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br-m<pinchas:nope.chat> hello
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br-m<pinchas:nope.chat> i'm looking for spirobel and getting concerned
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br-m<pinchas:nope.chat> it's been over 2 weeks with no response in private dm, and i find this suspicious happening after he got death threats. has anyone seen any recent activity or heard if he's alright?
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br-m<pinchas:nope.chat> github.com/spirobel
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br-m<pinchas:nope.chat> no commits in a long time
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> @pinchas:nope.chat: Sometimes, developers need to take a break
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plowsofpinchas there where zero commits between end of july mid august so inactivity is not out of the ordinary
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br-m<pinchas:nope.chat> i know, but when you add the context of him not responding to dms from me or other people he's close with, it's worrying
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> He's probably fine. Sometimes people burn out and need to take a break from everything
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br-m<pinchas:nope.chat> okay... i'm just asking if someone has seen spirobel. there's no need to be condescending
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> @pinchas:nope.chat: He posted on xwitter and then took a breaky
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br-m<lza_menace> crazy amounts of i2p nodes being added monero.fail/?chain=monero&network=mainnet&type=i2p - prob our friends at chainalysis
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> wild part is they have different downtimes
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> @lza_menace: Weird af
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> @lza_menace: I don't think Chainanal makes sense. As seen in that leaked video, they would host clearnet nodes to track IP addresses and connect that with other metadata they have
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> linkinglion, we know for fact runs i2p servers
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> How is that useful for them?
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> running i2p relays and nodes gives them potentially 2 or more hops
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> you can track tor/i2p if you control all of the hops
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Running the nodes they can set their own hops to 0
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: I'm pretty sure that's not possible with I2P, given how many nodes there are (more than Tor), and with Tor, they have trusted guard nodes to prevent that from happening
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> So instead of 6 total, its only 3
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> The probability of them controlling all hops is basically 0
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> the monero node i2p can be set to 0 hops
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Meaning there are only 3 hops
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> ☠️
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> What is the default value?
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Of those 3, there are probably 5000+ spy relays run by the same entity
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> @duckpondy:matrix.org: 3in 3 out = 6 total
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> you can reduce both sides to 0, to have a fast, encrypted tunnel, w/o privacy
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> The best thing to do is host your own node anyway. I don't recommend using remote nodes at all, though I guess you could use one for the initial sync
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> Apparently, you'll soon be able to torrent the chain, which will be cool to see
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Yeah, im just pointing out that a spy company that runs spynodes on xmr and btc, uses those exact same domaibs to run spy i2p relays
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> It wouldnt make much sense to run i2p relays, and not also run nodes/exits, so they can monitor the payload
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: Didn't 0xB10C suggest Dandelion++ to protect against this for BTC? Isn't that what Monero uses?
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Dandelion doesnt work if you're sybilled
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Also doesnt work if you dont have incoming connections
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> But I remember 0xB10C proposing D++ specifically to address the LinkingLion issue
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> It helps, for sure. But its not a fool-proof solution
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> b10c.me/observations/06-linkinglion
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> > A solution might be Dandelion (in particular, Dandelion++ or some modification of it), where transactions are first transmitted to another node, which then broadcasts it. Dandelion++ is beeing used in Monero since 2020. An implementation attempt in Bitcoin Core did not succeed primarily due to DoS and complexity concerns.
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> If you have real incoming connections and real outgoing connections, you have plausibly deny that you are the origin
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: If LinkingLion controls a majority of the nodes on the network, I guess that's where it doesn't work?
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> But lacking incoming connections = every stem you send will always be you as the origin
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> @duckpondy:matrix.org: They do control the majority of the ips
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> @ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: Right, so the nodes you host must be public to receive incoming connections?
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> > Transaction broadcast over privacy networks like Tor is not affected if done correctly. A strategy is to broadcast a transaction to a node on the Tor network using a fresh connection and then close the connection right after. > <@duckpondy:matrix.org> b10c.me/observations/06-linkinglion
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> and need to have good outgoing connections
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> Does Monero automatically do this?
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> @duckpondy:matrix.org: No, we have tx-relay
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Tx-relay uses a diff circuit for each outgoing onion peer, and you can also fluff directly to all peers at once
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> It doesnt drop connection as soon as tx is relayed
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> tx-relay adds plausible deniability to nodes that dont have incoming connections
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br-m<duckpondy:matrix.org> I was wondering: if you host an I2P/Tor node but don't have any real incoming or outgoing traffic, could it still be traced back to you?
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Technicall anonymous-inbound
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Since you can have incoming stem phase txs via anonymous inbound
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br-m<ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> Anonymous-inbound means that your node will still stem txs to clearnet, even if you have no incoming clearnet peers
36 minutes ago