-
MajesticBank
-
TrasherDK[m]
<monerobull[m]> "this kills the conversation 💀" <- Yes, please. Kill it already 😴
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
Pew pew
-
apotheon
Pew pew?
-
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
wtf?
-
plowsof11
i asked for more info and only got "version incompatibility error acfer ", any ideas BigmenPixel
-
plowsof11
s/acfer/after flatpak run
-
BigmenPixel[m]
-
BigmenPixel[m]
>
-
BigmenPixel[m]
> wtf?
-
BigmenPixel[m]
Wtf, it would be good if there is a github issue with info
-
plowsof11
cannot reproduce, closing for now, good job everyone
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
People are weird
-
susman1[m]
<red_cardinal[m]> "There's a long list of natural..." <- > <@red_cardinal:monero.social> There's a long list of natural resources of which the world's biggest consumer is the US military. The primary purpose of the US military is to (indirectly) maintain USD and UST as global reserve currency/asset, thereby allowing the creeps in the shadows to maintain control for their own benefit and at the cost of everyone else.
-
susman1[m]
>
-
susman1[m]
> As a general rule, anyone "left leaning" has a child-like understanding of economics, so is a hopeless case. There are always exceptions, of course.
-
susman1[m]
don't simply discount leftists like that be the bigger person bc this kinda behaviour leads to possibly wrong assumptions and echo chamber thinking there are some leftists who are adept at economics its just that it is somewhat subjective
-
susman1[m]
<ofrnxmr[m]> "My response is "youre on reddit,..." <- that is more of a player not the game type thing tho
-
susman1[m]
* don't simply discount leftists like that be the bigger person bc this kinda behaviour leads to possibly wrong assumptions and echo chamber thinking there are some leftists who are adept at economics its just that it is somewhat subjective, its like when some auth people say libertarians are retarded same with college educated liberals the same about conservatives don't turn an argument into an ego boost
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
is cryptogrampy around the matrix?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
I would like to ask him some questions about his android-termux-monero-node project
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
if you see him, please tell him to DM me.
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
btw, you can join #yolgezer:karapara.net to discuss about running a monero node on your android device
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
🤦♂️
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
what is the world record for syncing a full monero node in shortest amount of time?
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
Ravfx did hdd/ssd testing
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
They might know
-
sech1
World record doesn't mean much because a few months later it will take more time anyway
-
sech1
Right now it's 4-5 hours to sync a full node with 1 Gbit connection and a fast PC with NVMe SSD
-
sech1
Also, it's faster right after new release because new release has fresh checkpoints
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
then I should've asked "the world record for having GB/s synced.
-
sech1
you can compile a binary with fresh checkpoints to save a few hours of syncing in the end
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
k4r4b3y[m]1: > <@k4r4b3y:karapara.net> then I should've asked "the world record for having GB/s synced.
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
>
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
can be computed as the full blockchain size / total time it took to sync
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
sech1: > <@sech1:libera.chat> Also, it's faster right after new release because new release has fresh checkpoints
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
what are the functions of "checkpoints"? Am I trusting someone else with the state of the blockchain with them?
-
sech1
it's known block hashes (or hashes of each 256 consecutive blocks, I don't remember the details)
-
sech1
with these hashes, you're just choosing the "current" blockchain and make your binary ignore deep reorgs (deeper than the last checkpoint)
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
why are they needed? can't a node sync to a full blockchain without them?
-
sech1
node can sync without them, but it will be much much slower
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
also, aren't reorgs discarded by "eventual consistency" among the many numbers of nodes?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
you know, the most proof of work chain is the main one?
-
sech1
reorgs happen from one chain with X amount of PoW to another chain with more than X amount of PoW
-
sech1
if someone does 51% attack lasting for a long time, then nodes with checkpoints will ignore new chain even if it has more PoW
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
hmm..
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
does btc also make use of such checkpoints?
-
sech1
no idea
-
selsta
yes bitcoin also has checkpoints
-
selsta
though based on googling it it seems they removed them at some point
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
-
DanIsnotthemanBr
Yeah thats what i saw
-
selsta
monero checkpoints are usually weeks or months old, if there is a whole month of reorg there is a bigger issue anyway
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
so, in monero, these checkpoints are used for increasing the speed of the sync?
-
selsta
no
-
selsta
fast-sync and checkpoints are two separate things that sometimes get confused
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
so, the checkpoints in monero are used as part of the blockchain's security model?
-
selsta
fast-sync is a list of known hashes that reduce verification work during initial sync
-
selsta
checkpoints are to make sure you are on the right chain during initial sync and have the right difficulty
-
selsta
i don't know if they help with security, like i said there's often weeks or months between the latest checkpoint and current blockchain height, such large reorgs are not realistic unless the whole system is broken
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
selsta: > <@selsta:libera.chat> checkpoints are to make sure you are on the right chain during initial sync and have the right difficulty
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
I am not understanding why wouldn't a fres-syncing node be lead-astray during the initial sync?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
*why would
-
selsta
fres-syncing?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
fresh-syncing
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
why would a fresh-syncing node be lead-astray during initial block sync?
-
selsta
in case the node gets isolated from the network and only connects to malicious peers for example
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
is monero's node network still open to such attacks? still the attackers can outnumber the honest nodes?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
I would expect monero's network to be mature enough to have resilience against that, at this point.
-
selsta
every p2p network can be attacked this way
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
yeah, true. But having a large number of honest nodes counters this attack, no?
-
selsta
it's a theoretical thing
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
what's theoretical? the attack or having the resilience by large number of honests?
-
selsta
the attack
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
isn't such a "checkpoint" mechanism a form of centralization around some human institutions?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
is it being considered for discarding the checkpoints? like btc did apparently?
-
selsta
imo it's not centralization, as it only protects against attacks but there's no way it can be abused
-
selsta
everyone can run their own client without checkpoints
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
does monerod have an option (or, directive) for this to be placed in its config file?
-
plowsof11
relevant issue from tevador i think
monero-project/monero #8836
-
selsta
compile your own daemon
-
selsta
plowsof11: this is about fast-sync and not checkpoints
-
plowsof11
ah ok ok
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
plowsof11: > <@plowsof:matrix.org> relevant issue from tevador i think
monero-project/monero #8836
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
yes, this gave me a surprise
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
yeah, I know the current topic is about fast-sync and checkpoints, but also tevador's issue gives some concerns about actually having Monero network be decentralized when it comes to its blockchain state.
-
sech1
I was talking about fast-sync as "checkpoints" this whole time
-
sech1
there's a lot of confusion about this
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
it sure seems like it
-
plowsof11
XD
-
sech1
even the file is called "src\blocks\checkpoints.dat" in Monero repo
-
sech1
but it's for fast-sync
-
selsta
yes, that's where the confusion comes from
-
sech1
the "other" checkpoints were created to prevent attacks and have never been used IIRC
-
sech1
they're DNS-based
-
selsta
the DNS based ones have never been used
-
sech1
and by default they only print a warning
-
sech1
you need special command line to enforce them
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
<selsta> "in case the node gets isolated..." <- > <@selsta:libera.chat> in case the node gets isolated from the network and only connects to malicious peers for example
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
is this the only reason we have the checkpoints (the ones that protect against reorgs_?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
if so, can the protection from being isolated from the network be solved with getting people to run monero nodes?
-
selsta
they are so infrequently updated that i don't see a scenario where they help against reorgs
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
Why not remove them?
-
selsta
what harm do they cause?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
they give the impression that a human institution is still being trusted with monero's chain state.
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
imho
-
ofrnxmr[m]
You can just run with --disabke-dns-checkpoints
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Or something like that
-
ofrnxmr[m]
And also disabke fast sync, am i wrong?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
ofrnxmr[m]: > <@ofrnxmr:monero.social> Or something like that
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
I think the messages prior has shown that what we now talk about is different from dns checkpoints
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Can free-wheel it all day if you please
-
ofrnxmr[m]
But if you run a wownero node and witness a chainspit, you might want those checkpoints
-
selsta
i would like a scenario where hardcoded checkpoints harm decentralization that isn't impression based
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
ofrnxmr[m]: > <@ofrnxmr:monero.social> And also disabke fast sync, am i wrong?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
also, we have been talking about the "checkpoints" of the sort that "protect against reorgs", as far as I am understanding the convo
-
ofrnxmr[m]
There was even talk of decentraliz*ng the checkpoints sobthey are genersted distributed p2p every x blocks
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Im referring to both
-
ofrnxmr[m]
There are flags to disable checkpints and alsp fast sync
-
selsta
we could also remove prebuilt binaries because they "harm decentralization"
-
selsta
remove seed nodes
-
ofrnxmr[m]
You can do that too
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Free wheel it if you want. Nobody is stopping you
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
ofrnxmr[m]: > <@ofrnxmr:monero.social> Free wheel it if you want. Nobody is stopping you
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
give me the monerod flags to do that
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Monerodocs.org
-
ofrnxmr[m]
daemon page
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Ctrf f
-
ofrnxmr[m]
fast-sync
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Ctrl-f
-
ofrnxmr[m]
dns
-
ofrnxmr[m]
99% sure both are documented there
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
How do I locate the flag for disabling the reorg protection checkpoints?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
you are missing that kind of checkpoints still
-
ofrnxmr[m]
--disable-dns-checkpoints
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Or look at the termux node install script
-
selsta
dns checkpoints are never used anyway
-
ofrnxmr[m]
It disables em
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
selsta said you have to compile yourself for disabling the reorg checkpoints
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
there isn't a flag for that
-
selsta
yes
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
anyways I don't want to keep playing the devil's advocate here, as I am moving towards concern trolling
-
selsta
dns checkpoints are never used without enabling them with a flag, hardcoded checkpoints are added to the source code once per release and have to be removed from the source code
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
but I would like to say, I want to see monero rely on no-checkpoints for its chainstate in the near future.
-
sech1
dns checkpoints are not enforced by default
-
sech1
"./monerod --fast-block-sync 0" to disable fast-sync checkpoints
-
ofrnxmr[m]
selsta: this option doesnt skip them?
-
ofrnxmr[m]
--fast-block-sync Sync up most of the way by using embedded, "known" block hashes. Pass 1 to turn on and 0 to turn off. This is on (1) by default. Normally, for every block the full node must calculate the block hash to verify miner's proof of work. Because the CryptoNight PoW used in Monero is very expensive (even for verification), monerod offers skipping these calculations for old blocks. In other words, it's a mechanism to trust monerod
-
ofrnxmr[m]
binary regarding old blocks' PoW validity, to sync up faster.
-
sech1
--disable-dns-checkpoints just turns off the warning in case dns checkpoints and chain state mismatch
-
selsta
ofrnxmr[m]: this option disables fast-sync
-
sech1
turns off the warning and turns off dns updates
-
ofrnxmr[m]
sech1: I thiught it was other way around
-
ofrnxmr[m]
```
-
ofrnxmr[m]
--disable-dns-checkpointsThe MoneroPulse checkpoints set by core developers will be discarded. The checkpoints are apparently still fetched though.
-
ofrnxmr[m]
```
-
sech1
MoneroPulse checkpoints are not fast sync checkpoints
-
selsta
k4r4b3y[m]1: how does monero "rely" on checkpoints?
-
ofrnxmr[m]
so to clarify:
-
ofrnxmr[m]
fast sync =/= hard coded checkpointsc disabling fast sync doesnt effect them
-
ofrnxmr[m]
dns checkpoints = are still used and it just turns off the logging?what?
-
ofrnxmr[m]
Disable-dns-checkpoints*
-
sech1
all wrong :D
-
sech1
fast sync checkpoints are hardcoded
-
sech1
dns checkpoints are not used and were never used
-
ofrnxmr[m]
My understanding:
-
ofrnxmr[m]
- fast sync = hardcoded checkpoints = disable fast sync will skip checkpoints.
-
ofrnxmr[m]
- disable dns checkpoints = still fetched but not used or logged
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
selsta: > <@selsta:libera.chat> k4r4b3y: how does monero "rely" on checkpoints?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
as far as I could understand, they seem to offer protection against a few weeks' of reorgs for the nodes that are still syncing the blockchain?
-
sech1
they're used to speed up sync, nothing more
-
selsta
-
sech1
"few weeks reorg" is only a theoretical scenario
-
selsta
this is what i call hardcoded checkpoints
-
sech1
if it happens for real, checkpoints will be the least of problems
-
selsta
having two things with the name checkpoint is unfortunate lol
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
there seems to be two camps in this chat so far: First camp says that the reorg-checkpoints are used for a few weeks of reorgs for the syncing nodes. The second camp says that they are solely for speeding up the sync. Am I understanding this correctly?
-
sech1
"he reorg-checkpoints are used for a few weeks of reorgs for the syncing nodes" whaaaat
-
ofrnxmr[m]
<sech1> "all wrong :D" <- I dont know wth i typed, but i dont even understand it. Apologies
-
sech1
"few weeks of reorgs" is not even correct description of what you're trying to say
-
sech1
"reorg few weeks deep" is probably better
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
<sech1> "with these hashes, you're just..." <- > <@sech1:libera.chat> with these hashes, you're just choosing the "current" blockchain and make your binary ignore deep reorgs (deeper than the last checkpoint)
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
.
-
Rucknium[m]
Will monerod ignore a block that has more proof-of-work at a particular block height than the "checkpoints"? I don't think so (please confirm, selsta). I don't think it offers re-org "protection". Just declare that the transactions contained in those hard-coded block hashes are valid, so monerod does not verify all the cryptography in those transactions (which is expensive!).
-
sech1
it will ignore is this block is built on top of chain that forks before the last checkpoint
-
sech1
*if this
-
sech1
"Just declare that the transactions contained in those hard-coded block hashes are valid" or maybe this, actually
-
selsta
Rucknium[m]: what you are saying is correct for fast-sync, it's just a list of known hashes that partly skip verification
-
sech1
lol
-
sech1
so we were discussing non-issue
-
selsta
but there's also a checkpoint system
-
sech1
if it's a known "correct block" hash, then it's only for fast sync
-
selsta
like i linked previously
-
selsta
2851000, "5bf0e47fc782263191a33f63a67db6c711781dc2a3c442e17ed901ec401be5c9", "0x3b6cd8a8ed610e8
-
selsta
means block 20851000 has this hash and this difficulty
-
selsta
these get added once per release
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
selsta: > <@selsta:libera.chat> these get added once per release
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
and their function is ..?
-
sech1
ah, so these are actual stoppers
-
sech1
so there are 3 kinds of checkpoints now :D
-
selsta
k4r4b3y[m]1: they help when you are syncing from scratch and completely isolated from the network / only connected to malicious nodes
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
what a shitcoin /s
-
sech1
fast sync "src\block\checkpoints.dat" that's used only to speed up sync
-
selsta
yes
-
sech1
then there is src\checkpoints\checkpoints.cpp" that prevent syncing alternative chains beyond the latest checkpoint
-
sech1
and then there are DNS checkpoints which are not used :D
-
selsta
yep, and dns checkpoints are unused
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
selsta: > <@selsta:libera.chat> k4r4b3y: they help when you are syncing from scratch and completely isolated from the network / only connected to malicious nodes
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
so yeah, it seems like this is the point I wrote above: can getting more people to run nodes nullify having these blockhashes being hardcoded?
-
selsta
more nodes help but p2p networks will always be vulnerable to attacks like this
-
selsta
we also have other mitigations
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
am I getting my point across, that, having such hardcoded blockhashes are just aesthetically displeasing when viewed from decentralization of the chain?
-
selsta
yes, but i don't like to make decisions based on aesthetics or impressions
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
alright
-
selsta
i'm not even arguing for keeping them, but at the moment i don't see how they harm while they make it a bit harder for attackers
-
selsta
bitcoin is a more mature network with more nodes so it's easier for them to remove them
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
mature in the sense of having more nodes and more hashpower behind the chain?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
ah ok, you mentioned the nodes already
-
selsta
both
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
ye ye
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
do we have an estimation of maturity for monero, then? Like, having above X amount of nodes, and X Gh/s of hashpower will get Monero to the big-boys club?
-
selsta
i don't, it's probably arbitrary
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
but surely you seem to have a sense about it?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
since you are of the "feel" that monero isn't mature enough
-
sech1
src\checkpoints\checkpoints.cpp just fix the state of THE chain at the moment, I don't see how developers can centralize something here
-
sech1
THE chain = current consensus chain which is run by everyone at the moment
-
dMartian
System Information: Model: iMac (Retina 5K, 27-inch, Late 2015) • OS: macOS Monterey (Version 12.6.6, Build 21G646)
-
sech1
sure, they prevent new nodes from syncing other chains except for THE chain
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
sech1: > <@sech1:libera.chat> sure, they prevent new nodes from syncing other chains except for THE chain
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
this
-
sech1
which also prevents some DoS-attacks
-
sech1
like feeding new nodes with fake chains with millions of blocks
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
sech1: > <@sech1:libera.chat> like feeding new nodes with fake chains with millions of blocks
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
in this case, shouldn't the new node be contrasting the next-block data it gets from many different peers, and pick the consensus among them?
-
sech1
so if you remove these checkpoints, malicious nodes can cause big mess for new syncing nodes
-
sech1
new node can't pick the consensus before it validates everything until the last block
-
sech1
before it does, every candidate block is just that - a candidate
-
sech1
and it must verify everything before choosing
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
sech1: > <@sech1:libera.chat> so if you remove these checkpoints, malicious nodes can cause big mess for new syncing nodes
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
I am saying, Monero should have at least enough nodes at all times to prevent against such an attack, and nullify the need for a hardcoded hash in its codebase.
-
sech1
many honest nodes won't help
-
sech1
a few malicious nodes can connect to everyone and feed them fake chains (not really fake, just other chains with millions of blocks and low difficulty)
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
sech1: > <@sech1:libera.chat> a few malicious nodes can connect to everyone and feed them fake chains (not really fake, just other chains with millions of blocks and low difficulty)
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
yeah I get that. But is my node blindly accepting the suggestions from its one or two peers, and not comparing those block suggestions with the ones it gets from the 14, or 15 other peers it has?
-
sech1
if you go that way, welcome to Sybil attacks
-
sech1
node only respects PoW
-
sech1
because it can't trust anything any peer is saying before it's verified
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
Yeah, OK. Then isn't the new node comparing the suggested PoW's from all its peers and not blindly trusting the"few malicious nodes'" sugestions?
-
sech1
or hash checked with known hash
-
sech1
malicious peers can suggest PoW that's higher than the real chain PoW
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
I am struggling to say that, btc (seems like) it works without that hardcoded hash stuff
-
sech1
and force you to sync 10 million blocks before you find out it's an incorrect chain
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
why is my new node blindly trusting the pow suggestion from a "FEW" nodes that it has connected to, and why is it not comparing what the other 'HONEST' nodes that it ihas connected to suggests?
-
Rucknium[m]
k4r4b3y: Are you aware that bitcoin had block hash checkpoints in the past? According to Peter Todd, bitcoind still today will only accept a chain that has a block with a certain amount of PoW.
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
Rucknium[m]: > <@rucknium:monero.social> k4r4b3y: Are you aware that bitcoin had block hash checkpoints in the past? According to Peter Todd, bitcoind still today will only accept a chain that has a block with a certain amount of PoW.
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
yes, I am aware btc had those. But it seems like it doesn't have that anymore.
-
Rucknium[m]
k4r4b3y: You cannot guarantee that you've connected to any honest nodes in the beginning
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
Rucknium[m]: > <@rucknium:monero.social> k4r4b3y: You cannot guarantee that you've connected to any honest nodes in the beginning
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
and that's why we need to get more people running nodes.
-
sech1
something something Sybil attacks
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
Rucknium[m]: > <@rucknium:monero.social> k4r4b3y: You cannot guarantee that you've connected to any honest nodes in the beginning
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
Also I heard seed nodes are a thing?
-
k4r4b3y[m]1
ehhh, we are just circling each other's arguments at this point
-
sech1
seed nodes are a thing in any p2p network
-
sech1
how would you find the _first_ peer to connect to?
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sech1
if you don't have previously saved peer lists?
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k4r4b3y[m]1
sech1: > <@sech1:libera.chat> how would you find the _first_ peer to connect to?
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k4r4b3y[m]1
yes, and thus we have seed nodes. and thus rucknium's suggestion that "how do you know you've connected to any honest nodes" is moot
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sech1
how do you know seed nodes are honest?
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k4r4b3y[m]1
I gotta trust
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Rucknium[m]
You can say "find the seed node" (arguably a central thing) or "find blocks with these hashes" (arguably a central thing). If you have neither, then malicious parties can keep DDoSing infant nodes potentially.
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sech1
monerod doesn't make such assumption?
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sech1
seed nodes are the actual centralized part of the sync process
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sech1
which is why monerod doesn't assume anything about them being honest
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k4r4b3y[m]1
Rucknium[m]: > <@rucknium:monero.social> You can say "find the seed node" (arguably a central thing) or "find blocks with these hashes" (arguably a central thing). If you have neither, then malicious parties can keep DDoSing infant nodes potentially.
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k4r4b3y[m]1
I would take "find blocks with these hashes" anyday, instead of "find the seed node" directive. At least I can verify the hash of the genesis block in a way similar to verifying QubesOS developers' main air-gapped GPG fingerprint.
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Rucknium[m]
It may be good to compare the security budget of Monero today with that of bitcoin when it removed the block hash checkpoints.
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sech1
huh, so if someone cracks SHA256 and recalculates the whole BTC blockchain, they can erase all BTC history now? Funny
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k4r4b3y[m]1
sech1: > <@sech1:libera.chat> huh, so if someone cracks SHA256 and recalculates the whole BTC blockchain, they can erase all BTC history now? Funny
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k4r4b3y[m]1
yes it is over.
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k4r4b3y[m]1
cracking sha256 should kill btc, fair and square.
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Rucknium[m]
as in, number of coins in a day's worth of block rewards times the purchasing power of the coin unit
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sech1
Monero daily emission is is ~$65k
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sech1
Bitcoin is $25M
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sech1
380 times more
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Rucknium[m]
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Rucknium[m]
The youngest block in those checkpoints was in 2014
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Rucknium[m]
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ofrnxmr[m]
dMartian: your client is leaking
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toralien[m]
<k4r4b3y[m]1> "cracking sha256 should kill btc,..." <- > <@k4r4b3y:karapara.net> cracking sha256 should kill btc, fair and square.
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toralien[m]
>
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toralien[m]
sarcasm I suppose? because otherwise it's completely ogre
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toralien[m]
<ofrnxmr[m]> "dMartian: your client is..." <- how does ye know this
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ax[m]
What is the deference between transaction key and transaction hash?
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ax[m]
and how can I find my transaction key
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merope
<Rucknium[m]> "It may be good to compare the..." <-
moneroj.net/securitybudget
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merope
<sech1> "a few malicious nodes can..." <- Doesn't the consensus rule require the *highest cumulative pow*, and not just more blocks? So to pull that off, they'd have to pull a 51% over the entire history they're rewriting
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sech1
no, they can put fake high difficulty PoW blocks in the end and many low difficulty PoW blocks in the beginning
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sech1
so by the time your node bans them, it has downloaded many blocks
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merope
Oooh right
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Rucknium[m]
endor00: Thanks. So the last time Bitcoin had the security budget that Monero does now was in 2013 (ignoring inflation of the U.S. dollar). Bitcoin was still actively using checkpoints at that point. Case closed?
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xfedex[m]
Is it true that Monero got delisted from Binance in UE?
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cockliuser[m]
Appears to be so
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cockliuser[m]
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cockliuser[m]
XMR included
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cockliuser[m]
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DanIsnotthemanBr
Binance should de-listed binance at this point
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hbs[m]
Their notion of "privacy coins" seems kind of wide as SCRT is included in the list
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Alex|LocalMonero
<cockliuser[m]> "
cointelegraph.com/news..." <- Can't believe they called XMR a token
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DanIsnotthemanBr
Rude
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cockliuser[m]
Journalists being journalists
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DanIsnotthemanBr
De list them of localmonero
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DanIsnotthemanBr
:)
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DanIsnotthemanBr
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RavFX[m]
<DanIsnotthemanBr> "De list them of localmonero" <- Go there as a Russian (use a russian VPN) and tell me
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plowsof11
recent, 25 May 2023
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plowsof11
the blogpost on getmonero is soon to be released and will look something like this
deploy-preview-2170--barolo-time-75…0block-old-decoy-selection-bug.html
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toralien[m]
<cockliuser[m]> "
cointelegraph.com/news..." <- are they pushing out regs independent of mica?
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toralien[m]
or is this in prep for 2024 enforcement of mica?
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cockliuser[m]
Probably prep
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cockliuser[m]
Can't get into trouble with meddling authorities
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hfclover[m]
<nix_lord_fomo[m]> "sorry about not using nitter 😂" <- People should be using libredirect or untrackme anyway. Anybody who roasts you for posting a twitter.com link is a noob.
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toralien[m]
hfclover[m]: true
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toralien[m]
cockliuser[m]: would LE be able to retroactively enforce something specifically for this?
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DanIsnotthemanBr
Sounds like an eu thing
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DanIsnotthemanBr
Some new law there trying to bring in too keep everyone say¡
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DanIsnotthemanBr
s/say/safe/
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cockliuser[m]
toralien[m]: Probably not but IANAL
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DanIsnotthemanBr
On ios you can create a shortcut if anyone is using that.
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idkrn[m]
<123bob123> "On ios you can create a shortcut..." <- You know I'm not