<a​mmortel:monero.social> Is there anything that prevents me from signing my transaction alone and not in a ring, sending to the actual adress and not to a one time adress, and not commiting to the output amount but instead reveal it ? Or can I just bypass All of monero's privacy features?

<s​trawberry:monero.social> Why would you want to do that

<a​mmortel:monero.social> I am curious

<s​trawberry:monero.social> You could choose bad decoys on purpose, not sure about the others

<s​trawberry:monero.social> but an easier way to leak everything is to publish your view key and tx keys

<s​trawberry:monero.social> the theme is it's possible to bypass the privacy features, but you can't do it by accident

<a​mmortel:monero.social> You could if you use a wallet Software that does it and you're unaware of it

<s​trawberry:monero.social> true, monero can't help if you're running a fake version of it

<a​mmortel:monero.social> monero could potentially help by adding validation rules of transactions that prevent such behavior

<j​babb:cypherstack.com> no, your tx will be rejected without a proper ring

<s​trawberry:monero.social> you can still fill the ring with provably spent outputs

<j​babb:cypherstack.com> not for long

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> its impossible

<s​trawberry:monero.social> I assume the current decoy selection algo can produce any valid ring? so there's none which can be rejected with 100% confidence

<s​pirobel:kernal.eu> the only solution is moving towards a place where decoys dont matter anymore

<s​trawberry:monero.social> that's kind of scary, imagine you get unlucky and it uses the first 15 outputs

<n​ihilist:nowhere.moe> seth is BACK

<3​21bob321:monero.social> Banned name

<3​21bob321:monero.social> Plz use correct name

<3​21bob321:monero.social> S*th ,sith or sith lord

<3​21bob321:monero.social> Or darth sethious

black

dsfadsf

test

tests

tests

tests

tests

tests

tests

tests

teststests

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tests

Stop spamming

<3​21bob321:monero.social> Your test is complete

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> yasabi: That doesn't work. MimbleWimble has a light node class where you only need the current UTXO set and the block headers. The obvious issue is you need the UTXO set. Monero can't determine the UTXO sender due to its sender privacy. MimbleWimble can as it doesn't have sender privacy.

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> Then there's the issue of how pruning the history does create different safety properties (hence why I'd call it a light node, but they're welcome to only guarantee their limited safety properties and accordingly have their limited guarantee nodes be full nodes).

<k​ayabanerve:matrix.org> strawberry: It's weighted towards the recent so that's not feasible. The node publishing the TX also sanity checks the distribution unless the caller disables said checks.

<s​nowman:tetaneutral.net> Is it possible to run monerod or Monero cli on one of the iOS terminal applications

<o​frnxmr:monero.social> Probably not

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> Technically yes, but probably not. It might end up being easier to just write a bare bones wallet for the math and use a relay to do the leg work. If you figure it out though let me know 😂

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> As long as you’re familiar with the different kinds of hashing and technologies used to create a transaction, you can quite easily do things like make mnemonics seeds, generate addessses, sign transactions (so long as you got the priv key. The. Just send signed txns to some random guys relay like Rucknium ‘s

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> The main problem with iOS specifically is long running tasks (even services), they have minimum interval 15 minute fetch period and are limited to between 6-10 seconds a run. Android has ways around it.

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> The first challenge is creating static binaries or native libraries! ;) you can start there

<k​ewbit:matrix.org> Checkout Monero-cpp / Monero-Java by @woodser on GitHub