing toward the biggest pool you may gain in the short term, but increase the risk at the margin of the pool admin being able to perform an attack. Which could destroy one's future earnings

yes it would be more decentralized if qubic was not a malicious pool

if they mined honestly there wouldnt be much of an issue

but they are constantly doing annoying things on chain

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> but it is malicious, they are doing things what a normal pool doesnt

thats what im saying

What if someone just made the same exact thing but as a token like what 0xbitcoin was, but to help

really, i don't know if these other pool operators are anon or what, but i think its time to consider the top 4-5 pools excluding qubic blocks

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Has there been discussions of allowing back asic mining?

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> no, botnet operators ask "do you have proof of botnets"

you have a single pool doing selfish mining likely lowering profit for all other pools, why not just get the top 4 or 5 pools which is probably 60% of the hash rate, and just exclude any qubic pool blocks

the other short term option is vassal state under eth which would take a couple weeks

to code out

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Qubic mining is like 3 times more profitable than just mining in the other pools. So it’s just a easy choice for miners to mine with them.

its not an easy choice lol

because youre contributing to crashing xmr price

and attacking the network

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It is if you only care about money, which drives a lot of miners.

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> they dont pay in xmr, their pubic token has enough liquidity ?

lol qtards have been using this logic for weeks now, that miners only care about money and they will all switch

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yeah I believe like 200 trillion

they haven't switched

its a shit coin, lots of people have numerous logical reasons not to mine qubic beyond just they can generate more profit in the short term

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I get what you’re trying to say, but it’s just economics man. People care about money and that want overrides anything else

its not just economics

go back to qubic discord

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> liqudity to sell those mined coins

theres the liquidity

somebody gave a good example the other day

you can make bad choices to generate higher profit in the short term, such as not paying your home fire insurance, now you have extra money from not paying, all is good until your house burns down

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I mean I don’t mine with qubic. But I would be lying if I didn’t know why people do

<j​ack_ma_blabla:matrix.org> what if its not your house and you are just passing by ?

can you tell them to unban me from the qubic discord?

i can tell you guys are like french qubic users or something

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> 'french'

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I mean I don’t have any qubic and I hate them just as much as you.

you got it buddy

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Do you believe that the diminishing of the dark web has lowered the demand for monero?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> New heads grow

<e​longated:matrix.org> It is diminishing?

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> one market down, two new markets

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Vacuum always get filled except if what around the vaccum is vaccum

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yes i don’t think it’s as big as it was. New markets do pop up, but it seems at a slower rate than it was in the past.

<e​longated:matrix.org> They will need privacy coin on streets soon

<e​longated:matrix.org> Only if xmr survives by that time 🤣

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> People who buy drugs on the street mostly use cashapp as dumb as that sounds

<e​longated:matrix.org> 🔜

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> Any high quality write-ups on the q*bic situation anyone can share?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> They’re at 30% now down from 40%

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> But if you want to know what’s happening. We’re hoping that qubic just rug pulls or their halving next Wednesday hits them hard and they aren’t able to recover

<t​hugeater:matrix.org> isn't it easier for botnet operators when it's not around asic mining?

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> Are they burning cash by renting hashrate or is it strictly incentives using their vaporware token for mining in their pool

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Could be, but we just don’t really know right now

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s over

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> lol

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> NO BLACKPILLING

help

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Damn monero down 3% in price.

damn 3%... what ever will I do...

<e​longated:matrix.org> I am not, wait for confirmed txs being rollbacked and havoc

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> How about down 15% from last month

many exchages has stop depositig monero..

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> yeah i saw some exchanges are disabling deposits because of reorgs, is that true?

<e​longated:matrix.org> That’s tiny, going back to 150 sounds good

<e​longated:matrix.org> Or maybe 40s

150 mean more easy to attack us ...

its a circle

<e​longated:matrix.org> It is easy with botnets anyways

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> If you want to make it impossible for you to make transactions then sure let’s drop the price to 150

kinda fuck up

<e​longated:matrix.org> It will drop there once it’s impossible to transact

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It would go down to zero basically

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> price talk -> monero-markets

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Price matters and we’re learning that the hard way

<e​longated:matrix.org> Price = security ? Doesn’t it cost same to mine 1 xmr ?

at this point I just hope a bilionaire with humanitarian conscience help us..

<e​longated:matrix.org> Humanitarians don’t become billionaires

ahah I know

kinda fuck

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> This is research lounge, not whine therapy

sorry

<e​longated:matrix.org> Well you said it costs xyz to mine xmr , not me

<e​longated:matrix.org> Then you said without botnets price will go to xy

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Are you talking about something i said, sonewhere else, days ago?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Is your priority price or chain integrity?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> How would the FCMP++ fair against a mop decoder attack?

<e​longated:matrix.org> A few hours ago

isnt chain integrity somewhat correlated to price ? PoW is thermodinamycally link through economic

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Kind of the price of monero dropped once a orphan block was found a couple days ago I believe

<e​longated:matrix.org> Not really, price can be xyz but if botnets go and mine on a malicious node it’s not secure

<e​longated:matrix.org> Orphan blocks are normal, intentionally doing it isn’t

I meanif price is xyz then it cost xyz to attack network

<e​longated:matrix.org> Will get cheaper

<e​longated:matrix.org> With randomx

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yeah they’re likely trying to force orphan blocks and because 5 were found it caused a panic sell

<e​longated:matrix.org> MRL tool to show this with nice gui helped price too 🤣

<e​longated:matrix.org> MRL tool to show this with nice ui helped price too 🤣

<e​longated:matrix.org> Looking forward to more tools to show weakness of monero, so it gets cheaper to mine 1xmr

<e​longated:matrix.org> Solutions can come later

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Will if that’s your wish then the Monero couldn’t be sent anywhere, because they would’ve gotten to 51% already

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Is FCMP immune to MAP decoder attacks

<e​longated:matrix.org> ofrnxmr:

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> I have no idea 🫡

<e​longated:matrix.org> But if chain isn’t stable secure, fcmp is useless

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Because if you don’t know a decoder attack reduces the ring signatures from 16 to 4. The way to get around this is to have an intermediate wallet address then send to a final address. This reduces the the map decoder attack chances from 23% to 5%

<s​paceburn:matrix.org> Come someone explain if the 51% attack has been successful, and if so what does that mean for XMR?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> No they haven’t succeeded yet they’re at like 20%

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> moneroconsensus.info

many exchange stop depositing xmr because empty block still worrying, even if 51% attack not succesfful what is this kind of attack then ?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> That’s unfortunate, but we must endure and hold on for now. There’s not much we can do about it

copy, do we have a name for this kind of malicious activities ?

never heard anything like that

<s​paceburn:matrix.org> What does the attack even do? Have the compromised the security/anonymity of monero or are they just slowing down the confirmation time?

<t​orir:matrix.org> It's not quite a 51% attack yet. Getting 51 out of a set of 100 blocks is not a 51% attack by itself, in fact I wouldn't be surprised if some top mining pool has done that in the past already. There has been some effects from the attack: Transactions have been delayed, Monero's price has dropped somewhat, and reportedly some exchanges are delaying or halting deposits. Qubic's main<clipped message>

<t​orir:matrix.org> threat at this point is still mainly creating misinformation, fear, and panic.

<e​longated:matrix.org> If it can be 51% attacked xmr transactions are not trusted/final

copy, but delaying block, and creating empty one is kind of an attack no ?

its so weird

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Are the exchanges not accepting monero, because they believe monero transactions would be stopped if they succeed?

MEXC just stop without information, SafeTrade said: deposit disable: monero is in maintenance pending the outcome of o-chain events currently in the news this weeks

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Mexc does this all the time

Idk about kucoin

<e​longated:matrix.org> Yes, they don’t want to mess with txs which may not be final

<e​longated:matrix.org> It’s so over

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Mexc recentlt had closed for weeks

I mean its def temporary lol

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Elon stfu with your trolling

<e​longated:matrix.org> Deposits ?

Lol

yes deposit

<e​longated:matrix.org> Okay 👍

<t​orir:matrix.org> 51% attack only has the ability to censor transactions and cause double-spends. **Privacy is unaffected**. But Qubic hasn't actually pulled off a 51% attack, despite their claims. A 51% attack implies full control of what transactions are confirmed, meaning the ability to fully censor any transaction. That has not occurred. They mined 51 out of 100 blocks by chance, which has a ch<clipped message>

<t​orir:matrix.org> ance of occurring when you only have 30% hashrate, but they haven't even managed to cause a 10 block reorg yet. There are other attacks that can be pulled off with <50% hashrate.

<e​longated:matrix.org> For weeks ?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> This is bad, if we can’t trade monero then the price of monero will be lower making it easier for them to attack monero

<e​longated:matrix.org> Trading has stopped ?

they get 2 time with 10 block last 24 hours

from the info I got

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Idk it’s being reported that some exchanges have stopped accepting monero for the time being

<t​orir:matrix.org> Since Qubic doesn't have 51% hashrate, it is still safe to transact Monero, you just have to wait for more confirmations.

im not worried about xmr but reputation damage here

<e​longated:matrix.org> Where is this info ?

MO and official xmr discord

people has share screen about 10 block in a row two different time

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yes thankfully but the fact exchanges aren’t accepting monero right now is hurting us

<e​longated:matrix.org> What’s MO ? Discord is just garbage speculation

Monero ocean pool discord

<e​longated:matrix.org> Same discord

<e​longated:matrix.org> Wait for MRL UI website to announce it has been 51% attacked

CFB has announce 51% attack official and waiting for peer review

Idk

can he lie that much Lol ?

I know pie chart doesnt show this at all.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Rucknium: can you confirm 51% attack?

<s​paceburn:matrix.org> What’s the solution to the attack?

is this even real is the real question id say x)

<e​longated:matrix.org> I don’t listen to gays

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Check the view key

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/uTjnasCSYMuyIAEyYzSqttUQ

<b​asses:matrix.org> xcancel.com/c___f___b/status/1955158154213220492#m

<v​tnerd:monero.social> proof of useful work (for ai) was announced to get some general liquidity for a unique token called qubic. Then the founders released software that performs as a single monero pool that receives xmr for the operators but pays out in this unique token to the users. The xmr received by the qubic operator can pay rented hash rate (and profit) while users get paid out via qubic token <clipped messag

<v​tnerd:monero.social> inflation. The more "real" users take this deal, the more hash rental or profits occur for the qubic operators. It continues as long as there are people willing to pay real electricity costs in exchange for something riskier than btc at its origin - qubics claimed features haven't been released via code or whitepaper and mining monero as a centralized pool doesn't prove the ai cla<clipped messag

<v​tnerd:monero.social> ims either.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> If they had hit 51% of hash power, they'd be able to immediately publish blocks _and_ remain the sole miner. Unless that's happening...

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Theyre not immediately publishing

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And its still in bursts

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (I wouldn't generally say a 51% adversary should prove it, but they're already orphaning blocks sooooo)

<e​longated:matrix.org> “In the meanwhile #Monero team is polishing details of their 51% attack protection” which team ?

<b​asses:matrix.org> he's speaking like @Monero on twitter

<e​longated:matrix.org> Are they working with monero classic team ?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> That's probably the GH issue I made? They make it seem like we have a board and a CEO they're negotiating a buy out with.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Is anyone from MRL in touch with them ?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I haven't heard anything like that

<t​revorkedge:matrix.org> Listening to the monerotopia episode on it now, thx for being proactive on this Luke

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Is it confirmed?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The percentage of blocks they have should exceed their percentage of hash power due to selfish mining FWIW

<b​asses:matrix.org> sgp_ ?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Unless Qubic mines an outsized majority of blocks, no, it isn't.

<t​orir:matrix.org> A 51% attack? Nah. A 51% attack would mean excluding other miners entirely, for hours or days at a time. Getting 51 blocks out of 100 is not a 51% attack.

<t​orir:matrix.org> At least, according to Qubic's stated goals, which are to exclude other miners.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'd ask Rucknium: for what percent of blocks a selfish mining 49% adversary can obtain.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Is that from their website?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> twitter

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The answer is probably so high, that the only way to know for certain if they have 51% is if they actually censor everyone else.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> *I wouldn't be surprised if the answer is so high

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Qubic stated that they want miners to know that mining on other pools is useless, becauae they will be wasting $ ans lost their blocks

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Qubic stated that they want miners to know that mining on other pools is useless, becauae they will be wasting $ and lose their blocks

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Where did they get the statistics from? The charts I saw indicated they weren’t even close to a 51% attack

<t​orir:matrix.org> By chance they got 51 blocks out of a set of 100 consecutive blocks and called it a 51% attack.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> They mined 9/10 blocks during reorgs

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> [@kayabanerve:matrix.org](https://matrix.to/#/@kayabanerve:matrix.org) , to be able to consistently mine blocks at the same speed as the rest of the chain, would imply having at least as much hr, no?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Id they are able to produce blocks (even selfishly) every 2mins, theyd have to have ~same hashrate at the network

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> No, because they're orphaning blocks.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> On their own secret chain, they produce more blocks than the main chain (like 7 vs 6)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> If we're producing blocks twice every two minutes, the difficulty should be double what it actually is.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> orphans dont add to the difficulty

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> ... which I just said?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Yes but the question is can they maintain a longer chain

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> So it’s confirmed

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Not if they can mine a block at roughly the same speed, not if they can maintain a blockchain that's a few blocks longer, not if they're mining 51% of blocks

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> None of that actually _proves_ they have 51% of hash power.

<t​orir:matrix.org> Just like with gambling, they are going to "get lucky" sometimes with long strings of blocks, that doesn't prove they have 50% of hashrate.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> We'd have to see a majority of blocks go to Qubic _without orphaning_ OR their censoring of every other miner, proving they can independently produce a chain with the most work

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Right now, we have some amount of blocks go to Qubic _with orphaning_, so the percentage of blocks will exceed their percentage of hash power (assuming profitable selfish mining)

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/rMISYYXNwgPSsDhdPJJccIFb

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Because what I’m seeing they have around 23% hash power. Why is the chart off by that much

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> It shows higher during their active times

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Even their own website they control shows they have 45%

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> explorer.jetskipool.ai/xmr-tracker

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> So they claimed 51% an hour ago and have already turned 60% of their hash power off, but are leaving 40% online?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (Well, sorry, their historical blocks would trickle out)

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Oh ok. But that website is actually controlled by them

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Uhhhh their site is blatantly wrong?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> It claims they have 2.5 and the network is 5.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The chart I showed was from a independent source

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I'm counting ~4.5 *across known mining pools*.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> If Qubic had 2.5, the network total would be ~7 and they'd only have ~30%?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> That’s much closer to the graph I showed

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Can someone clarify for my where my mistake is, or if their 'percentage of the network' isn't including themselves in the network?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Yeah, that would notably explain the miningpools graph.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Because if you look at independent sources they don’t have close to the that level of hash power

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Because else, even if their site claims they have 51%, that's only in comparison to the existing hash power and they'd still need to double their own hash to actually have 51%.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Also cc ofrnxmr who may have an idea

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Wait really so it would basically be 25% because you’re cutting the hash rate in half

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> i hypothesized that they might be submitting hashed to known pools, then selfish mining on top of them

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Except then they wouldn't valid pool shares, because the pool shares wouldn't be for the selfishly mined blocks?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> *wouldn't have valid pool shares

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> They'd have to EITHER mine a secret chain or the pool's.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> The original ones are valid, but could be switching to selfishmining after finding a pool block. Only reason i say this is because the numbers dont add up unless their own hashrate is included in known pools (or they are lying)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I can agree on the numbers not adding up lol, that's pretty obvious

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> They’re likely lying. Independent sources debunk their math and the website they showed is controlled by them

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> For the purposes of their marketing campaign, does it matter if they're lying?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> No, but it matters whether or not they did achieve it or not

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> For the purposes of our chain's security, obviously, there's a difference, but the annoying fact is whatever they claim will bolster their claims.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> it shows 50.2% now. Their math adds up, if done dishonestly

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> "The node reports 4.97gh. Their pool reports 2.5gh. Therefore, we have 50.2%"

how tf we have 2.5ghs

xmr hashrte has been at 5ghs pretty much stbale without shit

qshit*

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> This is what I was trying to highlight about orphaned blocks though.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> The 5gh doesnt include orphans - only including winning blocks

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Yeah

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Orphaned blocks don't increase the difficulty as they *should* and the estimated hash rate is based off the difficulty.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> I'm glad we agree

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> So they may have 51% of the estimated hash rate but the real hash rate should be much higher, and no, they don't have 51% of that

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> It's only if they had 51% of the actual rate that they could indefinitely mine a chain with the most work, alone

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> They also only mine sporatically, so that also keeps the net diff low

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> How do we even know that chart is legit

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> So the network is still under attack, and still subject to longer re-orgs, but it isn't captured.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Will be fun to see 10+ block reorgs for actual impact

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> so: good idea to include orphans in target diff? It would have to be reactive though, i assume, since one side might not be aware of the alt chain until after it is mined

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I mean, we can't

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> By definition, they aren't in consensus

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Qubic claimed to have 51% like 10 hours ago on that sight, but strange other sources collaborate what they say if it’s true

they paid 500$ an hour deshe known kaspa developper to check it out, everything so weird

might be just PR campaign

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> We'd need an adjusted difficulty calculated with consideration to orphaned blocks to estimate the actual hash rate at this point.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> which site? Miningpoolstats or the ai site?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Any analysis from the on-chain data alone isn't sufficient since they've forcibly excluded on-chain data when lucky enough to be able to do so.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Mining pool reports they only have 27% hash

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The statistics where they said they got a 51% attack is from a website they control

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Reminder explorer.jetskipool.ai/xmr-tracker is controlled and affiliated with qubic

<t​hugeater:matrix.org> is miningpoolstats even trustable?

<t​hugeater:matrix.org> is miningpoolstats even trustable right now?

I have seen a couple 7-block reorgs and a bunch of smaller ones, that's bad enough already, not surprising exchanges are closing xmr

<e​longated:matrix.org> Did you see it on moneroconsensus ?

I have seen it on my node

<e​longated:matrix.org> Which exchanges have closed ?

2025-08-12 06:40:02.062 [P2P6] INFO global src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp:2099 ###### REORGANIZE on height: 3475995 of 3476000 with cum_difficulty 496259719462956792

2025-08-12 06:40:02.476 [P2P6] INFO global src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp:1217 REORGANIZE SUCCESS! on height: 3475995, new blockchain size: 3476002

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> btw, 8% orphaned blocks

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> And you trust a website that’s operated and controlled by Qubic? Their website shows a 51% attack, but that website has been known to lie

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> FWIW, I'm solely saying there isn't sufficient evidence to say Qubic has 51% at this time. I'm not saying they don't have a problematic amount of hash power, aren't degrading the chain, etc.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Shall I make a CCS for a finality layer? /s but not /s

<e​longated:matrix.org> Pos ? Or pow?

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Well, there isn't such a thing as a PoW finality layer

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> So PoS

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> It'd stop deep re-orgs and potentially cement honest blocks before they can be re-org'd out

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> How does bch do theirs?

<e​longated:matrix.org> Without HF ?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> And is this like firo's chainlocks

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> (Selfish mining would face the risk of having the honest chain cemented before the selfish miner decides to broadcast)

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Even if they’re lying this has been bad and even the claim that monero has had a 51% attack hurts us.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I don't believe BCH has a finality layer.

<e​longated:matrix.org> I 51% attacked bitcoin yesterday

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I heard the BCH fork eCash does, and while I don't immediately know how they select validators, their methodology is inapplicable.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> they just dont allow reorgs beyond (configurable, but default) 10 blocks

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> ofrnxmr: Those are insecure and inapplicable here.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> But otherwise yes.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> *they're insecure as per the parameters seem within Dash, 20% of nodes can cause finalizations to fail.

I doubt devs could make a finality layer functional within the time frame needed for the current issue

the real question is do we vassal onto eth as a temp fix until a more permanent one can be made

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Is it even confirmed that they succeeded or not

define succeeded

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> They actually got to 51%

actually, short answer is no, they haven't. their stated goals were to exclude all other pools and take all mining rewards

theyve disrupted the network and caused reorgs that haven't happened before

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> They probably don't have 51% and there's insufficient evidence for that.

<t​orir:matrix.org> If by success, you mean "did they achieve 51% hashrate?", the answer is still very likely no.

I don't believe even with their selfish mining they've achieved 51% of blocks over a day

<t​orir:matrix.org> They say they have 51%, but because blocks are getting orphaned a lot of hashrate calculations are off, which makes it easier for them to cook the numbers to make it seem like they won.

maybe on shorter time scales i'm not 100% sure

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> if anything, it would be the CIA/NSA :P

again though, their stated goals were to orphan all other blocks that weren't from their own pool

they said 51% was needed for that, then said they could do it with less than 51%

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Mining pool stats vs their website have widely different numbers, so if they’re telling the truth why is the data from the independent source so widely off

other mining pools are still getting blocks

<t​orir:matrix.org> Of course, if they fail to do that, just watch, they'll try to say that their actual goals were something else all along.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> you can get deeper reorgs than your share of the network hash by just being lucky

<t​orir:matrix.org> If the numbers are off maybe they aren't telling the truth.

<t​orir:matrix.org> The premise of that question is odd.

they are definitely more like an unreliable narrator in the whole situation

maybe some things they report or say are accurate, or half true, or some are just lies

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Well I question their statistics that website explorer.jetskipool.ai/xmr-tracker is controlled by qubic

lies exaggeration stuff meant for marketing to attract more buyers to their coin

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> So that’s why I question their numbers, because if they’re telling actually pulled it off why isn’t it showing on the other pool websites

<t​orir:matrix.org> If two sources of information disagree then by definition one of the sources is wrong. It's up to you to figure out which one is the incorrect one.

I believe that website incorrectly calculates the pool share %

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I take the independent source over the qubic one

because it is taking the monero network hash rate reported on other websites, and does add the qubic pool hashrate into it when calculating the pool share %

as in it is calculating pool share % without accounting for the increase in hashrate that their own pool adds to the network

or only partly accounting for it

doesn't*

<t​orir:matrix.org> Yeah. I'm not saying that the one site intentionally made up numbers, it could be error as jpc4r says or they could be doing it on purpose, or who knows? Maybe the independent sources are lying. /s

Well he had it correctly showing at one point

a few days ago

then he changed it back

so it would show higher pool %

so I would lean towards intentionally misleading to make it look better

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Ah that makes sense because I actually saw that happen on that website.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> mining poold add their own information to the blocks that they produce, voluntarily. miningpoolstats picks up on that and shows what it reads

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Qubic doesnt add their info, so it shows as "unknown". The blocks produced by unknown miners, is the % you see there

I think they are at about 35% of the network

rough estimate

sech counted up all the blocks in a marathon I believe and it was 35%

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yes but even if include all the unknown it still works out nowhere close qubic is saying

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Those numberc can be wrong, because miningpoolstats might not replace pool A's original block with pool B's reorged block

No hes able to check which blocks their pools are actually mining

not just counting unknown

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Qubics 2.4gh claim isnt consistent, but is likely real

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Meaning, they dont mine ar 2.4gh for 24hrs

<b​lurt4949:matrix.org> Qubic's plan is to use the selfish mining results as a way to lie about having 51%, then threaten to orphan other pools and convince miners to join them instead. That way they can actually accumulate the necessary hashpower for a 51% attack.

<b​lurt4949:matrix.org> It doesn't matter that they're lying, what matters is whether people believe them

I mean other pools are still getting blocks

<t​orir:matrix.org> With 35% hashrate they can definitely cause disruption, orphan blocks, delay transactions, and do selfish mining, but it's not a 51% attack. 51% attack means complete control over what blocks and transactions make it into the chain. Their stated goal is to prevent other pools from mining at all, and the only way to do that requires 51% hashrate. Of course, their actual goal appear<clipped message>

<t​orir:matrix.org> s to be to cause FUD and convince miners to switch.

that and so they can claim to their users victory or whatever else

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Or to convince us to do something

this

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Yes they did get around 40% according mining pool stats, so that should be enough to cause disruption

I suspect they try to force us to switch pos or something

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Imagine if it wasnt some twitter coice, but we were being silently attacked by some shadow

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Voice*

well they do need miners to switch to actually start orphaning all other blocks

that is true

<b​lurt4949:matrix.org> Yes, their entire plan is to just deceive miners into thinking they're able to 51% attack, when they're not

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Their entire plan could just be that they are xmr bulls and want us to fix this before someone else does it

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Oh please stop it

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> ?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Do you think an attacker has to tell us the time and date that they will attack?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> The only source claiming they were able to achieve a 51% attack is them and nobody else

definitely not xmr bulls

<t​orir:matrix.org> I know the odds of this are probably less likely than convincing Bitcoin to switch to POS, but would doubling the block reward (requiring a hard fork) provide sufficient incentive to increase the network hashrate?

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> why mine xmr if not xmr bull

they just dump the xmr anyways

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Were not changing the emission

no I don't think doubling the block reward would do anything

<t​orir:matrix.org> Yeah, I know, the emission isn't going to change.

before tail emission its not like people were rushing to mine xmr anyways

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Doubling the block rewars just doubles the amount of xmr that miners sell

I think randomx is almost by design meant to be either just slightly profitable, or actually unprofitable for most

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> +1 jp

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> (re tail emission)

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> ppl calling for dbl of block rewards, are same ppl saying inflation is bad. Why dont we eliminate block rewards and have 0 inflation? /s

<t​orir:matrix.org> I can get behind that. Making mining less profitable means that only people actually interested in the coin mine, meaning more centralization. Nano did that with consensus nodes: there's no network reward for operating one, and so far it seems to have done a good job of discouraging centralization.

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Raise tx fees to 0.1xmr per kb

doing good PR for fcmp++ might be the only way out of this probably

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> You know what would work?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Merged mining. In that scenario the hashrate adds together to form one giant network. In the scenario we have now, everyone’s competing for the same cpu hashrate. So XMR isn’t very strong with its tail emissions.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Ltc and doge are merge mined. With that, LTC enjoys over 10x the security it would if it weren’t merge mined.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Tail emissions was never going to work. But merge mining might: Bonus points if we find a coin to merge Mine with that has an uncapped supply like doge.

<t​orir:matrix.org> *less centralization

<t​orir:matrix.org> barthman132: Nah, Qubic can't keep this attack up forever. A coin with no actual proven value like Qubic will eventually die.

<t​orir:matrix.org> Wait, meant to reply to hi585858

yes but nothig will prevent nother attacker to try the same and without altering the blockchain probably only fcmp ca save us

<t​orir:matrix.org> What other attacker has the hashrate?

hopefully with good PR and usage it'll do the job to bring more incentive for miner to come

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> This Belarus guy is small fry, if we can be beat by him then we can get beat by many people.

qbic doesnt that much financial mean so I guess a states or very wealthy person with different interest than ours

let be honest on the fact is doesnt need extreme ressource to hurt us

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> We’re getting clowned by a guy with a 200 million dollar shitcoin. Their are many people like him who now see us as a potential target

exact, but im very against altering the chain somehow...

we can go through I think

but that my non expert view, you guys are the brain of the project

Would be great to have some kind of more efficient PR fundation to help fallow market average a little bit better, might have nothing to do you with, probably worth a css

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I doubt he actually achieved it, but at this point he got what he wants he can pump his coin into oblivion and eventually pump. There are going to be people wanting to do the same thing

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I doubt he actually achieved a real 51% attack but at this point he got what he wants he can pump his coin into oblivion and eventually pump. There are going to be people wanting to do the same thing

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I doubt he actually achieved a real 51% attack but at this point he got what he wants he can pump his coin into oblivion and eventually dump. There are going to be people wanting to do the same thing

i dont disagree I think you are 100% right and more threats are to come if we stay at the same level, either technologically or economically

<t​orir:matrix.org> I'm also a non-expert, I mostly just spoke up to put down potential misinformation about 51% attacks.

Lol

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Interestingly the news the mexc was rejecting monero was reported 18 hours ago

do you think fcmp could be ready before 2026 or this is extreme copium ?

<t​orir:matrix.org> 2026 was the goal, and from the meeting logs I've read, we still seem to be on track.

appreciate

<t​orir:matrix.org> It won't be before the end of the year, I believe.

no rush,we want something that wont break xmr :)

<t​orir:matrix.org> So not in 2025

is there any professionnal PR in the hub that will fallow FCMP release or it is something to consider yet ?

this time frame could be good opportunity to work on something

might not even be a good place to light up the subject and im sorry if its the case

maybe under nda

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> what i dont understand: the purpopse of qubic mining monero is to sell it for their own token which they then burn in order to lower supply and drive up their price (correct me if i m wrong?). now if they attack monero and hence price drops, they hurt their own cause... or am i missing something?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> It’s likely a marketing strategy. hell CFB claimed to have actually gotten a 51% attack and it pumped his coin by 5% and now everybody sold their gains it’s now losing 2% after

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> alright, another thing i dont quite understand is: qubic will have a halving soon I understand, and the sentiment i read here is that at that point their current tactic will no longer work. why is that? because presumably the qubic price will not rise to double the level and then the attack will not be so profitable or how exactly will that work?

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> We’re hoping that enough people won’t be able to join, because the incentive isn’t really their anymore. So we’re hoping after that happens most would just leave

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> We’re hoping that enough people won’t be able to join, because the incentive isn’t really their anymore. So we’re hoping after that happens most would just leave

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> thanks for clearing that up too! i saw some images floating around about the reorgs visualized - is that some kind of website or how do you get this information (how big of reorgs happened)

<t​orir:matrix.org> moneroconsensus.info

<t​orir:matrix.org> It might be down. It's been getting a lot of traffic.

<t​orir:matrix.org> So try again in a few minutes if it doesn't load.

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> ah perfect - thanks so much!

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> while it feels bad to have monero attacked right now, its also somewhat exciting? A lot of bitcoiners are bringing this point forward as an argument against xmr ("but what about big computing servers mining/attacking the network")

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> thank you to all the insightful comments in this channel! <3

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> bfb made it clear on x , he's not a "rational" attacker. Which raises questions if he is "funded from beyond" ?

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> *cfb

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> yeah, hard to know i guess. but something to keep in mind.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> In the early years of Bitcoin it got a few close calls as well

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> it is exciting

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> so far the consensus is working

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> id be worried if they achieve a 10-11 block reorg though

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> That's a silly argument to make as a bitcoiner, they have security budget problems too

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> budget.day

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> sure, may be silly, but like someone said in this chat earlier, if monero can't even survive qubic, how will we survive nation state attacks etc... still asking myself this question and kind of come to the point that monero currently will not survive an attack like this. i think xenu has the same pessimism.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Sure they do, but we’re fairing worse off than bitcoin I’m afraid as of right now

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i think we will need the PoS finalization layer

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> I'm not really qualified to say one way or another but moving to proof of stake is one potential option

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> I'm not sure it's the best option, there are centralization concerns there

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> unlike most other PoS coins, there are no CEXs who got free handouts, we are literally in tail emission. if you can still mine it, the permissiveness issue is also not a real one

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> alternatively some kind of monetary policy change

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> no way

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> don't blame you

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> just spitballing really

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> higher fees, yes. emission changes, fuck no

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> interesting, i m not too familiar with PoS... this would be on the monero network then, right?

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> Ethereum pulled it off a few years ago, reading their documentation on proof of stake would be the place to start. But yah, it would be on monero and very much still decentralized. And since monero doesn't have native smart contract capability restaking tokens and the centralization problems that came with them on ethereum shouldn't be an issue.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> alexanarcho: it wouldnt go fully PoS, just have the PoS validators "lock" the current PoW chain so you cant re-org past that point

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> yeah i understood that

<w​anderingeggbeater:matrix.org> ohhhh that's cool

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> so basically just pos against reorg, and keep pow for chain security and validating blocks, right?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> correct

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> monero-project/research-lab #135

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> tbh, i like it

I like the idea of staked validators too, the only problem is it does not solve our current issues because it would likely take a significant amount of time to implement

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> kayaba has already built half the stuff we need

Yeah but its still not a quick fix

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i think we will weather qubic without any changes

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> but we wont weather a state-sponsored attack

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> so the finality layer would be to protect us from bigger threats in the future

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> the "quick" fix right now is to start mining & potentially even buying rented hash

Well we could use a larger network as a finality layer for a quick fix

and implement it as a temporary solution

while something else is developed over the next year or so

depending how bad it gets

I agree I think we will be fine from qubic once this blows over but in case it does get critical that is an option

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The quickest 'fix' now is an Ethereum SC for finality, using Ethereum blob space for data storage :/

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> The immediate countermeasure is moar pow

<r​ucknium:monero.social> kayabanerve: A selfish miner can obtain nearly all blocks if it has 49% of hashpower AFAIK. See figure 10(d) on page 12 here: kevinnegy.github.io/Selfish%20Mining%20Re-Examined.pdf

<r​ucknium:monero.social> The Y axis is blocks per minute, so 0.5 blocks/minute with Monero's 2-minute target block time is 100% of blocks.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> i think at that point the top 3 pools would counter attack

I'm not against that as is right now

might turn the chain into a mess though

<r​ucknium:monero.social> elongated: No 51% attack by any definition is evident in the verifiable data, IMHO.

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> @Rucknium but there were 7 block re-orgs, right?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Usually, "51% attack" means a double-spend attack against a specific victim. I see zero double-spends when I input `print_pool_stats` into my node.

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> alright thanks for that info

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> they could have chosen not to double spend and just do reorgs

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Unlikely

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> if they double spent, xmr would be crashing, not profitable for them either

<r​ucknium:monero.social> You can easily get 7 block re-org with high enough _minority_ hashpower share and trying long enough. I did the calculations last year. Satoshi did some calculations, too.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> See "Table: Duration of meta attack to achieve attack success probability of 50 percent" here: monero-project/research-lab #102#issuecomment-2402750881

<t​orir:matrix.org> Mind if I copy this message verbatim to paste in chat when this inevitably comes up again?

Their stated goals are not to double spend but to exclude other miners from block rewards but orphaning all other blocks outside their pool

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> if we hold out for 6 more days, qubic block rewards drop by 50%

Key images would provide an additional problem for an attacker attempting a double spend anyways

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> That’s assuming the price for qubic stays the same, but yes the halving will definitely hurt them in my opinion

<r​ucknium:monero.social> If you have 30% of hashpower and you are constantly trying for a 7-block re-org, you only have to try for about 3.5 hours to reach a 50% probability of achieving a 7-block re-org.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/zWLlEOGqiibMGIXwzOXlqDlI

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> still claiming he's being helpful towards monero

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> *8 days

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Torir: Sure. I've posted this work a lot recently.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> *data availability, not data storage

Rucknium can you calculate this: if they have 35% of hashpower, how long do they need to mine to get 51/100 blocks in any consecutive 100 blocks?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> hows it looking for 10/11 (whatever can break transactions)

I don't know how to calculate it properly, I can only do monte-carlo simulations to get an approximate number

<r​ucknium:monero.social> sech1: Selfish mining or honest mining?

honest mining, for starters

just assume they are able to get 35% of blocks, one way or another

<r​ucknium:monero.social> The order of the 51 doesn't matter, right? (Of course, in a double-spend attack, the order matters.)

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> if hashrate is 5GH/s and they add 2.6GH/s, doesn't that make the HR grow to 7.6GH/s?

<t​orir:matrix.org> The context here is that Qubic got 51 blocks out of 100 and used it to "show" they had a 51% attack, despite there being no victims except a bunch of orphaned blocks. I don't believe Qubic had 51 blocks in a row, someone please correct me if I am wrong.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> the victim were the miners not being paid for their found blocks

<t​orir:matrix.org> Yes, I suppose that is technically correct. My point is that Qubic is trying to create misinformation about their capabilities, so we want some math showing how hard it was for them to get that particular number (and why having 51 blocks in a set of 100 consecutive blocks doesn't mean 51% hashrate).

they've been doing that the whole time

exaggeration, lying, etc

nothing new

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> What you mean scammers lie?

Rucknium I ran 100k simulations: 1000 consecutive blocks with 35% probability of each block being from one miner, then check rolling window of 100 blocks to find any 51/100. It found this window in 5467 cases (5.467%)

you can point it out to people if you want, anybody who's bought it will just argue with you in bad faith

if they have 40%, this probability increases to 53.7%

so it ramps up pretty fast

not a surprise, they were able to get 51/100 eventually and screenshot it

41% of blocks -> probability increases to 68.3%

well they usually just screenshot their own data from jetski whenever the pool share % on that website goes above 51% and consider the job done

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> growing only 5% from 35% to 50% you increase odds from 5.46 to 53.7?

like a flip is switched or something and 51% "domination" as they say, is completed

They posted a screenshot of their wallet

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> growing only 5% from 35% to 40% you increase odds from 5.46 to 53.7?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> sech1: The dependency of a moving window makes the probability calculation much more complicated, yes. If you just sample many independent 100-block ranges, it should be a simple computation based on the binomial distribution AFAIK.

<t​orir:matrix.org> At 50%+ you have 100% success rate (you have met the condition for a 51% attack), so the math checks out.

I wrote a script already and posted some numbers

So 35% of blocks doesn't give them much chance (5.467%) to get it, but 40% of blocks already gives the, 53.7% of successfully finding 51/100 blocks inside some 1000-block range

and if I take 40% and 2000-block range, it's already 79.66%

so they just need to get 35-40% and then wait, wait, wait until they get lucky and screenshot it

then spam social media

pretty much what theyve been doing

<r​ucknium:monero.social> The many 100-block ranges assumption I get 0.07% with the binomial method. Anyway, this is why I was making a distinction in the conversations earlier about fixed intervals vs. rolling intervals. Much easier to appear to get a streak of luck if you are considering rolling intervals. That's why I set moneroconsneus.info to show fixed intervals instead of trailing, rolling intervals.

Yes, rolling interval increases probabilities significantly. That's counter-intuitive, but simulations show it

Probability theory is hard

<r​ucknium:monero.social> It's not counter-intuitive to me at all. It's a type of classic multiple hypothesis testing issue that you always have to be aware of in empirical work. Roll the dice enough times and you will get double sixes.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Not trying to brag or anything, but this is warned about in all of statistics.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> There is a lot of work on valid stopping rules for hypothesis tests when you have a series of results coming in on an continuous basis.

<t​orir:matrix.org> You develop that intuition when you study probability enough, but casinos can tell you that probability intuition is not something that people normally have.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> this means they can reorg the blocks by being lucky with 35-40%, but they cannot successful do other attacks like double-spend as they didn't reach 51%?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> For example, medical trials need to stop when there is extremely good news about the treatment. When there is not doubt that the treatment works, you _must_, ethically, start giving the treatment to patients who were receiving the placebo.

<t​orir:matrix.org> I have a sense of foreboding whenever I'm writing code that concatenates strings and passes them to shell or SQL that tells me that something might be wrong, yet we keep having shell and SQL vulnerabilities in actual code from people who apparently don't have that sense.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Not for a sufficient amount of confirmations Leonardo:

<r​ucknium:monero.social> But you need a valid statistical stopping rule. Those are complicated because you have non-independence.

<t​orir:matrix.org> They can double-spend with the probabilities in: "Table: Duration of meta attack to achieve attack success probability of 50 percent" here: monero-project/research-lab #102#issuecomment-2402750881

<t​orir:matrix.org> (Assuming victim permits unlimited attempts in that window)

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Rucknium: would you support a pos finality layer?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I have been warning about the weaknesses in PoW-only for a while.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Which doesn't answer the question directly :p

<r​ucknium:monero.social> ^ I don't know if this message from a year ago will show up since it's so old

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> I don't see a replied-to message :/

<r​ucknium:monero.social> > I haven't read Budish's latest version, but I read most of his previous version. I like his simple observation that PoW uses the value of a flow to protect the value of a stock. Put that way, PoW seems like an expensive and risky protocol. Then, he analyzes potential failure modes of ASIC-and non-ASIC PoW protocols, which is also nice.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> > Budish has a new paper with Lewis-Pye and Roughgarden that extends the analysis to general blockchains and compares PoW with PoS: "The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus" arxiv.org/abs/2405.09173

<r​ucknium:monero.social> The first Budish paper I was referring to is Budish, E. (2025). Trust at Scale: The Economic Limits of Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140(1), 1–62. moneroresearch.info/101

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Finally published in a (top) economics journal after years of being in draft state.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> Monero has a 10-block lock on transferred funds before they become spendable, therefore a double-spend attack would require a reorg of at least 11 blocks. afaik

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I would support a literature review of Monero's options for blockchain security. I think research on this topic has been neglected in the Monero research community.

<t​orir:matrix.org> You could double-spend against a victim who accepts your transaction as confirmed with fewer than 10 if you can pull off a reorg of that size.

<t​orir:matrix.org> If you find an exchange that only requires 5 confirmations, you could double-spend against it pretty easily with 40% hashrate.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I would be open to changes of Monero's blockchain security protocol if better systems exist, perhaps after an exhaustive search.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> you still need a reorg of 11 blocks, otherwise what's the 10-block lock for?

<t​orir:matrix.org> There's some complexity with if your victim will let you try again if your attack fails and things of that regard when it comes to double-spend attacks with less than 50% hashrate, and unfortunately I'm not qualified to explain them in more than very general terms.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> the only way to spend outputs is if your inputs are 10-block old

<t​orir:matrix.org> I send 1 XMR to an exchange that only requires 5 confirmations, wait for the transaction to confirm 5 times, trade for some instantly withdrawing coin on the now-unlocked balance on the exchange, withdraw immediately. In the meantime, I'm mining to perform the attack, and with some probability I get to undo my deposit that only has 5 confirmations.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> The 10 block lock doesn't protect against a double-spend attack with less than 10 blocks of confirmations. The 10 block lock only makes sure that transactions are still valid if there was a 10+ re-org (because Monero txs reference outputs by index number of the blockchain, not output public key directly).

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> thank you Rucknium

<r​ucknium:monero.social> It's subtle. koe explains it here: monero-project/research-lab #95

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Yes, there are two "fix the 10 block lock" MRL issues because people wanted it so much. The other one is monero-project/research-lab #102

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Anyway, to try to answer your question, sech1: I think simulations are fine for now and can actually be better when trying to convince programmers. I can try to look into exact probability formulas for the complicated rolling window case later.

<r​00t_of_bnets:matrix.org> Can someone explain what is going on with Qubic? Did they really do a 51% like CTO of Trezor said? How tf can they afford such hashrate? Who is helping them?

<t​orir:matrix.org> All signs point to "No, Qubic did not do a 51%".

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> @r00t_of_bnets check out the logs of this chat libera.monerologs.net/monero-research-lounge/20250812

<r​ucknium:monero.social> r00t_of_bnets: No. Read the room's backlog. If Matrix doesn't show it, get it here: libera.monerologs.net/monero-research-lounge/20250812

<r​00t_of_bnets:matrix.org> Are they hiding their hashrate somehow because it doesn't appear here - miningpoolstats.stream/monero. In fact the nethash dropped by quite a bit in 1-2 days.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> how much would it cost to rent 40% of monero's network hashrate per hour?

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> is there even availability in the market?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> they could be hiding it in pools

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> ofrn had a theory about that

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> that's a voluntarily reporting service, they stopped reporting it, therefore you won't see it there

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> afaik if you mine a sidechain the network won't see your hashrate as you're not publishing blocks in order to calculate it

<t​orir:matrix.org> This is all confusing because Qubic *is* doing an attack, just not a "51% attack". It's a selfish mining attack (a real attack, but not the same as a 51% attack) combined with a misinformation campaign. They are trying to create the message that they *are* capable of doing a 51% attack when they are not.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> I double that they would do a real 51% double-send attack because that would be fraud. A 51% double-spend attack is supposed to be executed by an unknown attacker. If they were to double-spend against a centralized exchange, they are a known entity that could be punished by other exchanges,, i.e. de-listing.

<t​orir:matrix.org> I'll be honest, I don't actually know what the 51% attack is supposed to refer to. I think it can refer to a few different types of attack.

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> Then why is there a unknown miners in the chart

<r​ucknium:monero.social> sech1: It looks like this would be the answer, which includes some casual commentary: askamathematician.com/2010/07/q-wha…ions-when-the-exact-answer-is-known

<r​ucknium:monero.social> > And that’s why exact solutions are stupid.

<r​ucknium:monero.social> > Want an exact answer without all the hard work and really nasty formulas? Computers were invented for a reason, people.

<r​00t_of_bnets:matrix.org> Torir: if you had to guess, what will ultimately be the outcome of this attack?

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> economic reason an attacker would invest into a 51% is to be able to double-spend and recoup the investment

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> in this case the economic incentive is marketing behind claiming "our project is so cool, we've been able to break Monero"

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Well, that doesn't give the exact answer, because we don't need 51 in a row. Just 51 in a treak of 100. Need to look more

<r​ucknium:monero.social> sech1 ^

simulations give an approximate answer

enough to get 3-4 correct digits of the probability

<t​orir:matrix.org> r00t_of_bnets: Are you referring to the Qubic attack? It depends on how the community reacts. At the present time, Qubic doesn't have the hashrate to take over the Monero chain completely (an actual 51% attack). If they convince miners to move to mining their coin, due to misinformation, or due to mining their coin being more profitable, that can change. If the miners don't move o<clipped message>

<t​orir:matrix.org> ver, they just lose. If the miners do move over, it's possible Monero can survive with a hardfork or with block checkpoints (there is a currently unused DNS checkpointing feature that might help with that).

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/CbGDwGzidCBuDMLMLguXkxUT

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> he's reposting FUD

<r​00t_of_bnets:matrix.org> Torir: how is it profitable for miners to mine Qubic at all??? They are mining Monero only 50% of the time and the other 50% they are using their compute for "AI". If I understood correctly Qubic receives XMR from the mined blocks, sells them for Qubic and then pays out the miners. The question is - who buys the Qubic, where and why? I have some really strange feelign after lookin<clipped me

<r​00t_of_bnets:matrix.org> g at the Qubic reddit and related websites, like it's literally all AI generated.

<b​asses:matrix.org> what the price chart has to do with the post?

<t​orir:matrix.org> r00t_of_bnets: It's one of those scamcoins you hear about. The more you look into it, the shadier it seems. For instance, the coin is highly centralized. Yet it got enough traction to get some coin value, to the point that mining it *does* generate some monetary value. At least, that's what Qubic claims. I have not investigated mining profitability of Qubic. I stopped once I saw t<clipped message>

<t​orir:matrix.org> hat the mining software is closed source.

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> that's how they posted it, to make it more dramatic I suppose

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> CryptoRank say they are "Leading crypto industry research & analytics platform"

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> what they really are: "Crypto industry FUD network"

<r​00t_of_bnets:matrix.org> Just wanted to add that it it's all highly suspicious, not just in terms of Qubic in general but also with the TradeOgre shutdown recently. Anyway I will keep my mining rigs on during this time, just to help the network. Thank you for your input.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Ugh. The current claim I just got pinged about on Twitter is they had 51% of hash power because they mined 51/100 blocks.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> That's exactly what sech1 analyzed above.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/VEXrAGpcTjHvgemzkfHLrXXy

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> yeah to demonstrate a 51% capability, you need a longer window, or use selfish mining to demonstrate it in a short window, which would net you >95% of block reward with 51% hash power

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> (image is the earnings vs. Selfish mining % from kevinnegy.github.io/Selfish%20Mining%20Re-Examined.pdf Figure 12(d) for IRC folks)

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> They failed to even approach any reasonable threshold for a reliable proof of attack

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> To be clear though, they have far, far too much concentrated hash rate under a single entity control, which poses significant economic risk regardless, which is the primary disincentive to stakeholders underinvesting in mining to allow such concentration to persist

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> I would have already tripled or more my long term hash rate with miner righ purchases, but even the talk of entertaining PoS has put that on pause

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> Unfortunately the centralizing aspect of PoS would make mining/Pow ultimately superfluous from a network security (and decentralized consensus) perspective - and mining, or using, Monero, no longer interesting from my pov

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> I would have already tripled or more my long term hash rate with miner rig purchases, but even the talk of entertaining PoS has put that on pause

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> Just added 15 MH/s, can maintain it for a few weeks.

<m​oneroj:matrix.org> just started mining again after reading about this qubic bs

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> told you all you should xmrig harder

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> :3

<u​sb:envs.net> XD

<v​tnerd:monero.social> x.com/vtnerd/status/1955238417404453296?t=cZvHD4ExZ6ZeoJEbUyygsA&s=19

<v​tnerd:monero.social> The twitter post just reiterates what kill/switch: said

<v​tnerd:monero.social> Your slicing the hashrate with selfish mining such that it's literal takeover once you get 51% - you get 100% of the blocks at 51%

<m​oneroj:matrix.org> fascinating fud, meanwhile the exchanges and swaps have no XMR to trade 🤣😂

<v​tnerd:monero.social> And credit to the authors of the original paper for truly understanding statistics+math

for those that are unaware rucknium 's CCS has just opened ccs.getmonero.org/proposals/Rucknium-Research-II.html

also vtnerd ccs.getmonero.org/proposals/vtnerd-2025-q3.html

the full list is here, they were all added at the same time ccs.getmonero.org/funding-required

it is currently safe to send txs :D

I will be doing so later today after some work

<3​21bob321:monero.social> General fund cough cough

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> +5 MH/s also. totally 20.

<a​nnelinlol:matrix.org> it will cost me around 0.01BTC/day if my counting is not f up

<r​ucknium:monero.social> Thanks, nioc

meow

<1​7lifers:matrix.org> nyah~

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/muOUluOnuhrPtmhHjlCuDhCa

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> their rig rentals running out? lol

<m​oneroj:matrix.org> xD wheres this metric from?

<b​asses:matrix.org> and people realizing he's scamming them?

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> their fake explorer

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> explorer.jetskipool.ai/xmr-tracker

<b​asses:matrix.org> looks vibecoded

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> pretty sure they just lie about their hash

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> everything we have seen so far lines up with them having ~30%

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> not more

<b​asses:matrix.org> btw, I wouldn't let @monero tweet anything about qubic

<b​asses:matrix.org> no need to acknowledge some troll

I wonder if the attack has stopped because CfB isn't able to sell xmr any more because exchanges have shut down xmr operations. And he may be a troll, but he isn't a nobody, he was a pioneer of many of the ideas that modern PoS networks have implemented, he should be taken seriously.

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> youd think he has enough money to keep this going for longer than a day

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> especially after his shitcoin pumped so hard

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> Well if you merge with LTC, then LTC miners would get moth doge and XMR rewards, so effectively a cumulative tail emission for all three chains. I'd also suggest keeping half of mining RandomX to not be fully dependent on LTC / scrypt asics

I am sure he alone has enough money from his past projects to keep this going long enough if he needs to prove his point. Monero should better implement better defenses.

<m​oneroj:matrix.org> moar ryzen cores !!!

<p​uff1k:matrix.org> What about reworking PoW concept and protocol, by paying more for less hashrate.

<p​uff1k:matrix.org> I mean for example if you mine for single address and you have 25 kh, you get 1 XMR/year, and if you got 100 kh, you get only 2, for 400 kh, 3 XMR and so on

<p​uff1k:matrix.org> This will not only resolve Qubic problem, but also the problem with big centrilized pools

<b​asses:matrix.org> u​ser000, like what?

<p​uff1k:matrix.org> it is something like we had with XMRvsBeast, before they changed rewrd calculation

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> it costs $70 million per day according to the ledger cto

<p​uff1k:matrix.org> it is something like we had with XMRvsBeast, before they changed rewrd system

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> lol what

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> xcancel.com/p3b7_/status/1955173413992984988

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> it costs $75 million per day according to the ledger cto

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> Sustaining this attack is estimated to cost $75 million per day. While potentially lucrative, it threatens to destroy confidence in the network almost overnight. Other miners are left with no incentive to continue, as Qubic can simply orphan any competing blocks, effectively becoming the sole miner.

15:40:33 <m-relay> <p​uff1k:matrix.org> I mean for example if you mine for single address and you have 25 kh, you get 1 XMR/year, and if you got 100 kh, you get only 2, for 400 kh, 3 XMR and so on

this doesn't work in a system where payout is obfuscated

more so

they can spread hashrate across accounts or addresses

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> lol he bought into this fud hook line and sinker

it's instant to make one

XMRvsBeast does it locally with his own funds

basses: multi-pow with some share of asics, i would say.

and it has been gamed in that specific way, making multiple accounts

<b​asses:matrix.org> u​ser000, any papers or code under his name?

<j​effro256:monero.social> Who knew lying online works...

basses: check out NXT, it was CfB's invention, Ethereum and others took ideas from it. It didn't enjoy corporate support like Ethereum did, and faded away, but it was there before Ethereum.

<j​effro256:monero.social> Lmao a crypto company CTO should know better than to take random crypto shills on Twitter at face value

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> anyone who's turned on the news in the last decade, I'm afraid

<p​uff1k:matrix.org> I think this wont work, as this means giving each individual miner/smal pool control of the wallet

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> if its really 70M per day that shit cant be sustainable at all

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> 70M a day doesn't make much sense to me when XMR's entire daily security budget is under 130,000 USD even when XMR was at $300

<b​asses:matrix.org> stole from north korean hackers

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> yeah true

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> prices for rented hashrate go up with demand so i could see 200-300k a day being realistic if its mostly rented

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> it isn't. qubic was just at 17% hash rate of 0.85 GH/s (looks like they stopped mining now). they would have to increase their hash rate by approximately 3.48 GH/s (4x), which is equivalent to 4.33 GH/s, assuming no one else mines while they gain hash rate. this costs just over 3 BTC per day to maintain

<v​enture:monero.social> hey guys... I'm wondering, aren't re-orgs already to be considered successful double-spend attack on coinbase transactions?

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> @venture, not really because you have to wait 10 confirmations to spend an output

<b​oog900:monero.social> qubic.org/blog-detail/historic-take…ic-miners-now-secure-monero-network

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> noname:

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> >> kill/switch

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> >> With PoW you have other centralization pressures, but the provable decentralization is a function of a real world, system independent costs incurred by the stakeholder, which does not exist at all in PoS

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> > when you think of these risks, please consider a hybrid model is completely different from pure pow and pos. let's continue this chat in the lounge.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> A hybrid model is meaningfully different, but not for actual consensus. The only reason to implement a hybrid model is because decentralized consensus failed, or is judged likely to fail. Once implemented, the PoW portion is not a consensus mechanism; it can be used for coinbase reward, but then again, as there is no network security aspect worth considering for PoW, the most pr<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ofitable mining operations will be the ones to benefit from coinbase collection (as always) - and there is no decentralization incentive to mine, or use the coin, if you want to participate in a decentralization-maximizing ecosystem as described in the OG paper, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> noname:

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> > > kill/switch

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> > > With PoW you have other centralization pressures, but the provable decentralization is a function of a real world, system independent costs incurred by the stakeholder, which does not exist at all in PoS

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> > > when you think of these risks, please consider a hybrid model is completely different from pure pow and pos. let's continue this chat in the lounge.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> A hybrid model is meaningfully different, but not for actual consensus. The only reason to implement a hybrid model is because decentralized consensus failed, or is judged likely to fail. Once implemented, the PoW portion is not a consensus mechanism; it can be used for coinbase reward, but then again, as there is no network security aspect worth considering for PoW, the most pr<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ofitable mining operations will be the ones to benefit the most from coinbase collection (as always) - and there is no decentralization incentive to mine, or use the coin, if you want to participate in a decentralization-maximizing ecosystem as described in the OG paper, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> never mined a block and it shows /s

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> coinbase outputs need like 70 confs

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> With the takeover test now complete, the Monero network's core functionality remains intact. Its privacy, speed, and usability have not been compromised.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> wow thanks qubic

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> hey they found a bug in haveno

<m​onerobull:matrix.org> so thanks for the stress test

<v​enture:monero.social> yeah. but still. it's pocketed and then gone. small miners with a block frequency of 7 days or so... and then seeing it gone. i felt double-spend-attacked at least

<a​lexanarcho:matrix.org> @monerobull called me out and i accept it. thanks for the correction :D

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> another little known fact is that btc had over 31 orphaned blocks were discarded back in 2013. hopefully this puts things into perspective. qubic was only able to do 7 orphaned blocks during their attack

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> bitcoin.org/en/alert/2013-03-11-chain-fork

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> from block 225430.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225461 2013-03-12 16:21:02 00000000000002d74c31d9c9f8e4768c0b51c3f145be07be7e77af0146144c30

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225460 2013-03-12 15:05:56 00000000000002afb9088485b05a2b8a1dfa6b82e3e915fa0765879a05061461

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225459 2013-03-12 14:36:39 000000000000036e459f26b1dc02683c9beeb061eedf18689995143354467245

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225458 2013-03-12 12:18:23 00000000000000620d78c08bd345aa489b02a52c5f823f0324d3c42212577c24

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225457 2013-03-12 09:48:00 0000000000000067fa40b890799ef9814e1e427abd5fc9f4751ffb3ef6512d14

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225456 2013-03-12 07:59:29 000000000000031ce5f5c447dbe06ebd62f988c6718e1a17d14b9dcd8ff9605c

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225455 2013-03-12 07:14:21 000000000000009d2dee89c7732b5bc912845d96a6bee38cab815949cfa60d23

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> 225454 2013-03-12 05:17:11 00000000000000df96f272c3b1e9dd15272b55750966cbd239219b94756c73ec

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> it isn't a double-spend though

<v​enture:monero.social> not in the literal sense, but it's still harmful to honest miners and skews the hashrate down. every intentional orphaned block had a real cost not calculated in the network hashrate.

<v​enture:monero.social> I read Rucknium's Meta-attack analysis.. I'm not sure, but would these numbers be at least somewhat improved if the block frequency was lower?

<r​ucknium:monero.social> venture: Yes, but not enough to make a big difference IMHO. Monero used to have 1-minute block time intervals, but raised to 2 minutes to reduce the orphan rate.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> if implemented pow would remain consensus for half the blocks. while pos would have the other half. we arent talking about checkpointing and removing pow utility from consensus.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> to 51% the network you would need to be lucky enough to mine a pos block + pow block in continued succession which is waaaay more unlikely to happen.

<s​gp_:monero.social> x.com/BitMEXResearch/status/1955254320305217726

<s​gp_:monero.social> finally a reasonable take for once

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> best take I've read so far on x

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> @noname-user0:matrix.org what did you think of monero-project/research-lab #98?

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> here was my concern reposted:

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> "if we do use tevador's proposal, how would the change in hash rate look like? unless I've understood it incorrectly, large pools will not exist because (from tevadors proposal) miners would either switch to p2pool by running their own node or quit entirely. because there's no way a large pool can provide 256 MiB cache per hour for every miner sustainably. the issue with this is t<clipped mess

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> hat if lots of miners "drop out", wouldn't the total network hash rate drop substantially, making an attack easier?"

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> I don't include p2pool in "large pool" and by "large pool" I mean centralized ones

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> apparently cloudflare offers free CDN up to 512 MB, dunno if anyone can confirm that

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> but it may efeat the whole purpose

<m​onero.arbo:matrix.org> but it may defeat the whole purpose

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> tevador used docs.digitalocean.com/platform/billing/bandwidth/#droplets in his PoC

<s​gp_:monero.social> cloudflare does appear to have a 512mb cache for free. they might terminate certain usage consider abusive

<s​gp_:monero.social> cloudflare does appear to have a 512mb cache for free. they might terminate certain usage considered abusive

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> This is exactly the point, it does make 51% attacks impossible because of the PoS portion, and PoS doesn't use mining, as the network security is guaranteed effectively by the largest stakeholders. The PoW is totally unnecessary for consensus at that point, because it offers no additional relevant security - it's rendered irrelevant and unneeded to defend against a mining attack <clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> like Qubic, and has no way to defend against whatever the whims of the PoS stake are - the concentration of stake is predictable but invisible, which is one of the things that make it brilliant as a fully centralized consensus mechanism. Once you have a centralized system that perfectly follows the distribution of wealth, you have just recreated the same ultimate incentive struct<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ure that any system run by the wealthy minority has. Any defection or objection on the PoW side could be "mitigated" by the PoS side, which is precisely why it works against an attack like Qubics.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> ... and then LLMs multiply that bs. Example: coinmarketcap.com/currencies/qubic "Qubic price stabilized above key moving averages after a 9.55% weekly drop."

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> you are only looking at it one way. pos has a lot of issue if its the only consensus mechanism. you need to add slashing and other penalties like that and potentially introduce kycd master nodes to ensure it continues to function properly like ethereum did.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> kyc master nodes

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> by keeping pow as half of the consensus you dont need all this other garbage on the pos side and can stick with a basic implementation

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> forget about PoS if we ever need to introduce kyc to determine security

16:00:48 <m-relay> <v​enture:monero.social> hey guys... I'm wondering, aren't re-orgs already to be considered successful double-spend attack on coinbase transactions?

locktime is 60 blocks

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> exactly my point

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> double spend is defined as a transaction being spent twice not a coinbase reward going to a different address.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> and even without this "attack" the reorgs of blocks is a common occurance.

<v​enture:monero.social> from their blog post: "However, the end goal is for the Monero protocol's security to be provided by Qubic’s miners."

<v​enture:monero.social> lunatics. why would they want that? kyc-ing transactions for qutard to mine it? or is it really just "economical"?

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> PoS is the only real consensus mechanism once it is implemented, because implementing it comes at no "cost" (in the real, world, PoW mining costs real effort sense of the word) - which also means that the client development cycle is fully captured by PoS interests, too. If PoS can be implemented, it can be adjusted via the same process that favors the interests that get it implem<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ented in the first place. PoW is merely ceremonial and/or for coinbase distribution is such a system. Which is why, if it was attempted or pushed, it would probably lead to (at least) two competing forks of Monero.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> PoS is the only real consensus mechanism once it is implemented, because implementing it comes at no "cost" (in the real, world, PoW mining costs real effort sense of the word) - which also means that the client development cycle is fully captured by PoS interests, too. If PoS can be implemented, it can be adjusted via the same process that favors the interests that get it implem<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ented in the first place. PoW is merely ceremonial and/or for coinbase distribution in such a system. Which is why, if it was attempted or pushed, it would probably lead to (at least) two competing forks of Monero.

<b​oog900:monero.social> its just marketing bs, trying to push their coin

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> The only problem I have with the finality layer (hybrid PoW + PoS solution), is the amount of time it will take (2years, according to Kayaba) to implement

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> tevador's proposal can be implemented quickly

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> although the consequences are not clear

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> it's not tho as I explained.

<v​enture:monero.social> I'm not so sure.. they seem to have a positive feedback loop going on eventually may push them over that 51% edge.

<v​enture:monero.social> He seems to be well aware of that and is harping on the self-fulfilling prophecy fallacy. switching/believing that would make this likely in the first place. but every lost / re-orged block that had been pocketed let's miners seriously consider this

<v​enture:monero.social> xcancel.com/c___f___b/status/1953763035954233394#m

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> yeah the technical implementation does seem like the biggest concern for me as well. especially with the network privacy updates coming and making sure we can do zk proofs around stake weights and without compromising privacy of wallets.

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> qubic's miners have been subsidized with an illiquid shitcoin using their emissions, which will be halved in just over a week. the reason they are pushing so hard now is because they cannot sustain this "attack" for long once their emissions fall and trust erodes

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> doesn't change too much if the reorg blocks are less than the coinbase lock

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> the expected payout is the same

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> if that attacker hash rate was mining in the clear vs hidden

<b​asses:matrix.org> qubic.org/blog-detail/historic-take…ic-miners-now-secure-monero-network

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> first, to me it feels like a one-man show... and he is loosing real bucks - every hour.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> they are definitely losing money with this attack as mining itself is not profitable on xmr... especially when the price dropped

<b​asses:matrix.org> matrix search is very terrible

<v​enture:monero.social> the expected payout is lower though than the one you see / is calucated from network hashrate. since orphans skew the reported hashrate down and the real hashrate is higher

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> @ofrnxmr:monero.social how did the alpha stressnet go? I couldn't find any resources on it even after scouring the meeting logs

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> I saw that you posted about the alpha stressnet for fcmp++ on x

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> The public one isnt out yet, but mine hit 15mb blocks yesterday

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Node sync seems to be about as fast as ringct. Tx generation for 1in-2out txs is fast, about 1 second

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> did you manage to test syncing?

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> how about tx generation for many inputs? I remember there were concerns about that

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> I get it, but the actual incentives in any system with PoS make PoW merely ceremonial, no matter what the "in system" design is for slashing, penalty, share of block minting, etc. The successful implementation of PoS is the proof itself that such a take over by a wealth minority has already occurred, and makes the system design fully unresponsive to minority stakeholders no matt<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> er their share of the network participation, because the system design has been chosen and is ultimately controlled by % of stake interest. This is exactly the case with Ethereum or any other PoS coin. At that point, the PoW miners, no matter their numbers or hash rate or anything else, have the same chance of overthrowing or changing Monero design in-system as they do levying c<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> hanges on Visa or Mastercard. All they can do is fork.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 128inputs = 7mins to create a tx

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> matrix.monero.social/_matrix/media/…matrix.org/ASfJKPCDywdqHJaOeXOkfdKA

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> how did p2pool mine an empty block

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> And probably abt 1 second for the node to verify it

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> not bad

<b​lockreward:matrix.org> I expected much worse 😅

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> yeah, same. Using without the 128input patch was.. difficult. I vwry often have 8in-2out or 16in-2out txs

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> how did p2pool mine an empty block <<>> because the blocks were 6 seconds apart and there were no txs to include

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> man, I really disagree with you here. the unbalanced distribution of rewards skewed to pow solves this problem. you would have to agree that at 0% rewards to stakers there's no "takeover" as you described. but then, there is no incentive for stakers to run nodes either so it needs to be greater than 0% for it to function properly with enough of the coins staking to generate blocks.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Proof-of-pow-stake 😬

<l​eonarth_:matrix.org> proof of stake-work :D

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> There is no in-system checks or balance against proof of stake interest that works, no matter how rube goldberg you make it, by adding in PoW puzzles for the proles, etc; if an operating network consensus is weighted or checked by stake in any way, you already lost your decentralization. A lot of people disagree with this, but the base case of the nothing at stake issue has never<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> changed since its first introduction, it's just not decentralized consensus once its in a system.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> There is no in-system checks or balance against proof of stake interest that works, no matter how rube goldberg you make it, by adding in PoW puzzles for the proles, etc; if an operating network consensus is weighted or checked by stake in any way, you already lost your decentralization. A lot of people disagree with this, but the base case of the nothing at stake issue has never<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> changed since its first introduction, it's just not decentralized consensus once it's in a system.

<v​enture:monero.social> implicit proof of stake: retire the block reward, make it "economical" only to the people who have a "stake" in the network.

<v​enture:monero.social> bites in the bitter apple that honest miners and economic miners are mutually exclusive.

<v​enture:monero.social> ^that's a joke

One might consider that, in order to continue staking, the money has to be left to stake, an opportunity cost, while a PoW miner can spend their block rewards. If the PoS staker sells their block rewards too, their relative staking power degradres, which does not happen for pow. So the effective cost is not 0. Though how to compare is another issue.

I mean relative staking power degradres vs other stakers. I'm assuming network wide pow hash rate stays constant of course.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Moneromooo, whattdya think about only being able to stake coinbases

*only coinbases

I'm not sure I agree with the argument overall, but it is interesting to read, thanks.

It does feel a bit like "this is not perfect, therefore it is bad" though.

I guess I need to keep it in my head for a while for it to percolate...

I have no thought about this.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Ty

Well, first thought comes now:

if it is the case, only pow miners can stake, and in relative propotion to their hash rate. So it's essentially a nop ?

It just adds a bit of probabilistic froth to the hash rate distribution.

But hey, I thought about it for 10 seconds, so... :)

<e​longated:matrix.org> Only cubic can stake ? If they had enough hashrate to mine all blocks?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Right, but that assumes they dont sell or move their coins

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> @moo

Well, it just delays, no ? You can sell once staked.

<e​longated:matrix.org> They can sell some stake some, others can’t stake bought coins with your proposal?

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> [@elongated:matrix.org](https://matrix.to/#/@elongated:matrix.org) yeah, selfish mining all/majority of the stake is an issue

Since it's then not eligible anymore.

It's the same for staking all coins for this: the more you sell, the more your relative staking power decreases.

What is the intended benefit of staking only coinbases ?

Actually, if pos coinbases do also get eligible, then you're right, it doens't delay, it prevents.

Does it matter though ? It only influences the price.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Nothing just keeps out ppl who actually bought the coin

(I think ?)

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> avoid whale staking and buy in, like exchanges. mining pools could probably offer pooled staking (dont withdraw coins), so it doesnt stop staking pools

<e​longated:matrix.org> Why is buy in to secure chain such a big issue

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> its not, it just isn't decentralized

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> ok, we will agree to disagree then. pos does not automatically equal centralized in my view.

<e​longated:matrix.org> How is it not decentralised? Anyone can buy xmr and stake, easier than buying rigs and mining for months

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Because cexs would dominate

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> in fact i think current pow is way more centralized if one big economic actor can monopolize blocks and hold the network hostage

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> mining pools currently dominate pow

<e​longated:matrix.org> They could, if ppl held their coins in cex ; anyways all cex are going away one by one

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> even Bitcoin pow isnt decentralized due to the pool centralization

I think it does hte discussion a disservice to use black and white extremes here.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Still better than current state of xmr ?

GM

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> not really

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> most pools are owned by one chinese entity

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> only 1 independent pool these days i believe

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> but they havent decided to be an asshole and kill the network on purpose

<v​enture:monero.social> i didn't read through / understand it quite, but just want to drop it here.

<v​enture:monero.social> there is research on energy backed crypto.. what i thought pow essentially is. but they go one step further and claim it can be pegged to / redeemed for kwy with some reversible computing voodoo

<v​enture:monero.social> cryptoeconomicsystems.pubpub.org/pu…physical-asset-stablecoin/release/2

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> and keep the pools they acquired unconsolidated so it looks decentralized

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> the root issue is that proof of stake isn't actually proof of anything, and has no actual penalty against collusion. Proof of work works because it's an effective solution to byzantine general's because you can't un-use energy and reuse it again. Proof of stake is a misnomer, it's really concentrated capital consensus with proof of nothing, because collusion can be organized off<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> chain without undergoing any on-chain risks; slashing nor any other thing changes that.

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Yeah, dont multiple pools just identify as different pools, but are the same behind the curtains?

<v​enture:monero.social> i didn't read through / understand it quite, but just want to drop it here.

<v​enture:monero.social> there is research on energy backed crypto.. what i thought pow essentially is. but they go one step further and claim it can be pegged to / redeemed for kWh with some reversible computing voodoo

<v​enture:monero.social> cryptoeconomicsystems.pubpub.org/pu…physical-asset-stablecoin/release/2

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> in btc for sure

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> Proof of pow stake would be proof that you you're pow hashing. Its not as simple as being party to a transactions (receiving deposits). Like, tradeogre was staking users zano (and keeping the $)

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> ok well whatever your dislike is with pos, would you agree that adding it an alternative consensus besides pure pow as an alternating block construction would eliminate pow 51% attacks completely?

What kind of collusion ?

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> It's not that I dislike it per se, after all I use a Visa card and Fedbucks and that works fine too, it's just that if I'm looking for decentralized consensus, it's not a solution to that, as it's easily disproven as a logical solution to the problem set. I use Monero because I'm looking for decentralized peer to peer cash with privacy, a PoS coin does not meet logical criteria f<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> or that combined feature set

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> Yeah I like this theoretically in certain implementations, at least better than proof of stake

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> slashing and penalties absolutely changes the cost of off chain collision....

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> we have very robust working examples of pos working and mitigating attacks.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> we also have legal precedent which describes pos networks as being decentralized. (though we could obviously construct a centralized version of a finality layer as many of these networks have done)

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> PoS absolutely mitigates attacks, but that has nothing really to do with the on chain synthetic penalty; there is no cost to colluding off chain to reorganize a chain and rewrite the chain/database or the rules, the reason it doesn't happen is because the economic incentive to do so is in the hands of highly concentrated capital, and there's no rational incentive to change a stru<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> cture you already control

PoS is not the way

So, you mean stakers colluding to... find a way to create a long branch without intervening PoW blocks ?

(not intervening PoS blocks from other stakers)

nor*

If so, this seems rather equivalent to PoW miners colluding to orphan other miners' blocks.

Do you mean somethin else ?

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> basically yes, interleaved PoW blocks are not relevant, just like slashing isn't relevant. The collusion doesn't happen because once you have a proof of stake check/finality against anything "bad" that might happen on chain, you won control already, there is no need to collude to change anything else at that point. You eliminated the threat posed to concentration of control by n<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> ot having influence over potential PoW attacks (like Qubic) and your coins are secured by the very fact that a small minority group always owns most of them

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> you now have voting power relative to your wealth and that is enough :)

"once you have a proof of stake check/finality" - are we talking about a bog standard hybrid pos/pow thing here (I assumed we were) or something else ?

If something else, what I said above might not apply, sorry.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> anything PoS related; once wealth is the arbiter, wealth is the arbiter, that's what makes it attack resistant, most people aren't wealthy and can't infiltrate that requirement, which is what PoS is

Well most people can't get large PoS rigs eihter. Nothing is 100% perfect, but that's not a reason to declare defeat.

The point of a hybrid is to avoid the same thing in the first place, just with words replaced, like once hash power is the arbiter, hash power is the arbiter.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> true, but PoW is a logical provable solution to decentralized consensus, proof of wealth isn't, it's explicitly weighting wealth as network control, which is what basically all other human money systems do :)

Yes, if you hash half the hash power, or money, you can go to town. Point is to make it harder.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> and hybrid is just PoS with low wealth hamsters spinning on their wheels to feel important

Your argument is the same for pow. People mining on their gaming rig might get lucky from time to time. But they have a chance.

PoW hash rate is also a proxy for wealth, since you seem to have a thing against wealth.

Not a direct a proxy, I'll grant you.

Not as* direct

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> the difference is in PoW, you are *actually* contributing to distributed consensus with an irreversible activity, relative to your hash power yes, but each hash is equal weight. In PoS, only a few holders actually really matter, and if everyone else stopped staking or tried anything fishy, nothing would happen to the network because most people don't actually matter in that system

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> just because you say it's irrelevant does not make them irrelevant.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> interleaved pow + alternative consensus blocks absolutely removed the issues around 51% attacks and nothing at stake attacks beyond the single block that's being constructed

So while it could well be that raw money is better at getting a highr relative share of PoS stking power than PoW hash rate, it doesn't seem like an obvious showstopper re. centralization.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> you can say the exact same thing about pow

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> if you remove small pow miners it doesnt change anything. consensus is done by the few pools in pow. you might as well call them master nodes.

Now, hybrid pow/pos does improve decentralization, since different people will have more abiilty to get into pow or pos. So you *gain* decentralization ,even if the new scheme (pos in this case) is on its own less decentralized than the existing one.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> there is a growing consensus that there is not even a need for inflation in PoS systems because its in the economic self interest of the majority stakeholders to secure the network

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> that makes it more egalitarian than PoW

hybrid chain is acceptable if we keep PoW

I dont think any miner is agaist staking their reward somehow

Maybe you don't gain much of it if PoS stakers end up being mostly existing PoW miners though. But that's an extreme, and even then you did not lose anything.

(modulo possible bugs in the impl ofc)

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> the big difference is that pos requires you to already have xmr to participate where as mining does not.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> the second difference is that because mining doesn't require you to have any stake in the network it incentivizes bad actors who have no interest in the network itself to participate. e.g. botnets and other 3rd party entities such as qubic.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> The only real difference is perhaps is PoW is real work, which can be strategized, gamed, requires constant effort to maintain or shift share, etc - and PoS requires little else but wealth to self perpetuate indefinitely

user0 so keeping pow is essential if there is any form of pos staking

itll be the entry door essentially

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> pow was only of relevance because there was no other network to bootstrap liquidity from in the satoshi days

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> stakers need to keep their nodes online. if the economic incentives dont offset that cost, you wont see exponential growth of new nodes coming online to stake and further decentralize the network.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> PoS would be egalitarian if stake/wealth concentration was ever egalitarian, but then you just have a Star Trek communism with no need for money because everyone has the same maybe

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> this is a good point.

its mostly a question of balancing the requirement no

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> are you arguing that pow as it is today is egalitarian?

Well, monero did try to increase the egalitarianism of it though it is impossible to make it totally so.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> it depends on how muc hthe cost is too to act as a node in a PoS network relative to the emission, if you are just using it transaction-ally and not as a store of wealth, the inflation risk is zero and there's no sense to participate in a Pos network as a small/non holder other than as a payment processor

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> you could pay them in transaction fees. there is almost no cost to running a node

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> no

making hybrid with pow is a step further toward more option and egalitarianism

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> everyone participates equally in the ratio of their commitments in both pow and pos. actually, now that i think about it you could construct stake weights in a way which benefits smaller staking wallets proportionally.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> it depends on how much the cost is too to act as a node in a PoS network relative to the emission, if you are just using it transaction-ally and not as a store of wealth, the inflation risk is zero and there's no sense to participate in a Pos network as a small/non holder other than using as a payment processor/passthrough

1 monero 1 vote

I have no idea what that means tbh. Then again, economics confuse me so...

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> can be sybilled just adds rube goldberg layer

and you can aggregate vote for lower cost

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> p2pool has no incentive for miners to run their own nodes.... which is why it's not taking off. some staking rewards for running a node would really help this a lot.

anyway 1 cpu 1 vote that cpu is likely the price of 1 monero today

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> so pos would mean no more inflation and very fast almost instant finality

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 0 inflation pos is blasphemy

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> I wonder though... if one node can stake one wallet.... a sybil attack would benefit the network a lot by having a shit ton more nodes online

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> There are chains, like particl, that are staked to death

need to keep inflation for staking reward and miner reward

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> you have incentive to accumulate the entire supply, like zano

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> no that's not what anyone is saying

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> Like, is a PoS Monero (hybrid or otherwise) was the only "good" privacy coin, I'd probably still use it transactionally, but there'd be no sense in me participating in the network, that can be left to the whales

<o​frnxmr:xmr.mx> 80% of all zano is staked, 60% of particl. Just pure greed

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> would make all the other Pos chains look bad. transaction fees are incentive enough

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> Like, if a PoS Monero (hybrid or otherwise) was the only "good" privacy coin, I'd probably still use it transactionally, but there'd be no sense in me participating in the network, that can be left to the whales

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> its the truth

if people were more greedy we wouldnt be under 51% attack risk

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> that's your opinion but it still matters for small 🦐 to participate with the 🐋🐳

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> no it's not because staking would require resources to keep the node online and we cant rely on txs... that's literally why we have a tail emission

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> if there is no inflation it would be better than bitcoin. there will only ever be 18 million monero

"no sense" because you assume other pos stakers would collude to orphan your stakes ? If not you'd be getting abut the same percentage increase as them, no ?

Similar to how small PoW miners get the same % of the block reward, just very very occasionally, meaning mostly 0 with a lottery.

<a​ntilt:we2.ee> tbh: there are any number of methods to choose a set of validators... why stick to PoS ?

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> do you currently mine p2pool now and participate in the network?

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> btw staking coins in a network isnt greed

I mean it's a valid decision, but no different from deciding not to mine beause you can't be bothered playing the solo mining lottery.

why p2pool is so important ?

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> it actually increases utility for people to use the network

over other pool I mean

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> not really no, no sense because the transaction layer is effectively secured/finalized by stake, which is a handful of people that really matter to the finality, so I don't need to be concerned with the network layer, it's all down to those individuals being honest or not. It's a trust system, would be find for passthrough if the other privacy fundamentals were there but I'd have<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> no care about the network of that type/design itself.

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> Can we have Proof-Of-Node

<r​avfx:xmr.mx> The amount of TX you forward is your hashrate?

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> running it on an old computer in a closet is practically free. transaction fees are enough to reward stakers. The whales have the economic incentive to defend the network in any case.

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> not really no, no sense because the transaction layer is effectively secured/finalized by stake, which is a handful of people that really matter to the finality, so I don't need to be concerned with the network layer, it's all down to those individuals being honest or not. It's a trust system, would be fine for passthrough if the other privacy fundamentals were there but I'd have<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> no care about the network of that type/design itself.

p2pool brings the good of pools (decreases volatility) while not allowing that pool to control what your hash is going to.

Hmm

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> because it decentralizes hash rates away from big pools but still combines individual hash rates to increase probability of mining blocks.

I see, thanks for the explanation

To be clear, by "participating in the network", you mean either mining oe staking ?

proof of node sound interesting Lol

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> depending on the pos implementation, staked blocks are not final in what you are implying here. they can be orphaned by other stakers just as in pow.

<e​longated:matrix.org> Staking nodes should get some incentive

but its doubling the security or the attack cost, if not more

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> literally pos...

they would have to mine 51% plus buy a shitton of xmr and stake it now

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> and attacking a network where you have coins locked up in stake is probably not the best idea

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> i cant get gupax working on mac... how do i bypass apple security from not allowing me to run it?

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> it's not exactly plug and play for p2pool mining

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> meh the handful of rich holds the majority of staking power, it's not like you can design a system that can tie stake(s) together to an individual to try to make it 1 holder = 1 vote, but basically its 1 XMR = 1 vote, the rich win 10/10 times. They can compete amongst themselves if they want which I doubt, but the money wins the day, and I'm not going to be the money in that syst<clipped mess

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> em, because I don't value PoS systems as meaningfully having any advantage for me over any other non crypto store of wealth

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> the same holds with pow.... with pools.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> do you mineM

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> ?

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> noname: we can turn of tail emission if we switch to proof of stake because staking does not cost anything. no need to pay for expensive CPUs and electricity

if hybrid system could reduce 51% attack to nothingless and help incentivize some storing, so it also help making security economic better

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> yeah I've been mining since 2011, but I don't delegate consensus, i.e. I only mine for p2pool style or solo. I did mine for lukedashjr's pool when I very first started

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> and you can try to tie it to an individual for sure and some networks have tried but it requires kyc for obvious reasons. alternatively you can tie it to other things which might remain more decentralized but when it comes down to it, 1xmr ==1vote is the most egalitarian thing.

I don't get that. Everybody who stakes gets +X% (first approximation). You're getting less in absolute terms, but it seems like you'd be trying to scuttle yourself out of spite, and then showing other stakers slowly increasing their relative stake as proof of your point, rather than a consequence of your action (or course, you here is generic, since others might be making the same

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> it does cost things.... but yes less so than pow

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> we can also win the savings tech game against the bitcoiners. there will only ever be 18 million monero which means one monero should be worth more than one bitcoin as 18 < 21

decision).

1xmr 1 xmr very much like 1 cpu 1 vote. keep both option

1 xmr 1 vote*

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> practically nothing compared to mining

Moreover, if you stake, and others make that "I don't want to participate", you do increase your rlative stake. So it seems a puzzling decision to me.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> so if a hybrid system came out you would stop mining altogether?

I would expect hybrid to keep pow

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> 1 dollar = 1 vote is oligarchy, which is fine if that's what you want too. But yeah, I will not mine or contribute in any way to a system with PoS

and this is why keeping pow and 1 cpu 1 vote is important for balancing id say

the 1 xmr 1 vote also help financially to keep with market average gain and malicious actor who use this market average to growth their mean of attack

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> That’s a good idea

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> i dont care for marketcap as the priority, xmr should be spent. the only reason for a higher marketcap is that the network becomes more useful to more people. i.e. higher value capacity

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> what is wrong with oligarchy in this case? obviously the oligarchs want to keep their money safe. much more so then the plebs as they have much more money

<u​nt0ld:matrix.org> There need to be multiple layers of security. PoW+PoS.

sure xmr should be spend, but this 51% attack show that we suffer from an unbalancing economically when it come to securing blockchain through thermodynamic in a very sounding financial world

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> current rule of choosing the canonical chain is choosing the chain with the highest cum_diff, right? cum_diff is the summation of all the difficulty thresholds blocks had to overcome

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> let's say we choose the canonical chain based on the PoW hash.

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> in this scenario, nobody can comfortably keep building a private chain and be guaranteed that they can force a reorg whenever they wish to. they will have to publish blocks as fast as possible. otherwise, an honest miner can knock one of their blocks by having better PoW hash, thus invalidating the rest of the private chain.

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> how does a fresh node choose the canonical chain?

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> * let's say prior to the rule change, the blockchain progress is checkpointed. so, effectively, we can treat as if it's a brand new chain (in terms of block generation)

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> * ask peers for blocks, one by one

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> * if different blocks found at the same height, the one with the better PoW hash wins

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> i honestly disagree theres an oligarchy here too... xmr is the most equally distributed coin in existence

<b​arthman132:matrix.org> I mean I get what you’re trying to say, but monero has been stagnant in price for a long time and we do need the price for monero to go up

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> if you like the fundamentals of oligarchy, nothing wrong I guess. I got into crypto for decentralization. If it doesn't offer it, then I already get oligarchy bucks in my normal paychecks :)

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> if you really want to win: PoS. end tail emission. No inflation. there will only ever be 18 million monero. give stakers the tx fees. bitcoin is finished if we do this.

barthman, Im happy you understand this.. its not about making people rich or anything. Need *some* mechanic incentive at this point

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> i think you really need to take a breath... pos does not all of a sudden put xmr control under the hands of a few oligarchs who are allowed to censor transactions

while its a risk, the hybrid solution sound very good for all parties

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> but the fiat oligarchy inflates the plebs away while ours would be value preserving. we dont have state power and guns to force it down peoples throats. so we attract them with zero inflation

outside the extremist of one or the other solution maybe

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> hard disagree... xmr's emission curve is extremely skewed towards early adopters

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> but right now, I'm interested in everyone's opinion on my idea about using PoW hash to prevent reorgs

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> the biggest risk with a hybrid system is the implementation

I dont understand how zero inflation would make miner mine and people to stake, transaction fee only ?

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> if everyone early hodled, the price of xmr would be way higher. based on price vs btc alone I would say it's much more decentralized

<k​ill-switch:matrix.org> If all the PoW options go away, I'll reconsider if it had any advantages over my non-crypto options, but I got into Monero for the entirety of what was in the whitepaper. I don't really have a say in what happens to Monero other than my meager contributions; if it becomes uninteresting to me, so be it. Everyone is always looking for their best options of course

I agree there

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> you mean checkpoints?

<k​asmaristo:matrix.org> How would that work?

<n​eromonero1024:monero.social> yes

<u​nt0ld:matrix.org> As an urgent fix, why not increase the tx fees to increase the security budget? A Monero tx should not cost less than 2 cents or even 10. Monero having too little security budget is the reason for this shit show. You can't have a low mcap decentralized PoW coin that is secure but also low inflation and low fee. Impossible.

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> checkpoints are inherently centralized unless you are actually talking about anchoring to a bigger chain like Bitcoin or Ethereum

problem with that is botnet will reap out most of the profit that legit eddicated miner should take

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> hi585858: there is barely a cost to running a validator compared to mining. Because you don't need to buy expensive CPU hardware + pay for electricity. its in the self interest of large holder to protect the network with their stake. so transaction fees are enough for compensation stakers

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> hi585858: there is barely a cost to running a validator compared to mining. Because you don't need to buy expensive CPU hardware + pay for electricity. its in the self interest of large holders to protect the network with their stake. so transaction fees are enough for compensation stakers

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> hi585858: there is barely a cost to running a validator compared to mining. Because you don't need to buy expensive CPU hardware + pay for electricity. its in the self interest of large holders to protect the network with their stake. so transaction fees are enough for compensating stakers

im not against PoS system, but PoW give more chance for the little guy to speak and enter

in a world where botnet doesnt leech everything tho...

1 botnet is 1000 miner less and 10,000 of their direct social circle who wont heard positively about xmr

botnet create negative class of people who will hate xmr also

<n​oname-user0:matrix.org> running a node still costs.... for some networks to enable staking rewards, there's a minimum performance and uptime requirement. this is where the cost can be quantified.

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> hi585858: it is better for the little guy to have inflation free money. practically the little guy is losing money while mining. somebody has to pay for cpus and electricity. its a negative sum game

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> it is extremely low. round it down to zero / tx fees

If the economic never growth yes. This is why its primordial for XMR preservation to fallow market average